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INTEGRATE AND REACTIVATE THE 1968 FAIR HOUSING 
MANDATE 
  By Courtney L. Anderson ...................................................... 1 
 
The  Fair  Housing  Act  of  1968  (“FHA”)  was  created  to 
eliminate  discrimination  in  the  sale,  rental  and  financing  of 
housing,  and  to  mandate  affirmative  actions  be  taken  to 
develop fair housing throughout the United States.  Numerous 
scholars and practitioners have lamented both the failure of the 
FHA  to  enforce  its  sections  calling  for government  entities  to 
affirmatively  further  fair  housing,  and  the  narrow 
interpretation  of  the  FHA.    This  narrow  interpretation  has 
effectively  rendered  the  FHA  useless when  a  plaintiff  claims 
that environmental ills have reduced the value and livability of 
homes,  because  these  “non‐housing”  claims  are  too  far 
removed  from  the  acquisition  of  housing.    The  Office  of 
Housing  and  Urban  Development  (“HUD”)  has  set  forth  a 
Proposed Rule for assessing their compliance with section 3608 
of  the FHA by outlining a  comprehensive data  collection and 
reporting  process.    This  Article  suggests  a  benefit  of  the 
Proposed  Rule  left  unexplored  by  HUD:  this  Proposed  Rule 
both  supports  the  cognizance of non‐housing  cases under  the 
FHA  and will provide  the  statistical  evidence necessary  for  a 
plaintiff to make a prima facie case. 
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LA  GRAN  LUCHA: LATINA  AND LATINO LAWYERS, BREAKING 
THE  LAW  ON  PRINCIPLE,  AND  CONFRONTING  THE  RISKS  OF 
REPRESENTATION 
  By Marc‐Tizoc González ...................................................... 61 
 
In  a  time  when  people  in  the  United  States  have  been 
taking  to  the  streets  en  masse  to  protest  unjust  socio‐legal 
conditions  like police brutality and  the draconian enforcement 
of immigration laws, the time is ripe to reconceptualize what it 
means  to break  the  law on principle.   Twenty  five years  ago, 
Harvard Law Dean Martha L. Minow conceptualized “the risks 
of  representation”  for  lawyers  whose  clients  “entertain 
breaking  the  law as one of  their strategies  for achieving social 
change.”  Responding substantively to Minow’s ideas, Houston 
Law Professor Michael A. Olivas presented three case studies to 
illuminate  the  risks  of  nonrepresentation,  terminated 
representation, and truncated representation.   Taking  Minow’s 
and  Olivas’s  insights  seriously,  this  Article  applies  them  to 
current socio‐legal situations  in  the United States,  like Central 
American  children  and  women  seeking  asylum,  immigrant 
workers  at  industrial  food  processing  plants,  and  social 
activists  indicted by racially compromised grand  jury systems.  
Delving  deeply  into  the  ethical  implications  of  representing 
clients “when  the state regime  is  the  law breaker,”  this Article 
proffers  the  concept  of  la  gran  lucha  (the  great  struggle)  to 
advance  “the  understanding  that  our  pasts  are  not  merely 
multicolored:  rather,  our  diverse  heritages  wind  through 
centuries of  socio‐legal  struggles, which  transcend  the current 
nation  state.”    The  Article  concludes  by  presenting  a  partial 
history  of Chicana/o  and  other Mexican American  lawyers  in 
California  and  Texas  in  order  to  contextualize  the  efforts  of 
lawyers,  and  clients, who  seek  to  create  social  change  today 
within actual lineages of and fictive genealogies of past lawyers 
who confronted the risks of representation. 
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THE OBERGEFELL  MARRIAGE  EQUALITY  DECISION,  WITH  ITS 
EMPHASIS ON HUMAN DIGNITY, AND A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
TO FOOD SECURITY 
  By Maxine D. Goodman ..................................................... 149 
 
Today,  the  welfare  rights  movement  has  faltered.  
However,  the  Supreme  Court’s  recent  marriage  equality 
decision, with its emphasis on human dignity, lends hope to the 
notion that the Court should also acknowledge a right to food 
security.    This  Article  identifies  the  role  human  dignity  has 
served  in  the  Court’s  constitutional  analysis  to  acknowledge 
and  protect,  for  example,  rights  to  privacy,  to  travel,  to  be 
heard,  to  self‐representation,  to marry,  to  speak  freely, and  to 
preserve bodily integrity.   According to the Court, these rights 
are all a part of liberty.  Arguably, and as FDR said, “[i]f, as our 
Constitution  tells us, our Federal Government was established 
among other things, to ‘promote general welfare,’ it is our plain 
duty to provide for that security upon which welfare depends.” 
This Article briefly examines food insecurity in the United 
States,  showing  that  approximately  17  million  households  in 
this  country  suffer  from  food  insecurity.    This  section  also 
identifies  the  Court’s  jurisprudence  regarding  welfare  rights, 
describing  cases  from  the  early  1970s  forward  that  have 
routinely favored the government.  The article’s crux is the five 
arguments why the Court should acknowledge a constitutional 
right  to  food  security,  discounting  those  arguments 
commentators routinely wage against such a right. 
Scholars have written on human dignity as a constitutional 
value.    This  Article  stands  apart  by  linking  the  Court’s 
treatment  of human dignity  to  a  right  to  food  security  based 
largely on the role human dignity has played in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, most recently in Obergefell v. Hodges.  The Article 
also  debunks  the  five  main  arguments  commentators  level 
against the Court protecting such a right, and, ideally, sets the 
stage  for  renewed  efforts  by  lawyers  and  commentators  to 
pursue a fundamental right to food security. 
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NOTE 
 
POLICE TERROR AND OFFICER INDEMNIFICATION 
  By Allyssa Villanueva  ......................................................... 201 
   
  Police accountability has quickly pressed  to  the  forefront 
of  national  conversations  and  subsequently,  the  national 
political agenda.  Increasing prevalence of excessive and lethal 
use  of  force  by  police  officers  induced  this  attention.  
President  Obama  convened  a  Task  Force  on  21st  Century 
Policing,  after  the  Department  of  Justice  conducted  several 
pattern and practice investigation of misconduct following the 
high‐profile  deaths  of  unarmed  Michael  Brown  and  Eric 
Garner.    Their  deaths  both  resulted  in  no  criminal  charges 
against responsible officers.  Civil suit was the only option left 
for officer accountability. 
This  Note  addresses  the  use  of  42  U.S.C.  §1983  as  the 
common  civil  cause  of  action  to  recover monetary  damages 
and  declarative  relief  against  law  enforcement  officials 
following  lethal use of force against civilians.   This Note also 
focuses on  the  role of government  indemnification of officer 
defense and any resulting monetary awards.  Indemnification 
conflicts with  the purpose of Section 1983  to provide a cause 
of action against law enforcement agents who engage in abuse 
of power.  Indemnification does not serve deterrence by (near) 
complete  alleviation  of  any  individual  liability  and  stake  in 
civil  litigation  resulting  from  an  officer’s use  of  lethal  force.  
This Note concludes with a call to local governments to act by 
limiting  indemnification  coverage  in  cases  of  lethal  force 
and/or  findings  of  intentional  or  reckless  misconduct  in  a 
court of law. 
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[1] 
Integrate and Reactivate the 1968 
 Fair Housing Mandate  
 
COURTNEY LAUREN ANDERSON* 
Introduction 
The Fair Housing Act (“FHA” or “Act”) was enacted in 1968 with 
the objective to “provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair 
housing throughout the United States.”1  The racial segregation and 
tensions that were rampant throughout the United States in the 1960s 
were the genesis of this legislation, which aimed to create a more 
integrated society.2  The FHA bans practices that are motivated by a 
 
 * Courtney Lauren Anderson is an Assistant Professor of Law at Georgia State 
University College of Law.  The author wishes to thank Professors Natsu Saito, Tanya 
Washington, and Florence W. Roisman for graciousness and valuable feedback.  The 
author also wishes to thank all who provided feedback at the 38th Annual Health 
Law Professors Conference, and the faculty at Georgia State Law.  The author’s 
research assistants Christian Dennis and Mark Moore were also integral parts of the 
conceptualization and creation of this Article. 
1.  Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968). 
2.  See 114 CONG. REC. 2985 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (noting that Title 
VIII will establish “a policy of dispersal through open housing . . . look[ing] to the 
eventual dissolution of the ghetto and the construction of low to moderate income 
housing in the suburbs.”).  See also Stanley P. Stocker-Edwards, Black Housing 1860–
1980: The Development, Perpetuation, and Attempts to Eradicate the Dual Housing Market 
in America, 5 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 50 (1988).  Senator Walter Mondale stated that 
Title VIII represents “an absolutely essential first step” toward reversing the pattern 
of “two separate Americas constantly at war with one another.”  114 Cong. Rec. 2274 
(1968).  See also id. at 2524 (Statement of Sen. Brooks) (“Discrimination in the sale and 
rental of housing has been the root cause of the widespread patterns of de facto 
segregation which characterizes America’s residential neighborhoods.”).  See also 
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racially discriminatory purpose, as well as those that “have a 
disparate impact on minorities.3  Considered as a whole, the Act is 
designed to fulfill “the goal of open, integrated residential housing 
patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of 
racial groups.”4 
The FHA has failed in its integrationist mission.  A contributing 
factor to this failure is the narrow view that courts take when 
presented with a case that implicates the FHA.  Nearly every 
instance—and these instances are few and far between—of plaintiffs 
successfully bringing a claim under the FHA involves a case in which 
the claimant alleges explicitly discriminatory intent that prohibited a 
protected class from acquiring access to housing.5  Clearly, such 
obvious prejudiced incidents are in line with what the FHA seeks to 
prohibit.  To illustrate, section 3604 of the FHA makes it unlawful to 
“refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a 
dwelling to any person because of race.”6  This Section is meant to 
prohibit acts and laws that prevent certain individuals from attaining 
housing due to their membership in a protected class.7  However, the 
section 3604 mandate to affirmatively further fair housing requires 
more than a reactionary punishment to a narrow category of cases.8  
 
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (stating the FHA’s goal of 
creating “truly integrated and balanced living patterns” (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 2706, 
3422 (1968))); Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 
F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The [Fair Housing] Act is concerned with ending 
racially segregated housing.”). 
3.  See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
4.  Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Action 
must be taken to fulfill, as much as possible, the goal of open, integrated residential 
housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial 
groups whose lack of opportunities the Act was designed to combat.”). 
5.  Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977); 
see, e.g., Williamson v. Hampton Mgmt. Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972).  See, 
e.g., Kormoczy v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 53 F.3d 821, 822–24 (7th 
Cir. 1995). 
6.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2015). 
7.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2015). 
8.  42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2015). 
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Section 3608 of the FHA requires “all executive departments and 
agencies [to] administer their programs and activities relating to 
housing and urban development (including any federal agency 
having regulatory or supervisory authority over financial institutions) 
in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of the [FHA].”9  
Although this language may seem revolutionary on its face, the 
ambiguity and lack of substantive remedies that has been afforded in 
the clause reduces the meaningful and practical impact it will have. 
On July 19, 2013, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) sought to change this by issuing a proposed 
rule titled “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” (“Proposed 
Rule”).10  The stated purpose of this rule is to provide recipients of 
HUD funds with the tools they need to fulfill their statutory obligation 
“to take steps proactively to overcome historic patterns of 
segregation, promote fair housing choice, and foster inclusive 
communities for all.”11  The tools that HUD will provide include data 
describing the demographics of neighborhoods, the disproportionate 
housing needs of protected classes, integration and segregation 
trends, and the racial and ethnic makeup of areas that have high 
concentrations of poverty.12  HUD will also detail the proximity of 
neighborhoods to critical assets and stressors, such as schools, 
transportation, environmental hazards, and employment 
opportunities.13  HUD is providing this data in order to reduce the 
time, effort, and expense that HUD program participants currently 
have to expend in collecting this material.14  HUD grantees will use 
this data to assess determinants of fair housing, set fair housing 
priorities and goals, devise action plans to better affirmatively further 
fair housing, namely through the enhanced coordination among 
community and investment planning, and public sector housing 
 
9.  42 U.S.C. § 3608(c) (2015). 
10.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43710 (proposed July 19, 
2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576 & 903). 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 42272 (July 16, 
2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576 & 903). 
4 ANDERSON MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2015  8:51 AM 
4 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIII 
decisions.15  Recipients of HUD funds transmit this information to the 
agency via the Assessment of Fair Housing, which will replace the 
Analysis of Impediments.16  This Assessment of Fair Housing is 
designed to analyze fair housing patterns and obstacles.17  HUD also 
intends for this data to assist other government agencies with their 
planning policies, and dissemination of pertinent civil rights data to 
public and private stakeholders.18  In addition to providing the data 
described above, HUD will incorporate fair housing planning into 
other development initiatives.  These initiatives include community 
development, and land-use policies.19  The Proposed Rule also 
purports to encourage collaborations across regions20 and that fair 
housing practices live.21 
The Proposed Rule takes an expansive view of affirmatively 
furthering fair housing as exemplified by its intent to “reduce 
disparities in access to key community assets based on race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability, thereby 
improving economic competitiveness and quality of life.”22  This 
language shows a significant shift from court opinions discussing this 
FHA issue that have sought to “prevent low cost public housing units 
[from being constructed] in neighborhood[s] where they do not 
belong.”23  Despite the promise of this broad interpretation of the 
FHA’s intent, HUD has limited its prediction of the impact of the 
Proposed Rule to administrative niceties.  These include alleviating 
the burden of compiling data on § 3608 and providing clarity on an 
admittedly confusing an ineffective procedure, Analysis of 
Impediments, that currently measures compliance with the 
 
15.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 42272 (July 16, 
2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576 & 903). 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43710. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42273. 
23.  United States v. Yonkers Bd. Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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affirmatively furthering mandate.24 
This Article sees the potential in the Proposed Rule as extending 
beyond logistical ease.  HUD has provided the foundation to permit 
subject matters that indirectly affect housing, but directly affect the 
creation of integrated neighborhoods.  The Proposed Rule can also 
increase the data plaintiffs are required to provide to make a prima 
facie disparate impact case under the Act and supports the movement 
to permit individuals to bring a private right of action under the FHA 
without utilizing additional enforcement mechanisms. 
Part I of this Article provides a summary of the FHA, primarily 
sections 3604 and 3608, and gives insight into their intent,25 success, 
and shortcomings.  Part II describes the Proposed Rule, and how the 
creation of this rule was driven by a realization that increasing 
measurability and effectiveness of section 3608 required substantive 
remediation of the process by which this mandate is evaluated.  Part 
III critiques the Proposed Rule with particular emphasis on how HUD 
limits the very rule that it drafted by virtue of not acknowledging the 
far-reaching potential of the Proposed Rule.  Parts IV and V advance 
the promise of the Proposed Rule into substantive legal remediation 
by explaining how it can add the substance the lawmakers intended 
the FHA to possess. 
 
I.  The Fair Housing Act  
 
Part I provides an overview of the FHA of 1968, giving specific 
attention to its primary substantive sections, 3604 and 3608.26  Part A 
discusses the genesis of the FHA and its grounding in decades of 
pervasive racial segregation of housing.  This Part also analyzes the 
Act’s primary enforcement mechanisms to promote fair housing by 
prohibiting discriminatory intent in housing availability.  Part B looks 
at the requirement under section 3608 that government agencies 
 
24.  Kormoczy, 53 F.3d 821. 
25.  See generally Florence W. Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in 
Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333 (Summer 2007). 
26.  Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3608 (1968). 
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“affirmatively further fair housing.”27  Going beyond simply banning 
discriminatory behavior, the affirmatively furthering clause creates a 
duty for proactive measures in federal and state actions.  Part B also 
summarizes the requirements and challenges with judicial review and 
enforcement of those duties. 
 
A. Background and Purpose of the Fair Housing Act 
 
The FHA of 1968 seeks to eliminate bias in housing decisions in 
the United States.28  Namely, it prohibits discrimination in the sale, 
rental, and financing of housing on the basis of race or color, religion, 
sex, national origin, familial status, or disability.29  Originally 
introduced in 1966 by the Johnson administration, Congress passed 
the FHA in the wake of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination.30  
Because the final statutory language resulted from a Senate 
compromise amendment to an omnibus House civil rights bill, the 
legislative history is sparse with no committee reports, and the 
hearing records are limited to discussing the broad objective of ending 
urban racial ghettos.31  In the decades following its passage, most 
states and many local governments have enacted their own fair 
housing laws that are equivalent to the FHA.32 
Sections 3604 and 3608 of the FHA contain its primary 
substantive provisions.  Section 3604 prohibits discrimination in the 
sale or rental of a dwelling or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
sale or rental of a dwelling.33  Furthermore, it bars discrimination in 
the “provision of services or facilities in connection therewith.”34  This 
 
27.  42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1968). 
28.  42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2015). 
29.  Id. 
30.  Robert G. Schwemm, The Fair Housing Act After 40 Years: Continuing the Mission 
to Eliminate Housing Discrimination and Segregation: Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory 
Municipal Services Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 757 (2008). 
31.  Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and 3604(c): A New Look 
at the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 198 (2001). 
32.  Id. at 275. 
33.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b) (2015). 
34.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
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section also forbids discriminatory intent in representing dwelling 
availability for inspection, sale, or rental to a party.35  Likewise, it bans 
inducing or attempting to induce the sale or rental of a dwelling by 
appeal to the discriminatory motives of the seller.36  Combined, these 
provisions seek to eliminate the impact of discriminatory intent on the 
availability of housing, providing a cause of action where such 
conduct occurs. 
Section 3608(d) grants the Secretary of HUD the authority and 
responsibility to administer the provisions of the FHA.37  The Act as 
written does not sit passively, providing only a cause of action for an 
aggrieved party.  Rather, it creates a duty for all federal executive 
departments and agencies to affirmatively further fair housing.38  
Through a 1994 executive order, President Clinton expanded the 
authority of HUD and directed stronger measures be taken to 
affirmatively further fair housing in federal programs in order to 
better address still pervasive housing discrimination.39  The order also 
created the President’s Fair Housing Council, a cabinet level 
organization comprised of the heads of numerous executive agencies, 
designed to increase coordination across the executive branch in 
affirmatively furthering fair housing.40 
The FHA responds to a long history of racial discrimination in 
housing and in the United States.41  In the late nineteenth and early 
 
35.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). 
36.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(d). 
37.  42 U.S.C. § 3608(a). 
38.  42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (“All executive departments and agencies shall admin-
ister their programs and activities relating to housing and urban development 
(including any Federal agency having regulatory or supervisory authority over 
financial institutions) in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this subchapter 
and shall cooperate with the Secretary to further such purposes.” (emphasis added)). 
39.  Exec. Order No. 12892, 3 C.F.R. § 849 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3608 app. at 5012–14 (“If all of our executive agencies affirmatively further fair 
housing in the design of their policies and administration of their programs relating 
to housing and urban development, a truly nondiscriminatory housing market will 
be closer to achievement.”). 
40.  Id. 
41.  Swati Prakash, Comment, Racial Dimensions of Property Value Protection Under 
the Fair Housing Act, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1437, 1445–46 (2013). 
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twentieth century, racial segregation codified racial preferences 
through express racial zoning and racially restrictive covenants.  In 
Buchanan v. Warley, the Supreme Court of the United States struck 
down racial zoning as unconstitutional.42  Almost a decade later, in 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court decided to uphold 
zoning land by use and density, finding this a valid exercise of the 
police powers of local governments, which began the shift from de 
jure to de facto racial segregation.43  Justice Sutherland’s majority 
opinion gave segregationists their new argument by equating 
apartment buildings to a nuisance, particularly when placed next to 
single-family residential uses.44  As African Americans were much 
more likely to rent than own detached housing, segregating within 
residential uses acted as an effective proxy for race, justified in the 
name of preserving property values.45  Throughout the twentieth and 
into the twenty-first century, courts have upheld ordinances on the 
basis of preserving such values.46  This trend accelerated with post 
World War II “white flight” and the increasingly suburbanized 
sprawl of the new millennium.47 
Throughout the twentieth century, both public and private sector 
actions worked to create residential segregation.48  Initially, private 
homeowners sought to maintain white neighborhoods through the use 
of racially restrictive covenants.49  Even after the courts finally stopped 
enforcing these covenants in 1948, the growing real estate industry took 
up the gauntlet of maintaining residential segregation.50  It became 
common practice in the real estate industry to profit off white fears of 
 
42.  Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917) (holding racial zoning unconsti-
tutional on the limited basis racially based restraints on the alienation of property 
violated Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
43.  See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
44.  Id. at 394. 
45.  See William Collins and Robert Margo, Home Ownership and Race from the End 
of the Civil War to the Present, 101 AM. ECON. REV., 355 (May 2011). 
46.  Prakash, supra note 41, at 1483. 
47.  Id. at 1454. 
48.  Id. at 1455. 
49.  Id. at 1457. 
50.  See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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racial minorities though “panic selling” in transitional neighborhoods 
and “blockbusting.”51  The federal government supported residential 
segregation housing through mortgage guarantee programs that 
refused to insure or subsidize home mortgages in integrated 
neighborhoods, justified as market-based risk aversion.52  The federal 
government also subsidized public infrastructure, such as highways 
and utility improvements, which were specifically sited to impact racial 
minority housing.53  These impacts were self-reinforcing as local 
governments zoned more industrial and commercial development near 
the new infrastructure, causing increasingly harmful externalities to 
minority communities.54  Today, the cycle continues as remediation of 
“blight” has become the justification for widespread destruction and 
redevelopment of minority residential neighborhoods.55 
The FHA directly addresses many of these historical issues: section 
3604 directly attacks discriminatory intent in housing availability.56  
This section bans not only baseline bias and discrimination, but also 
responds directly to the practices of the real estate industry that were 
prevalent throughout the last century.  Section 3608 addresses the more 
ambitious goal of eliminating disparate impact.57  The section’s 
affirmatively furthering requirement responds to the federal 
government’s practices that, while at least seeming facially neutral or 
market-based, had the real effect of entrenching and subsidizing 
racially segregated housing patterns.58 
Although the FHA professed noble goals, the Act as passed in 
1968 included enforcement mechanisms too weak to effectively 
enforce the antidiscrimination provisions.59  Originally, private 
 
51.  Prakash, supra note 41, at 1460. 
52.  Id. at 1454. 
53.  Id. at 1456. 
54.  Prakash, supra note 41, at 1452. 
55.  Id. at 1456. 
56.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). 
57.  42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2015). 
58.  See 42 U.S.C. § 3608. 
59.  Melissa Rothstein & Megan K. Whyte, Issue Brief, Teeth in the Tiger: 
Organizational Standing as a Critical Component of Fair Housing Act Enforcement 3 AM. 
CONST. SOC’Y (Apr. 2012) https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Rothstein_
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enforcement provided only nominal relief, and federal agencies 
enforced mere handfuls of cases over the first two decades of the Act’s 
existence.60  Congress sought to redress the lack of enforcement by 
passing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.61  The 
amendments added an administrative enforcement procedure, which 
can impose civil fines of up to $10,000 for the first offense, $25,000 for 
the second offense within five years, and $50,000 after two or more 
offenses within seven years.62  Congress also toughened private 
enforcement by removing the $1,000 cap on punitive damages and 
authorizing the award of attorneys’ fees to all successful plaintiffs.63  
Finally, Congress added disabled persons and families with children 
as protected classes.64 
While generally positive, many commentators still express 
disappointment with the FHA’s impact.65  In particular, the FHA’s 
failure to provide relief for plaintiff’s bringing disparate impact claims 
has become more pronounced in the last couple of decades.66  
Unfortunately, the statute has been unable to correct the implicit and 
systemic bias underlying and maintaining segregation.67  Only 
 
and_Whyte_-_Organizational_Standing1.pdf. 
60.  Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812(c), 82 Stat. 73, 82 (1968) 
(limiting the remedies for private civil enforcement to injunctive relief, actual 
damages, and $1,000 in punitive damages); James A. Kushner, An Unfinished Agenda: 
The Federal Fair Housing Enforcement Effort, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 348 (1988) (finding 
that U.S. Department of Justice had handled approximately 30 FHA cases by 1979 but 
dropped to virtually nonexistent enforcement throughout the early years of the 
Regan administration). 
61.  Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 
(1988). 
62.  42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) (2015). 
63.  42 U.S.C. § 3613(a), (c) (2015). 
64.  42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606. 
65.  Prakash, supra note 41, at 1461–62. 
66.  Stacey E. Seichshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate 
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. 
L. REV. 357 nn.221-22 (2013). 
67.  Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live? Class and the Limitations of Fair 
Housing Law, 35 URB. L. 399, 469–70 (2003) (“Housing discrimination and racial 
segregation, while they are intimately related, are not the result of the same set of 
factors.  Achieving racial integration would require an assessment of the interaction 
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focusing on the transactional aspects of housing is insufficient to 
correct pervasive segregation.  Unfortunately, recent court decisions 
are narrowing the focus of FHA enforcement to just those 
transactional aspects by construing it to only apply to actions taken 
before or during acquisition of the property.68  These cases severely 
limit the potential extension of FHA’s enforcement mechanisms to 
related non-housing issues—those that do not directly affect the 
ability of those residents to live where they desire—or to protect 
critical neighborhood assets. 
 
B. Affirmatively Furthering Clause 
 
With the affirmatively furthering clause, Congress expressed a 
goal much broader than merely providing a mechanism to redress 
discriminatory intent.  Indeed, one of the early FHA cases decided by 
the Supreme Court of the United States noted that the legislative 
intent of the clause created an obligation for proactive measures to 
address existing segregation and related barriers.69  Lower courts have 
supported this interpretation of the affirmatively furthering clause, 
requiring recipients of federal HUD funds do more than simply not 
discriminate; rather, they must actively promote integration.70 
The FHA leaves the precise scope of the affirmatively furthering 
 
of race and class in the creation of American communities.”). 
68.  See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 742–43 (5th Cir. 2005) (“§ 3604(a) gives 
no right of action to current owners claiming that the value or ‘habitability’ of their 
property has decreased due to discrimination in the delivery of protective city 
services.”); Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 
327 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding § 3604(a) was designed only to address “the widespread 
practice of refusing to sell or rent homes in desirable residential areas to members of 
minority groups”). 
69.  Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211 (‘‘the reach of the proposed law was to replace the 
ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living patterns’‘‘ (quoting Sen. Walter F. 
Mondale)). 
70.  See, e.g., Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 816, 821–
22 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding that the FHA requires HUD to affirmatively further fair 
housing by considering the racial and socioeconomic effects of its site selection 
decisions for public housing). 
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clause to the determination of the Secretary of HUD.71  Interpreting 
the Act and subsequent executive orders, HUD places a number of 
affirmative duties on funding recipients.  The primary requirement is 
that any federal or state agency receiving federal housing funds must 
analyze “impediments” to fair housing in their program and “take 
appropriate actions to overcome the effects of any impediments 
identified through that analysis.”72  This most often affects local 
governments through participation in the Community Development 
Block Grant (“CDBG”) program, a common source of federal funding 
for the revitalization of low-income communities.73  HUD’s Fair 
Housing Planning Guide provides local government CDBG recipients 
with requirements for the analysis of impediments as well as best 
practices for implementation of programs that actively reduce the 
barriers to fair housing.74  After completing the analysis, each funding 
recipient must submit a written affirmation certifying that the program 
will affirmatively further fair housing.75  Other requirements for certain 
HUD grants include development of five-year comprehensive housing 
affordability strategies and implementation plans.76 
Despite steps taken to increase implementation of fair housing in 
the regulatory and administrative setting, today’s potential plaintiffs 
face significant problems enforcing the affirmatively furthering clause 
of section 3608.  The first hurdle for a plaintiff is the issue of standing, 
because the FHA does not create a private enforcement provision to 
challenge the actions of HUD or funding recipients, for failing to meet 
their obligations under section 3608.77  Private parties seeking to 
enforce section 3608 have turned to the Administrative Procedures 
 
71.  42 U.S.C. § 3608(a). 
72.  24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1) (2015). 
73.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., THE IMPACT OF CDBG SPENDING ON 
URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS (2002). 
74.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., Fair 
Housing Planning Guide (1996), http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf. 
75.  Id. 
76.  42 U.S.C. § 12705 (2012). 
77.  Rothstein & Whyte, supra note 59, at 10. 
4 ANDERSON MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2015  8:51 AM 
Winter 2016] FAIR HOUSING MANDATE 13 
Act (“APA”),78 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the False Claims Act (“FCA”)79 
for standing to enforce the mandate.80 
In 1970, Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development became the first appellate decision involving section 
3608, establishing a private party’s right to challenge HUD’s actions 
under the affirmatively furthering mandate.81  In Shannon, a group of 
local resident plaintiffs challenged HUD’s decision to fund a public 
housing project that they claimed would increase racial 
concentrations in that portion of Philadelphia.82  The court held 
judicial review of agency’s compliance with section 3608 was 
available pursuant to the APA.83  More importantly, Shannon set the 
tone for all future FHA litigation by establishing the proposition that 
the purpose of the FHA, specifically section 3608, was racial 
integration for the benefit of entire communities and not merely to 
prevent discrimination against individual minorities.84  Other section 
3608 cases also endorsed this proposition.85 
These initial cases established a broad view of which aggrieved 
parties were within the “zone of interest” required for standing under 
the APA.86  All plaintiffs must pass the threshold question for APA 
 
78.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2015). 
79.  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2015). 
80.  Rothstein & Whyte, supra note 59, at 10. 
81.  Shannon, 436 F.2d at 820. 
82.  Id. at 811–12. 
83.  Id. at 820. 
84.  Shannon, 436 F.2d at 816–17. 
85.  See, e.g., Clients’ Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1425 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Alschuler v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 482 (7th Cir. 1982); Jorman 
v. Veterans Admin., 579 F. Supp. 1407, 1418 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Young v. Pierce, 544 F. 
Supp. 1010, 1017-18 (E.D. Tex. 1982); Schmidt v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 505 F. Supp. 988, 
996-97 (D. Mass. 1981); Blackshear Residents Org. v. Hous. Auth. of Austin, 347 F. 
Supp. 1138, 1146 (W.D. Tex. 1972). 
86.  Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987) (“The ‘zone of 
interest’ test is a guide for deciding whether, in view of Congress’ evident intent to 
make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard 
to complain of a particular agency decision.  In cases where the plaintiff is not itself 
the subject of the contested regulatory action, the test denies a right of review if the 
plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes 
implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to 
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suits: whether they are sufficiently aggrieved by agency action to gain 
standing.87  The test for standing in this case is whether the interest 
they are claiming was harmed was an interest Congress intended to 
protect.88  In Shannon, the Third Circuit held plaintiffs’ interest in 
challenging discriminatory site selection for subsidized housing was 
within the “zone of interest” Congress intended to protect with the 
FHA.89  The Shannon plaintiffs argued that a concentration of low rent 
public housing located in an area of minority “racial concentration” 
would have adverse social and planning consequences.90  In its first 
FHA case, decided in 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States 
endorsed this broad purpose, finding Congress’s intent was to replace 
racial ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”91 
Soon after Shannon, the Second Circuit further expanded the 
interpretation of section 3608’s broad goal of racial integration.92  In 
Otero v. Park City Housing Authority, minority families challenged the 
New York City Housing Authority’s (“Authority”) decision not to 
give displaced minority families first priority in leasing a HUD-
funded affordable housing development.93  The Authority based its 
decision on its duty under section 3608 to promote racial integration, 
and gave some white families priority in moving into the majority 
non-white area.94  The Second Circuit upheld the Authority’s position, 
stating that the Authority was obligated “to take affirmative steps to 
promote racial integration even though this may in some instances not 
operate to the immediate advantage of some non-white persons.”95 
Unfortunately for private proponents of the affirmatively 
furthering mandate, the APA provides few remedies, and then only 
 
permit the suit.  The test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there 
need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.”). 
87.  Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2015). 
88.  Shannon, 436 F.2d at 818. 
89.  Id. at 818. 
90.  Id. at 819. 
91.  Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211. 
92.  Otero, 484 F.2d at 1124. 
93.  Id. at 1125–29. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. at 1124–25. 
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after highly deferential judicial review.  First, the APA limits claims 
to review of federal agency action, providing no relief for state or local 
agency actions.96  Even when reviewing a federal agency’s actions, 
review is highly deferential and limited to enjoining actions that are 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law.”97 
On its face, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seems to fill the gap by creating a 
private cause of action directly against state and local housing agencies.  
Any agency accepting HUD funding is subject to the affirmatively 
furthering mandate, and § 1983 provides a wide spectrum of relief for 
the deprivation of any civil or constitutional rights, including 
monetary, punitive, injunctive, and declarative relief.98  Unfortunately, 
recent case law has called into question the broad standing of private 
plaintiffs under § 1983.99  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
recently held that private enforcement of federal funding provisions 
under § 1983 require an “unambiguously conferred right.”100  The 
vagueness of section 3608’s affirmatively furthering mandate makes 
one question whether Congress unambiguously intended an 
individually enforceable right, especially considering the section’s 
textual concern of controlling regulatory agencies.  Recent courts have 
split on whether section 3608 is enforceable through § 1983.101  As a 
result, at this time § 1983 is not a viable option for widespread private 
enforcement of the affirmatively furthering mandate. 
Recently, Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York, Inc. v. 
Westchester County breathed new life into private enforcement of 
 
96.  See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1966). 
97.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1966). 
98.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
99.  Rothstein & Whyte, supra note 59, at 11. 
100.  Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279–283 (2002) (“We made clear that 
unless Congress speak[s] with a clear voice,’ and manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent 
to confer individual rights, federal funding provisions provide no basis for private 
enforcement by § 1983.”). 
101.  Compare Wallace v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 298 F. Supp.2d 710, 714 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
and Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp.2d 33 (D. Mass. 2002) with S. 
Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham, No. 07-12018-DPW, 
2008 WL 4595369, at *14–*16 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2008) and Thomas v. Butzen, No. 04 
C 5555, 2005 WL 2387676, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2005). 
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section 3608.102  In a novel legal move, a private advocacy 
organization, the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York 
(“ADC”), sued Westchester County, an affluent predominately white 
suburb of New York City.103  On behalf of a multi-government 
consortium, Westchester County obtained approximately $50 million 
in federal CDBG funds from HUD between 2000 and 2006.104  ADC 
sued under the FCA, a federal statute dating back to the Civil War, 
which authorizes private parties to bring qui tam suits in the name of 
the United States government against parties who have submitted 
false or fraudulent claims to the federal government for payment.105  
ADC alleged that Westchester County falsely certified to HUD that it 
conformed to the affirmatively furthering mandate during the 
challenged funding period.106 
Successful FCA claims require showing that the fraud was 
knowingly committed.107  Furthermore, the statute imposes a high 
evidentiary burden by requiring the enforcing party to rely on 
evidence not readily available to the public.108  The ADC based its FCA 
claim on internal documents obtained through New York’s Freedom 
of Information Law.109  Westchester County moved to dismiss, 
claiming the suit was barred due to ADC’s use of public information 
and claimed that the certifications were not fraudulent.110  The court 
held that although the information was public, the documents were 
“not obtained from a source enumerated in the section 3730(e)(4)(A) 
 
102.  U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 
668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
103.  See Ford Fessenden, County Sued Over Lack of Affordable Homes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 4 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/04we
main.html?n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FSubject%2FH%2FHousing-
&_r=0. 
104. Westchester, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 550.  
105.  31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a), 3730(b)(1) (2009). 
106.  Westchester, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 561. 
107.  31 U.S.C. § 3729. 
108.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). 
109.  Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A 
Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 
100 KY. L.J. 125, 155 (2012). 
110.  Id. at 150.  
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jurisdictional bar [of the FCA].”111  As a result, the United States 
Department of Justice intervened and negotiated a settlement 
agreement.112  In the settlement, Westchester County was required to 
spend over $51 million to create affordable housing units.113  In such 
glaring instances of fraud, the FHA as written is helpful in bolstering 
a plaintiff’s case.  However, plaintiffs utilizing the APA or 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 would be able to leverage the ability to bring a disparate impact 
claim under the FHA.  While HUD initially hailed the settlement as a 
“landmark civil rights settlement,” it has led to years of continued 
legal wrangling with little indication that Westchester County has 
taken any concrete steps to fully comply with the affirmatively 
furthering mandate.114 
The post-Westchester changes to the FCA again leave proponents 
of the affirmatively furthering mandate disappointed.  Future FCA 
claims will require true “whistleblower” information.115  The statute’s 
requirement for an “original source” of information as a basis for a 
claim is unlikely to be overcome simply by analysis of publicly 
available data.116  The other significant limitation of the FCA is that it 
bars claims against a State, limiting plaintiffs to claims against 
municipalities under the statute.117  Short of a Congressional 
amendment creating a direct cause of action for private enforcement 
of section 3608, the future of enforcement of the affirmatively 
furthering mandate lies firmly in HUD’s hands.  HUD’s Rule shows 
initiative to create forward momentum on this issue.118 
 
 
111.  U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 
495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Subsequent to this ruling, 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) was amended to preclude qui tam suits based on information 
obtained from public disclosure statutes.). 
112.  Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal,  U.S. ex rel. Anti-
Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), http://www.westchesterhousingmonitor.org/files/Stipulation.pdf. 
113.  Id.  
114.  Schwemm, supra note 109, at 160–63. 
115.  Westchester, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 379. 
116.  False Claims Act § 3730(e)(4), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2015). 
117.  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). 
118.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43710. 
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II. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Proposed  
 Rule 
 
The Proposed Rule “has come from necessity due to possible 
inefficiencies of the current system and uses various approaches to 
achieve its goal.  This Article has framed the Proposed Rule in a more 
consumable form for purposes of evaluating its impact on the FHA.  
However, this Article does not purport to be a quick or all-inclusive 
guide to the Proposed Rule. 
HUD created the Proposed Rule to correct the negative aspects of 
the current system used to assess compliance with section 3608 of the 
FHA and to provide guidance to communities, agencies, and 
individuals in fulfilling the FHA’s original promise of affirmatively 
furthering fair housing.119  The Proposed Rule attempts to serve this 
purpose by aiding communities in their efforts to assess housing 
determinants or prioritize issues for response, and communities 
taking meaningful action to affirmatively further fair housing.120  In 
order for the objectives of the Proposed Rule to be realized, the current 
state or process it is designed to improve must be understood.  As 
such, Part II discusses the current process and the problems that 
plague it.  After establishing the current state and process of the FHA, 
Section B will discuss the details concerning the Proposed Rule, 
including its purpose, goals, process, the changes being made, 
negative aspects, and the subsequent impact. 
 
A. Analysis of Impediments 
 
The current process under which entities are evaluated for 
compliance with section 3608 of the FHA is called the Analysis of 
Impediments (“AI”).  The AI is a review of both private and public 
sector impediments that must be conducted by entities prior to their 
 
119.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43710. 
120.  Id.  
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receipt of federal housing and community development funds.121  The 
AI was to be used in affirmatively furthering fair housing by 
reviewing barriers, such as policies, practices, or procedures, which 
have the effect of creating a discriminatory housing environment.122  
HUD defines these barriers or “impediments” to fair housing choices 
as “any action, omission, or decision taken or that will have the effect 
of discrimination which restricts housing based on race, color, 
religion, sex, disability, familial status, [or] national origin.”123  
Additionally, the AI was to be used as a tool for essential community 
and business leaders (e.g. lenders, housing providers, policy makers, 
etc.) to better plan and implement actions to further fair housing.124  
Specifically, the AI was expected to target local laws, procedures, and 
practices, and assess its impact on the furthering access to fair 
housing.125 
HUD’s suggested format for AI packages includes five general 
areas of coverage, with the expected introduction and executive 
summary at the forefront of the package.126  Following the 
introduction and executive summary, HUD’s suggested format 
includes “jurisdictional background,” such as demographics, income 
levels, and similar dynamics unique to the jurisdiction.127  The next 
suggested inclusion is an evaluation of the jurisdiction’s current state, 
such as compliance rates, complaints, acts that resulted in fines or 
suits filed by the United States Department of Justice.128  One of the 
most important suggested sections calls for the identification of 
barriers or “impediments” to fair housing.129 
 
121.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE VOL. 1, 2–7 (1996). 
122.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS: HUD 
NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS REQUIREMENTS AND OVERSIGHT OF JURISDICTIONS’ FAIR HOUSING 
PLANS 5 (2010). 
123.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 74, at 2–8.  
124.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 5.  
125.  Id.  
126.  Id. at 7. 
127.  Id.  
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. 
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According to HUD’s Fair Housing Planning Guide,130 data 
collected for the AI consists of “generic data items” that includes 
zoning and land use policies, tax assessment practices, patterns of 
public or /assisted housing, occupancy in section 8 housing,131 the type 
and amount of fair housing complaints or suits, and lastly, data from 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.  Public policies and practices 
involving housing and housing-related activities are also considered 
data under the AI system.132  Importantly, there is no requirement for 
participants to actually collect or create new data in order to complete 
the AI.  The AI system is not inflexible and entities are afforded the 
discretion to use existing data in its AI package.133  The codified rule 
mandates that participants “conduct an analysis to identify 
impediments to fair housing choice within the State, take appropriate 
actions to overcome the effects of any impediments identified through 
that analysis, and maintain records reflecting the analysis and actions 
in this regard.”134  As such, entities may fall well within the current 
platform’s requirements even when using established data from 
federal agency databases and studies, academic studies, private 
housing reports, and other creditable sources.135 
Once entities obtain the necessary data and compile their AI 
reports, HUD encourages the entities to share the information with 
the public, government leaders, and other organizations that are also 
required to complete the AI.136  It is important to note that AI’s are 
normally not submitted to HUD for review or consideration.137  
Instead, HUD only receives an entity’s summary of its AI and any 
 
130.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 74, at 1. 
131.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS 
FACT SHEET, http://Portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_in
dian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:00 PM) (describing the 
Housing Choice Voucher program [often referred to as § 8] as the “federal 
government’s major program for assisting very low-income families, the elderly, and 
the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market.”). 
132. OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 74, at 2–9.  
133.  Id. 
134.  24 C.F.R. § 91.325(a) (2015). 
135.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 74, at 2–9. 
136.  Id. at 2–21. 
137.  Id. at 2–24. 
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accomplishment it may have achieved.138  Under the AI process, HUD 
serves more as an overseer or administrator of the certification 
process, which requires completion of the AI for government 
funding.139  HUD becomes more involved only after complaints or 
suggestions indicate that actions taken were inadequate.140  Keeping 
with its administrative role and sparse involvement, under the AI 
process, HUD delegates the collection and dissemination of data, 
research, and information largely to the participants completing the 
AI.141 
A report142 prepared for Congress created by the United States 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) detailed many problems 
with the AI process, and ultimately served as a major catalyst for the 
creation of the Proposed Rule.143  The GAO found the AI process to be 
ineffective and inefficient.144  The negative aspects are present in the 
areas of supervision, administrative resources, and a general lack of 
clear direction.145  One significant issue with the AI process is the way 
AI’s are created by participants and treated by HUD.  In its report, the 
GAO found that HUD fell short in regulating AIs in many aspects, 
including the frequency of updates and even the contents of the AI.146  
The GAO also found that HUD’s regulatory requirements pertaining 
to AIs are limited; particularly that there is no specific requirement for 
participants to submit AIs to HUD for review or approval.147  
Although HUD may require participants to submit information 
 
138.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 74, at 2–24. 
139.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122. 
140.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 74, at 2–24. 
141.  Id. 
142.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122. 
143.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43710. 
144.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 31. 
145.  Id. at 29–32. 
146.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 6. 
147.  Id. at 6. 
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regarding activities that affirmatively further fair housing,148 the lack 
of a mandate for the completion of an AI is yet another erosion of the 
effectiveness of the AI process.  This is especially true when 
considering the GAO’s reiteration that “the AI is a tool that is 
intended to serve as the basis for fair housing planning; provide 
essential information to policymakers, administrative staff, housing 
providers, lenders, and fair housing advocate[s]; and assist in 
building public support for fair housing efforts.”149 
Examining the participant’s role in the AI process, the GAO has 
found participants to be equally responsible for eroding the 
effectiveness of the AI process by not adequately preparing AIs.150  
The GAO’s evaluation discovered many participants did not 
complete or update their AI, or, where an AI was created, failed to 
provide adequate information.151  For example, many of the AIs 
reviewed by the GAO that were considered “current” did not provide 
an expected timeframe for implementing proposed actions to mitigate 
the noted impediments, despite HUD’s suggestion for inclusion of 
such timeframes.152  Notably, HUD’s unenforceable “suggestion” for 
the inclusion of timeframes did not amount to a mandate, even 
though, as stated by the GAO, the absence of timeframes reduces 
accountability and the ability to quantify progress.153  Moreover, fifty-
two of the sixty current AIs reviewed by the GAO lacked signatures 
of top elected officials, which may raise questions as to the support 
that elected officials are willing to provide in addressing issues 
hindering the requirement to affirmatively further fair housing.154  
Since HUD does not provide specific guidance as to the length of time 
that must lapse before an AI is considered outdated, the GAO, using 
HUD’s general guidance and its own interviews, stipulates that an AI 
 
148.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 17. 
149.  Id. at 6. 
150.  Id. at 5. 
151.  Id. at 15. 
152.  Id. at 18. 
153.  Id. at 9. 
154.  Id. at 20. 
4 ANDERSON MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2015  8:51 AM 
Winter 2016] FAIR HOUSING MANDATE 23 
six or more years old should be deemed “outdated.”155  Using six or 
more years as a benchmark, the GAO found that twenty-nine percent 
of AIs reviewed were outdated, and at least ten percent of the 
outdated AIs were over twenty years old.156  Thus, many of these 
documents are not adequate tools for furthering the purpose of the 
FHA because current impediments are likely to go undocumented, 
unrealized, and thereby uncorrected.157 
Administrative and enforcement issues are problematic and fall 
squarely on HUD.158  The GAO found that HUD lacks the resources 
and faces competition with other priorities within its own 
organization, which negatively affects its capacity to review AIs and 
other fair housing related documents.159  Moreover, the GAO reports 
that HUD has often failed to ask participants for their AI 
documentation during onsite visits.160  This neglect in administrative 
oversight further erodes the effectiveness of the AI process, as studies 
have found that audits, specific investigations, visits, and a greater 
level of enforcement, would improve the AI process.161  The GAO’s 
report noted a disturbing practice regarding HUD’s degree of 
enforcement.  For instance, there are questions as to how many 
entities are receiving government funds without completing an AI.162  
Additionally, lack of HUD enforcement was evident when the GAO 
was unable to obtain reports from a number of participants, despite 
HUD’s requirement that all participants maintain AI records.163  In 
addition to the lack of records and adequately completed AIs, a 
 
155.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 10. 
156.  Id. 
157.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 10–11. 
158.  Id. at 22. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. 
161.  See Philip Tegeler, Megan Haberle, & Ebony Gayles, Affirmatively Furthering 
Fair Housing in HUD Housing Programs: A First Term Report Card, 22 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 27 (2013). 
162.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 14. 
163.  Id. 
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number of AI reports that were reviewed by the GAO lacked 
sufficient information and were packaged in a manner that left GAO 
officials unsure as to the document’s status as an actual AI.164  
Examples of what the GAO obtained from participants that were 
tendered as AIs include: (1) a four-page survey of residents regarding 
fair housing issues;165 (2) a two-page document that included only two 
sentences describing a fair housing impediment, with the remainder 
of the document discussing the progress of “implementing a local 
statute pertaining to community preservation”166; and (3) a four-page 
document describing the community, and no information regarding 
impediments or corrective actions.167 
 
B. Purpose, Goals and Overview of the Proposed Rule 
 
The Proposed Rule generally seeks to further the legislative 
intent of the FHA by using fair housing strategies and actions in 
addition to planning.168  Key principles of the FHA consist of 
overcoming themes of segregation, suppressed choice, and the lack of 
inclusive communities.169  The Proposed Rule has the potential to be a 
response to inefficient and inadequate administrative support, and an 
overall process that lacks the essential oversight needed to attain the 
legislative intent of the FHA.170  Similar to the AI process, the 
Proposed Rule focuses on fair housing planning.171  However, the 
Proposed Rule presents a new take on planning, which furthers its 
broader purpose of improving the manner in which participants meet 
 
164.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 14. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. at 15. 
168.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43729. 
169.  Id. at 43710. 
170.  See supra Section I. 
171.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43713 (“. . .this 
proposed rule is intended in particular to improve fair housing planning by more 
directly linking it to housing and community development planning processes 
currently undertaken by program participants as a condition of their receipt of HUD 
funds.”). 
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the requirements imposed by HUD to affirmatively further fair 
housing and improve fair housing choices for all people.172 
In addition to improving the process, the Proposed Rule aims to 
provide in-depth data and resources to aid participants and “increase 
compliance and fewer instances of litigation.”173  The four goals of the 
Proposed Rule, as observed through the data collected by HUD are: 
(1) reducing segregation, (2) eliminating racially and ethnically 
concentrated areas of poverty, (3) narrowing the gaps that result in 
protected classes having severe housing problems, and (4) reducing 
disparities in access to critical neighborhood assets.174 
In order to fully comprehend the potential impact of the Proposed 
Rule’s goal of reducing disparities in access to critical neighborhood 
assets, it is imperative to provide background information.  This will 
provide a more robust understanding of the characteristics of 
neighborhoods, which strike at the core of individuals’ livelihoods and 
bear on a range of outcomes.175  Notably, HUD focuses its collection of 
data on six “dimensions,” that consist of: (1) neighborhood school 
proficiency, (2) poverty, (3) labor market engagement, (4) job 
accessibility, (5) health hazard exposure, and (6) transit access.176  The 
rationale and history resulting in the need for these “dimensions” are 
based on what has been called “environmental segregation” or 
“environmental racism.”177  The concept of environmental segregation 
provides that a greater percentage of localities that tend to have the 
worst environmental aspects tend to be occupied or slated for 
communities whereby a greater part of the population are minorities.178  
What makes up these environmental aspects has long been debated, 
but often seen “environmental aspects” generally consist of pollution, 
 
172.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43710, 43716-29. 
173.  Id. at 43712. 
174.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 7 (2013), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=HUD-2013-0066. 
175.  Id. at 4. 
176.  Id. at 4–5. 
177.  Prakash, supra note 41, at 1456. 
178.  Id. at 1455–56. 
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zoning, or quality of available municipal services.179  HUD admits that 
the environmental aspects that further environmental segregation are 
not limited to the six dimensions on which HUD will procure data.180  
HUD notes that crime, housing unit lead, and radon levels are aspects 
or dimensions as well.181  However, HUD has opted not to gather data 
on these dimensions due to inconsistency in the data, and instead 
“encourages program participants to supplement the [required]  
data … with robust locally available data on these other assets and 
stressors….”182 
The Proposed Rule aims to make a number of changes that 
include: (1) HUD providing uniform data for participants to use in 
their respective Assessments of Fair Housing (hereinafter “AFH”); 
(2) the adoption of a fair housing assessment and planning tool (the 
AFH) to replace the current AI;183 (3) better direction regarding the 
purpose of the AFH and how it will be assessed; (4) a new HUD 
review procedure; and (5) a greater link between the AFH and 
participant planning that occurs as a result of the AFH.184  The 
Proposed Rule will implement a new process that succinctly fits into 
what can be classified as four progressive courses of action 
(hereinafter “COA”), whereby subsequent COA’s are not only a 
progression of the prior COA, but rely on the effectiveness, 
usefulness, and quality of the prior COA. 
First COA:  HUD Provides Data to Program Participants.  The first 
COA proposes a stark change from the AI process.  Currently, 
participants utilize their own resources to acquire data to identify 
impediments in fair housing choices within its respective 
jurisdictions.185  As a result, HUD has found that participants often 
rely on third party consultants to acquire the necessary data.186  Under 
 
179.  Prakash, supra note 41, at 1455. 
180.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING, DATA DOCUMENTATION 5 (2013). 
181.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 180. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43714. 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. at 43710, 43713. 
186.  Id. 
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the Proposed Rule, HUD would take over the researching and 
gathering role, and provide national and local data of impediments to 
participants.187  By providing the data to program participants, HUD 
expects a reduction in the burdens previously imposed on 
participants, thereby allowing participants to better perform under 
the AFH.188 
Second COA: HUD Program Participants Evaluate Data of 
Impediments.  The second COA requires program participants, using the 
data provided by HUD in the first COA, to evaluate and note patterns 
of segregation, integration, and disparities in neighborhoods.189 
Third COA: HUD Program Participants Develop and Submit AFH 
Assessment.  The third COA requires program participants use the 
information interpreted from the data provided by HUD, information 
gathered from its own evaluations, and concerns arising from the 
data, in order to complete and submit an AFH to HUD.190 
Fourth COA: HUD Reviews the AFH Submitted by the Program 
Participant.  Once HUD receives the AFH from program participants, 
they are required to review it using new standards pursuant to the 
Proposed Rule.191  If HUD approves the AFH, the program 
participants are required to inform the program in which the entity 
participates.192  If the AFH is not approved, then HUD will inform 
the program participant why its AFH was not accepted, as well as 
explain the remedial actions that are required, and in some cases, 
HUD may assist the program participant in implementing those 
remedial measures.193 
 
C. Authority for the Proposed Rule 
 
The Proposed Rule finds its authority and purpose broadly in 
 
187.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43715. 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id.  
192.  Id.  
193.  Id.  
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Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (also known as the FHA).194  
The 90th Congress firmly established its intent in codifying the FHA 
through its plain proclamation that “[i]t is the policy of the United 
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing 
throughout the United States.”195  Keeping within its intent, the FHA 
mandates broad prohibitions on discriminatory acts related to 
housing.196  The Administration section of the FHA also gives the 
Proposed Rule its authority, declaring that “[a]ll executive 
departments and agencies shall administer their programs and 
activities relating to housing and urban development (including any 
federal agency having regulatory or supervisory authority over 
financial institutions) in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes 
of this subchapter and shall cooperate with the HUD Secretary to 
further such purposes.”197 
Additionally, an Executive Order in 1994 vested the Secretary of 
HUD with the power to ensure applicable governmental departments 
and agencies operate in a manner that furthers the purpose of the 
FHA.198  Both the legislative and executive branches established a duty 
for agencies and participants to further the purpose of the FHA.  In 
addition to executive and legislative influence, the judiciary has also 
weighed in,199 and through its interpretation has reiterated the 
significance of acting in a manner that furthers the FHA.  With intent 
and interpretation clear, the policy of acting in a manner that furthers 
the purpose of the FHA is soundly grounded. 
Rulemaking allows agencies to regulate activities that fall within 
its reach.200  In order for an agency to make rules, it must be granted 
authority by Congress.201  The need to enact rules may arise directly 
 
194.  42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2015). 
195.  42 U.S.C § 3601 (2015). 
196.  42 U.S.C. §§ 3603–3607 (2015). 
197.  42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2015) (emphasis added). 
198.  Exec. Order No. 12,892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (Jan. 20, 1994). 
199.  See Otero, 484 F.2d 1122 (finding the Housing Authority was “under an 
obligation to act affirmatively to achieve integration in housing.  The source of that 
duty is both constitutional and statutory.”). 
200.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
201.  Maeve P. Carey, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 2 
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from a legislative mandate, or new developments,202 interest groups, 
requests from other agencies, problems affecting society that fall 
under the agency’s authority, directives, problems with the subject 
agencies current policies, and a number of other influencers.203  
Generally, participation in the rulemaking process involves not only 
the proposing agency, but often times the public, other agencies, the 
executive branch, and at times the legislative branch.  Agencies may 
publish an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal 
Register, which serves as an invitation for the public to assist in 
formulating and improving the draft proposed rule.204  Additionally, 
proposed rules serve as notice to the public of an agency’s plans to 
resolve a problem and/or change its goals.205  Prior to the actual 
proposed rule being published in the Federal Register, where any 
member of the public may comment, the executive branch (particularly 
the President of the United States) and the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (hereinafter “OIRA”) are afforded the opportunity 
to review the rule.206  The President and OIRA are more likely to review 
the proposed rule when it raises significant policy issues, that is, when 
it has significant economic effects.207 
Once the proposed rule is open for public comments, the public 
has a predetermined amount of time to submit comments, often 30 to 
60 days, or longer periods for more complicated proposed rules.208  
After the comment period has ended, the agency, having determined 
that its proposed rule would actually accomplish the goals it set out, 
developed a proposed final rule.209  Similar to the draft proposed rule, 
 
(2013), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=739691. 
202.  New developments may include the need for corrective actions due to the 
rise of unexpected or unintended events.  For example, a rule may be enacted in order 
to close a loophole in a governmental program. 
203.  NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., OFF. FED. REG., A GUIDE TO THE RULE 
MAKING PROCESS 2 (2011), https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rule
making_process.pdf. 
204.  Id. at 4. 
205.  Id.  
206.  Id. at 3. 
207.  Id. 
208.  Id. at 5. 
209.  Id. at 204. 
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the President and OIRA are afforded an opportunity to review the 
draft final rule.210  The next and final step involves publishing the final 
rule with an effective date.211 
 
D. Distinguishing the Proposed Rule from AI 
 
The Proposed Rule aims to enact about 42 amendments or 
additions, most of which are minor changes.  The amendments fall 
within sections 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, and 903 of Title 24 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (hereinafter “C.F.R.”), with the majority of the 
changes concentrated within section 91, the Consolidated Submissions 
for Community Planning and Development Programs section.  Not all 
of the Proposed Rule amendments are negligible.  The Proposed Rule 
includes significant amendments to a number of sections, such as 
section 5(A).  In this section the Proposed Rule adds sections 5.150-164.  
Particularly worth noting is section 5.154, which establishes the AFH 
requirement that will replace the current AI.212  Under the Proposed 
Rule, HUD program participants must develop the AFH using the 
information and data provided by HUD.213  This is a noteworthy 
change from the AI process.  Under the AI system, the participants use 
“significant staff and other resources to complete [the AI] without 
adequately informing subsequent planning and action.”214 
Another noteworthy addition is section 5.158, which requires 
the involvement of the community via participation and 
coordination in creating the AFH.215  Furthermore, section 5.162 
creates the presumption that an AFH is valid after 60 days of its 
receipt by HUD.216  This presumption is overcome by written notice 
from HUD informing the participant that the AFH was not accepted 
and the reason why it was not accepted.217  In an addition to the 
 
210.  NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., supra note 203, at 7. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43717. 
213.  Id. 
214.  Id. at 43719. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Id. Reg at 43717. 
217.  Id. 
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creation of new sections, the Proposed Rule implements significant 
amendments.  For example, paragraph (a)(2) of section 570.601 was 
amended to explicitly specify that fair housing planning include 
taking “meaningful actions” to further the items identified in the 
AFH.218  For a breakdown of the changes to be enacted by the 
Proposed Rule, see the ”Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing 
Proposed Rule Changes” table.219  
With the intent of assisting communities and developing a 
strategy to further the policy of the FHA, the Proposed Rule shifts the 
burden of data collection from the participant to HUD, or specifically 
 
218.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43723. 
219.  See id. 
 
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Proposed Rule Changes 
§ Type § Type 
5.150 New 91.415 Amendment 
5.152 New 91.420 Amendment 
5.154 New 91.425 Amendment 
5.156 New 91.505 Amendment 
5.158 New   
5.160 New 92.104 Amendment 
5.162 New 92.508 Amendment 
5.164  New   
5.166 New 570.3 Amendment 
  570.441 Amendment 
91.5 Amendment 570.480 Amendment 
91.100 Amendment 570.486 Amendment 
91.105 Amendment 570.490 Amendment 
91.110 Amendment 570.506 Amendment 
91.115 Amendment 570.60 Amendment 
91.215 Amendment   
91.220 Amendment 574.530 Amendment 
91.225 Amendment   
91.230 Amendment 576.500 Amendment 
91.235 Amendment   
91.315 Amendment 903.2 Amendment 
91.320 Amendment 903.7 Amendment 
91.325 Amendment   
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to HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research.220  HUD will 
use nationally uniform sources, supplemented by local and regional 
information, to gather data in order to provide more uniform and 
accurate information.221  HUD expects the data collected to largely 
reflect five broad areas in which participants are required to address 
in their AFH.222  The areas of focus consist of: (1) geographic, (2) 
racially/ethnically concentrated areas of poverty, (3) disparity in 
access to community assets, (4) segregation, and (5) disproportional 
housing needs.223  By gathering such data, it is apparent that the 
Proposed Rule seeks to address the cost imposed on society by the 
adverse effects of environmental segregation on public health. 
HUD’s AFFH Data Documentation draft224 provides a precise 
breakdown of the areas of data collected, calculations, formulas, and 
other measures used to create the “data” that will be subsequently 
provided to participants. 
Geographical/Demographic Data: One area of data collection is that 
of demographics, though HUD couches it more broadly as geographic 
information.225  HUD intends to use nationally uniform sources such 
as census data,226 which will serve as the primary source for 
demographic/geographic information.  However, as a supplement to 
the census data, there may also be limited use of information from the 
American Community Survey.227  These sources of information will 
be used to gather data on race, ethnicity, and poverty in the subject 
communities.228  Unfortunately, HUD has not provided specific 
details regarding the use or purpose of the demographic data, 
separate from its use as a foundational supplement to other data 
 
220.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43717. 
221.  Id.  
222.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 1. 
223.  Id.  
224.  Id. 
225.  Id.  
226.  Id.  
227.  Id.  
228.  Id.  
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collected.229  Nevertheless, even without further guidance, the 
gathering of demographical data may nonetheless serve a purpose as 
standalone information for participants. 
Racially/Ethnically–Concentrated Areas of Poverty: HUD intends to 
provide participants with information regarding whether areas 
within its jurisdiction may be considered Racially/Ethnically–
Concentrated Areas of Poverty, or “RCAPs/ECAPs” as coined by 
HUD.230  HUD uses a two-part test to determine whether a locality 
should be deemed a RCAP/ECAP.  The first part of the test involves a 
simple threshold: “RCAP/ECAPs must have a non-white population 
of 50 percent or more.”231  The second part of the test is similarly 
straightforward, requiring the lesser of either a poverty rate that is 
higher than forty percent of the Federal Poverty Rate, or a poverty  
rate that is three times the average tract poverty rate for the 
metro/micro area.232 
A thorough examination of RCAP/ECAP determination results in 
the realization that the racial/ethnic threshold test is pinned to “non-
white” individuals.  It is true that many of the Nation’s impoverished 
areas are made-up of non-whites,233 however this threshold test runs 
the risk of excluding the poor white population.  One may argue that 
the data point being gathered is for “racially/ethnically-concentrated” 
areas and therefore excluding poor whites is not a major issue, or is to 
be expected.  Nonetheless, we know that poor whites may face the 
same injustices that the FHA is designed to eliminate.  Unfortunately 
until the law is finalized and fully enforced, we will not know whether 
the failure to consider poor whites will have any impact on achieving 
the FHA’s purpose. 
Disproportionate Housing Needs: As defined by HUD, 
 
229.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 43710. 
230.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 1. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id.  
233.  Algernon Austin, African Americans are Still Concentrated in Neighborhoods 
with High Poverty and Still Lack Full Access to Decent Housing, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 
22, 2013), http://www.epi.org/publication/african-americans-concentrated-neighbor
hoods/. 
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“disproportionate housing needs” refers to “a circumstance when the 
members of a racial or ethnic group within an income level experience 
housing problems at least 10 percentage points more frequently than 
the entire population within the same income level.”234  Data 
regarding “disproportionate housing needs” will be customized for 
HUD’s purposes by the United States Census Bureau, and be obtained 
through the Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy data.235  
The data will attempt to capture the extent of housing issues for low-
income households in a particular area.236 
Community Asset Indicators: HUD intends to provide participants 
with data regarding the degree in which a community offers 
“important community assets” and the degree to which groups of 
people have access to such assets.237  Important community assets are 
social services that help facilitate a good quality of life, including 
quality of schools, job centers, and transit.238  Specifically, HUD will 
focus on six areas that have been shown to have a significant bearing 
on community assets, including proximity to environmental health 
hazards, job accessibility, poverty, school quality, labor market 
engagement (e.g., job centers), and transit access.239  Regarding the 
collection of data for the six specific areas, HUD intends to use school-
level data from state examinations to determine the quality of 
schools.240  Although job accessibility and transit access may appear to 
positively correlate, HUD’s data regarding these two areas are not 
necessarily interrelated and are based upon different factors.  Job 
accessibility is based upon a locale’s distance from small, medium, 
and large employment centers, with larger employment centers 
carrying more weight.241  Whereas transit access is based upon data 
gathered from the General Transit Feed Specification (hereinafter 
 
234.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 1. 
235.  Id. at 9. 
236.  Id. 
237.  Id. at 4. 
238.  Id. 
239.  Id. at 4–5. 
240.  Id. at 5. 
241.  Id. at 6. 
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“GTFS”) exchanges to determine the distance between rail and bus 
stops.242  Regarding poverty, HUD will continue its trend of using 
established data, and use the percentage of households that receive 
cash-welfare, and the family poverty rate to develop the reported 
poverty data.243  Health hazard exposures will be based upon 
information from the Environmental Protection Agency, and it is 
expected that labor market engagement will be based upon the 
unemployment rate, labor force participation rate, and education 
level of the individuals in the subject locale.244  Although HUD 
proposes to offer a wide breadth of information, it has also included 
restraints to its data collection and reporting, limiting its collection of 
information to data that is “closely linked to neighborhood 
geographies and could be measured consistently at smaller levels 
across the country.”245 
Segregation: To analyze segregation and provide appropriate data 
to participants, HUD intends to use different indices to measure this 
highly dimensional category.246  For instance, HUD plans to use a 
dissimilarity index and isolation index in combination with predicted 
values based on racial/ethnic minority shares for a particular 
jurisdiction.247 
 
III. A Critique of the Proposed Rule 
 
Despite the GOA’s scathing review of the current AI process, the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis indicates that the Proposed Rule does 
little to change the course of present cost and administrative 
inefficiencies.248  As a result, success of attaining the goals of the FHA 
appear to rest solely on the structure of the Proposed Rule, because it 
 
242.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 6. 
243.  Id. at 7. 
244.  Id. at 6. 
245.  Id. at 5. 
246.  Id. at 2. 
247.  Id. at 2–3. 
248.  Id. at 10–11. 
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is unlikely the government will be able to point to an ancillary result 
(e.g., saving local governments money or instituting a more efficient 
process), and claim a success.  In short, if the Proposed Rule fails to 
provide substantive assistance, it could be as inefficient and 
complicated as AI.  Notable areas of concern include: (1) costs to 
federal government and participants, (2) administrative burden, and 
(3) uncertainty of impact.249 
 
A. Cost to Federal Government and Participants 
 
HUD expects there to be an implementation cost of $3 million to 
$9 million dollars—a cost HUD qualifies as “marginal.”250  Aside from 
implementation costs, HUD does not expect an increase in compliance 
costs.251  HUD grounds its expectations on the belief that cost increases 
will affect only a few areas of the compliance process, which will be 
offset by reductions in cost in other areas.252  Although HUD expects 
only marginal cost differences, HUD also concedes “the demands of 
the new process may result in a net increase of administrative burden 
for non-compliant entities….”253  HUD’s concession is echoed and 
broadened by the National Association of Housing and 
Redevelopment Officials (“NAHRO”), which boasts a commanding 
3,100 agencies, whose members manage over 970,000 public housing 
units.254  NAHRO has found that the “proposed rule adds substantial 
administrative burden and cost [to Public Housing Authorities] 
without providing incremental resources.”255  Although the 
NAHRO’s interests may be harmed by the Proposed Rule, the issues 
 
249.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 9–18. 
250.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 180, at 9. 
251.  Id. at 9. 
252.  Id. 
253.  Id. at 10. 
254.  Tamar Greenspan, National Association of Housing and Redevelopment 
Officials, Comment Letter On Affirmatively Furthering Housing Proposed Rule 
(2013), http://www.nahro.org/sites/default/files/searcable/NAHRO%20AFFH%20Co
mments.pdf. 
255.  Id. 
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raised by the group are nonetheless legitimate.  Additionally, though 
the NAHRO does not outline specific sources of the “substantial 
administrative burden,” one only need look to the Proposed Rule 
itself.  As detailed in what will be codified as 24 C.F.R. § 5.156, 
participants will still be required to analyze and address local fair 
housing issues that affect housing within its jurisdiction in addition to 
being “encouraged” to perform regional assessments.256  Moreover, 
the Proposed Rule will create 24 C.F.R. § 5.158, which requires 
participants to involve the community in their plans.257  Minor 
“encouragements” and requirements proposed by HUD appear to 
entail minimal additional effort on their own, but their cumulative 
impact may support NAHRO’s claim.  While there appears to be 
conflicting expectations between HUD, local governments, and local 
participants, it is unknown whether the Proposed Rule possesses 
issues regarding the federal government.  For instance, the Proposed 
Rule does not provide details regarding the cost that the federal 
government may incur as a result of implementing or operating under 
the provisions of the Proposed Rule. 
 
B. Administrative Issues 
 
Since participants are currently required to create plans and 
reports for certification, HUD does not anticipate that the Proposed 
Rule will drastically affect the time participants expend creating 
reports.258  However, and importantly, HUD expects a negative 
impact on its own staff.259  There is no indication in the Proposed Rule 
that there will be an increase in HUD’s workforce.  At first glance this 
may appear to be a good cost-saving point, however, the idea of not 
increasing HUD’s resources, monetarily or in human capital, is 
contrary to what one would expect when considering the new 
burdens that the Proposed Rule will place on HUD.  This 
 
256.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43719. 
257.  Id.  
258.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174. 
259.  Id. at 9. 
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administrative shortcoming is even acknowledged by HUD, which 
states: 
The regulation [the Proposed Rule] would place additional 
burden on HUD staff.  HUD must not only review and approve the 
AFH, but assist program participants in identifying and analyzing 
elements and factors that drive or maintain disparity in fair housing 
choice, and in developing strategies to overcome such disparity.  
Much of the additional effort on the part of HUD staff is likely to be 
the result of increasing review activity that is not currently 
performed.260 
The NAHRO has also commented that HUD does not have the 
staff capacity to properly monitor and oversee the requirements 
contained within the Proposed Rule.261  Administrative shortcomings 
are not a new concern, however, and the GAO’s report to Congress 
references HUD officials when it states that “staffing constraints will 
undermine officials’ oversight capacity and ability to implement 
corrective measures.”262  Additionally, the Proposed Rule does not put 
forth information regarding competing demands on HUD’s staff—
another area of concern reported by the GAO.263  In the GAO’s report, 
the AI was viewed as a “low priority” due to “competing demands 
and limited resources.”264  Thus, it can be deduced that the Proposed 
Rule will likely result in HUD performing a greater share of 
administrative duties, in conjunction with providing extensive data to 
participants.  However, HUD has not commented on any increase in 
human resources to assist with these increased responsibilities and 
there is no indication that HUD has addressed these issues as a 
preliminary matter.  
 
 
 
260.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 12. 
261.  Tamar Greenspan, supra note 254. 
262.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 25. 
263.  Id. 
264.  Id. 
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C. Uncertainty of Impact 
 
It would be difficult to find any regulation, or modification to a 
regulation, that includes definite and accurate outcomes prior to the 
regulation’s release.  Therefore, it is unsurprising that HUD is unable 
to provide definite assurances regarding the future impact of the 
Proposed Rule.  As HUD has indicated, it is difficult to “predict how 
a jurisdiction would use the information [data provided by HUD], 
what decisions they would reach, and precisely how those decisions 
would affect the protected classes.”265  What is disheartening about 
HUD’s efforts is the amount of uncertainty throughout the Proposed 
Rule’s new process.  Although HUD does not specifically address 
this issue, there is uncertainty regarding the quality of data that 
HUD will obtain given HUD’s administrative environment,266 which 
provides the foundation of the Proposed Rule and furtherance of the 
FHA’s policies. 
Aside from foundational uncertainty, there is still some 
insecurity about the effect that the Proposed Rule will have on the 
FHA’s overall goals.  Take for instance fair housing prioritization 
within jurisdictions.  HUD recognizes that the data it provides local 
jurisdictions may confirm and support what the jurisdiction already 
knows, or contrarily, may prove informing.267  Regardless of the 
relevancy or novelty of the data, there is still uncertainty with respect 
to how a jurisdiction sets its goals or policies in response to the data—
again assuming the data is adequate.268  In line with this admission, 
HUD has also found uncertainty in predicting “the exact policy 
choices that [a] jurisdiction will make and the impact that  
the jurisdiction’s choice will have on furthering the intent of the 
FHA.”269  Will response to the data result in resident opposition, 
 
265.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 12. 
266.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 22. 
267.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43712. 
268.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 16. 
269.  Id. at 17–18. 
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preventing the local jurisdiction from taking certain action in their 
particular neighborhood, or as coined by HUD, “NIMBYism” (Not in 
my backyard)?270 
HUD has outlined a number of uncertainties impacting four broad 
“steps” in its process.  The steps outlined for purposes of reconciling 
uncertainties includes: (1) HUD providing data, (2) jurisdictions 
prioritizing actions in response to the data, (3) policy decisions of 
jurisdictions, and (4) the extent of the improvements/actions by the 
jurisdiction.271  HUD has not specified any uncertainties within the first 
step.272  Under step two, the prioritization of jurisdictions, HUD has 
outlined at least three uncertainties (one being the competing legitimate 
interests among various policies).273  In step three, HUD identified the 
participants’ available resources as an uncertainty that may impact the 
Proposed Rule’s effectiveness.274  In the final step, HUD recognized the 
extent of improvement as an uncertainty, and elaborated that the extent 
of any improvement in a jurisdiction will depend on a number of 
factors such as, individual family choices, policies of nearby 
jurisdictions, and choices of private and nonprofit actors.275 
The uncertainties of the Proposed Rule appear plentiful, 
nonetheless, these uncertainties are arguably no more numerous than 
any other regulation that purports to amend and create new 
requirements.  The two  areas of concern for purposes of this Article 
include—quality of data and usability of the data—are both areas in 
which HUD has not provided a large amount of information.  These 
uncertainties go directly to the issue of whether the Proposed Rule 
will truly further the FHA’s intent. 
 
 
 
270.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HOUSING & COMMUNITY GRANTS, supra 
note 122, at 17. 
271.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 13. 
272.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174. 
273.  Id.  
274.  Id. 
275.  Id.  
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D. HUD’s Interpretation of the Impact of the Proposed Rule 
 
Notwithstanding the acknowledged uncertainties, HUD believes 
a number of benefits associated with the Proposed Rule may be 
realized.  One such benefit is that of clarity.276  HUD hopes that the 
Proposed Rule will convey the agency’s goals to participants in a 
manner that is clearer than those conveyed in the AI process.277  HUD 
also expects more “focus[ed] participant attention and decision 
making” as an ancillary benefit from increased clarity and better 
understanding of HUD’s goals.278  Moreover, HUD anticipates that the 
Proposed Rule will “provide greater resources” for participants to 
use, which HUD hopes will result in greater compliance amongst its 
participants and reduce litigation.279  HUD also suggests that the 
collection of data, as prescribed by the Proposed Rule, may reduce 
“logistical barriers.”280 
The benefits that HUD largely addresses with the Proposed Rule 
relate to the process of compliance and planning.281  However, HUD 
has not opined as to whether the Proposed Rule will create or 
recognize a benefit at the core of the matter, which is to affirmatively 
further fair housing.  HUD has not directly related how the increases 
in data will affirmatively further fair housing.  For instance, HUD 
states, “through this rule, HUD commits to provide states, local 
governments … [and] the general public with local and regional  
data … [and as a result] program participants should be better able to 
evaluate their present environment to assess fair housing 
 
276.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 1. 
277.  Id. 
278.  Id. 
279.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43712. 
280.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 2. 
281.  See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43712 (stating 
“HUD is confident, however, that the rule will create a process that allows for each 
jurisdiction to not only undertake meaningful fair each jurisdiction to not only 
undertake meaningful fair housing planning, but to have capacity and a well-
considered strategy to implement actions to affirmatively further fair housing”). 
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issues . . . .“282  In addition to assisting in the creation of plans to 
correct identified issues—assuming the data will be accurate and 
adequate—the Proposed Rule has great potential to provide victims 
of discriminatory housing practices with a legal remedy and increase 
their likelihood of success in prevailing when claiming a violation of 
section 3608 of the FHA.  
However, HUD has not explicitly addressed this benefit in the 
Proposed Rule.  HUD’s concession that the Proposed Rule will 
increase the administrative burden, on its already limited staff, 
decreases the likelihood of success for the Proposed Rule as it pertains 
to HUD’s general purpose of the rule that will “refine existing 
requirements . . . .”283  Moreover, until housing discrimination victims 
test the new resources (e.g., the HUD-provided data) in pursuit of a 
viable legal remedy, there is no way to determine the true value of the 
data and its impact on the pursuit of fair housing. 
 
IV. Integrating the Proposed Rule into Housing Integration 
 
HUD has stated the four goals of the Proposed Rule: (1) reducing 
segregation, (2) eliminating racially and ethnically concentrated areas 
of poverty, (3) narrowing the gaps that result in protected classes 
experiencing severe housing problems, and (4) reducing disparities in 
access to critical neighborhood assets.284  As previously discussed in 
Part III of this Article, HUD also restricts its predictions about the 
benefits of the Proposed Rule to administrative issues.  Although 
these technical factors will benefit the landscape of fair housing, HUD 
has not elaborated on the Proposed Rule’s potential to create a path 
for individual plaintiffs to successfully bring a claim under section 
3608 of the FHA.  The Proposed Rule has the high likelihood of 
making this benefit a reality for three distinct reasons. 
First, the Proposed Rule supports the contention that the scope of 
the FHA is not limited to cases directly in the category of housing.  
 
282.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43712.  
283.  Id.  
284.  OFF. FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,  
supra note 174, at 7. 
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This is the most significant benefit of the FHA that is left unexplored 
by the Proposed Rule.  Plaintiffs bringing non-housing cases have 
found little success under section 3608 of the FHA because many 
courts have ruled that issues outside of the housing purview are also 
outside of the intent of the FHA.285  However, the Proposed Rule has 
the explicit goal of reducing disparities in access to critical 
neighborhood assets in affirmatively furthering fair housing.286  The 
neighborhood assets, as described earlier in this Article, range from 
employment, healthy environments, and transit access (none of which 
are “housing,” but all of which affect housing).  This objective has the 
potential to increase the number of plaintiffs’ positive outcomes and 
the prevalence of non-housing cases brought under the FHA. 
Secondly, the data that will be collected and synthesized 
pursuant to the Proposed Rule will assist plaintiffs in making the 
requisite prima facie case for disparate impact when bringing a claim 
under section 3608.  The ability to prevail in a disparate impact claim 
often turns on the availability of reliable statistics to prove one has 
been discriminated against since there is an absence of evidence of 
intent to do the same.287  The Proposed Rule would increase this data 
significantly.  Finally, the Proposed Rule incorporates the concerns 
and issues of private individuals in its reformation of evaluating 
compliance with the “affirmatively furthering mandate.” 
The remainder of this Article will detail these three benefits of the 
FHA beginning with how the Proposed Rule illustrates the broad 
intent of the FHA, leading then to the notion that cases with primary 
issues other than housing discrimination (non-housing cases) should 
 
285.  See Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180 (4th 
Cir. 1999); S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 
486 (D.N.J. 2003); Laramore v. Ill. Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443 (N.D.Ill. 
1989); Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Companies, 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984); Southend 
Neighborhood Imp. Ass’n v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1984); Edwards 
v. Johnston Cnty. Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1989). 
286.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43715. 
287.  See Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 56 
F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating “[f]or purposes of this opinion, we shall 
assume . . . that a Title VIII plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory 
impact by proof of national statistics relative to U.S. households as presented here.”). 
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be heard under the Act.  For purposes of this article, non-housing 
cases are those lawsuits that allege discrimination by a defendant that 
affects residents of a protected class in a neighborhood, but does not 
directly affect the ability of those resident to live where they desire.  
The Proposed Rule’s goal of reducing disparities in access to critical 
neighborhood assets stresses the importance of situating the fairness 
of housing within the broader context of neighborhood amenities and 
stressors.  The Proposed Rule is premised on a foundation that is 
contrary to the framework used by the majority of the courts who 
opine on these cases.  As illustrated by the Proposed Rule, HUD 
interprets the FHA broadly and believes that the theories plaintiffs 
often use as the premise of their non-housing cases are central to the 
goal of the Act.288  However, courts rarely find in favor of a plaintiff 
who brings a non-housing case under the FHA289 
The remainder of Part IV explains why it may be advantageous 
for a plaintiff to bring a non-housing discrimination claim under the 
FHA.  Then, it will provide an overview of significant non-housing 
cases that have been brought under the FHA, with a focus on why the 
courts often find that these types of cases fail to state a cognizable 
claim under the Act.  As these cases are typically brought under 
section 3604, the analysis is concentrated in that portion of the FHA.  
The author then argues that the Proposed Rule, which focuses on 
section 3608, takes a view contrary to the court when examining the 
relevancy of non-housing arguments to the FHA.  The Proposed Rule 
will also assist a plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim under the 
FHA with constructing his or her prima facie case, because it will 
provide increased data.290  This suggests that non-housing cases may 
have a higher likelihood of success if they are brought under section 
3608 of the FHA. 
It may seem counterintuitive to seek a remedy for a non-housing 
issue under the FHA; however, the FHA is arguably more 
 
288.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43714. 
289.  See, e.g., Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d 180. 
290.  “[T]he provision of nationally uniform data that will be the predicate for 
and help frame program participants’ assessment activities . . .”  Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43714.  
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advantageous when compared to other nondiscrimination laws and 
statutes.  The FHA has a strong civil rights administrative enforcement 
scheme,291 and permits the bringing of disparate impact claims in 
addition to claims of discriminatory intent.292  Another aspect of the 
FHA that plaintiffs find attractive is that while some laws require that 
the defendant receive federal funding, under the FHA, a claim may be 
filed against a defendant that receives funds from HUD, whether 
directly or via pass-throughs from a HUD grantee.293 
All federal circuit courts that have analyzed the cognizance of 
disparate impact in this context have found that the intent of the FHA 
was to allow disparate impact claims294 in addition to discriminatory 
intent claims.295  Although disparate impact allows plaintiffs to bring 
a claim without providing evidence of discriminatory intent,296 the 
burden of proving disparate impact under the FHA can be 
insurmountable.  While there is no normative framework across the 
court system that dictates how to best make a prima facie disparate 
 
291.  Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Direc-
tives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV, 1339, 1348–49 (2012). 
292.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2015). 
293.  See Austin W. King, Note, Affirmatively Further: Reviving the Fair Housing 
Act’s Integrationist Purpose, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2182 (2013) (“The statute places the same 
burden on ‘[a]ll executive departments and agencies’ in carrying out housing 
programs.  To receive HUD grants, grantees must agree to affirmatively further fair 
housing.  If HUD knows that a grantee has violated the requirement, it is required 
under 42 U.S.C. § 3805(d)(5) to seek compliance and even compel it through 
withdrawal of funds.  The reach of AFFH is extraordinary: Every state and virtually 
every urban and suburban county and major municipality (collectively, ‘entitlement 
communities’) accepts HUD funds.  Further, when states and counties pass funds to 
non-entitlement communities, the grantee is responsible for the sub-grantee’s 
compliance.”); see also Jonathan J. Sheffield, Jr., At Forty-five Years Old the Obligation to 
Affirmatively Further Fair Housing Gets a Face-lift, but Will it Integrate America’s Cities?, 
SOC. JUST., Paper 52 (2013), http://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1051&context=social_justice; see also Rothstein & Whyte, supra note 59, at 70.  
294.  See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 48 (Bureau of 
National Affairs, Inc., 1983) (citing the same language in sections 3604(b), 3605, and 
3631(a), and similar language in sections 3606 and 3617).  See also Inclusive Communities 
Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
295.  Seichshnaydre, supra note 66, at n.2. 
296.  42 U.S.C. § 3608(d). 
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impact case, using statistics to show disproportionate adverse effects 
is generally persuasive.297  Part V of this Article explores in greater 
detail the positive impact that the Proposed Rule can have on this 
aspect of the FHA’s burden-shifting framework. 
The FHA’s flexibility with respect to viable defendants and the 
cognizance of disparate impact claims are significant reasons as to 
why a plaintiff with a civil rights discrimination case, only 
tangentially related to the housing context, may want to bring a claim 
under the Act.  However, all plaintiffs must still show a connection 
between the type of discrimination they are alleging and the type of 
discrimination the FHA intends to prohibit.298  For example, a plaintiff 
claiming that a county is not affirmatively furthering fair housing, as 
evidenced by the county’s reduction in public transportation services 
in underserved neighborhoods, must prove a nexus between 
transportation and the creation of truly integrated living patterns, as 
well as a general increase in fair housing opportunities for protected 
classes.  Evidence proving this nexus requires the collection and 
synthesis of information evidencing the disparity.299  This Article goes 
on to detail the problems with data collection under the FHA’s current 
AI system.  The Proposed Rule not only explicitly recognizes the 
connection among housing and other socioeconomic factors, but also 
contends that this connection was contemplated at the time of the 
FHA’s enactment.300  The Proposed Rule will also enhance the 
quantity and quality of data that is available for a plaintiff to use in 
her construction of a prima facie disparate impact claim.301 
 
A. Non-Housing Cases Under the FHA: The Current State 
 
The Proposed Rule recognizes the correlation between housing 
 
297.  Seichshnaydre, supra note 66, at n.2. 
297.  Westchester, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548. 
298.  Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (finding that “[a] plaintiff who 
fails to allege facts at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating 
a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.”). 
299.  Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
300.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43712. 
301.  Id. at 43715. 
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and housing proximity to other important community assets, such as 
hospitals, job centers, transportation, green space and schools.302  
HUD’s requirement that funding recipients collect data on these 
elements as part of evidencing that they have satisfied their obligation 
to affirmatively further fair housing is indicative of HUD’s broader 
interpretation of the FHA.303  This more inclusive reading of the FHA 
is important because it will help achieve “truly integrated living 
patterns,” which is what the FHA intended to do, but has yet to 
accomplish.304  The Proposed Rule will be more successful in 
facilitating this endeavor because acknowledging that policies outside 
of the realm of direct housing discrimination create and maintain 
segregated living provides an opportunity to address those policies 
using the FHA. 
The Proposed Rule strengthens the connection between housing 
and other non-housing socioeconomic elements such as 
environmental conditions, schools, social services, parks, and 
transportation systems.305  This is significant because the vast majority 
of plaintiffs alleging discrimination in these non-housing contexts 
have failed to prevail under the FHA in large part because the courts 
have deemed these elements are too far removed from housing.306  In 
creating this substantive connection, the Proposed Rule not only lays 
down a foundation for bringing these types of cases under section 
3608 of the FHA, but also increases the likelihood that these cases will 
succeed.  This is because “affirmatively furthering” is more clearly 
defined and more inclusive of characteristics that are inherently 
linked to housing. 
The following information provides details on the success of 
bringing claims under the FHA in instances relevant to this Article. A 
plaintiff has a forty-two-percent likelihood307 of proving defendant 
 
302.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg at 43714–15. 
303.  Id. at 43711. 
304.  Sheffield, supra note 293. 
305.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43711. 
306.  See Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 192 (finding a challenge to the highway site 
selection process “too remotely related to the housing interests that are protected by 
the Fair Housing Act”). 
307.  Seichshnaydre, supra note 66, at 392–402. 
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liability under the FHA in cases where minority groups are excluded 
from living in areas that are underpopulated by the same groups or 
in cases where housing structures with mostly minority residents are 
concentrated in neighborhoods that have a high presence of these 
groups.308  In Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park 
Ass’n, the Seventh Circuit held that housing exclusion cases are the 
primary focus of section 3604.309  The court stated that, “[section] 
3604(a) applied to the problem of exclusion.”310  The remainder of Part 
IV.A. will examine cases brought under the FHA, in which 
regulations and plans arguably affect housing—protected under the 
FHA—but are not directly related to it.  Plaintiffs seeking remedies 
for injury incurred from these “non-housing” cases have a lesser 
likelihood of success.311  These losses can largely be attributed to a 
belief held by many courts: these cases are not within the scope of the 
FHA.312  Courts in many of these non-housing cases have narrowly 
construed the purpose of the FHA, with the sentiment reflecting that, 
“[section] 3604(a) does not reach every event that might conceivably 
affect the availability of housing.”313 
In Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening,314 African-
American landowners claimed that the construction of a new 
highway violated section 3604 of the FHA.315  The plaintiffs contended 
that the highway would create a northern boundary, precluding 
housing expansion in that direction.316  The plaintiffs argued that they 
 
308.  Seichshnaydre categorizes these and similar cases as “housing barrier” re-
gulations.  Seichshnaydre, supra note 66, at 14–15. 
309.  Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 
327, 329 (2004). 
310.  Prakash, supra note 41, at 1437. 
311.  Prakash, supra note 41.  
312.  Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 192. 
313.  Id. 
314.  Id. at 180. 
315.  ”[The plaintiffs asserted] claims against state and federal agencies and officials 
under the Federal-Aid Highway Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing Act, and the Maryland Environmental 
Policy Act, as well as the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.”  Id. at 
183–84. 
316.  Id. at 192. 
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had been excluded from the planning process of the highway, because 
white residents who were affected by the proposed construction 
received individual notice of public hearings, while African-
American residents who were similarly situated did not receive such 
notice.317  It was their contention that in selecting the particular 
location for the highway, sections 3604(a) and 3604(b) were 
violated.318  Interestingly, the Jersey Heights court interpreted the spirit 
of section 3604 as solely prohibiting discrimination, and not providing 
a positive right.319  The court reached this conclusion by applying 
reasoning similar to that of the court in Lindsey v. Normet,320 a decision 
that focused on statutory interpretation.321 
The Jersey Heights court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a 
claim under the FHA because government agencies did not refuse to 
make dwellings available based on race to individuals of color by 
electing to situate the highway bypass at the edge of the neighborhood 
in a predominantly African-American neighborhood.322  At the time of 
the decision, the city of Jersey Heights was ninety-nine percent 
African American, as a result of displacement from the siting of other 
highway and discriminatory real estate practices.323  Since the 
residents were not barred from living in areas outside of where the 
highway was located, the court did not believe this created the type 
of housing barrier that the FHA, specifically section 3604(a), was 
intended to prevent.324  The opinion emphasized that highway siting 
decisions are not related to housing, and are therefore beyond the 
scope of the FHA.325  The court found that the statute explicitly states 
that the prohibition on discrimination is not limited strictly to 
housing, but also prohibits “the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale 
or rental of a dwelling, or . . . the provision of services or facilities in 
 
317.  Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 195. 
318.  Id. at 192. 
319.  Id. at 191. 
320.  405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). 
321.  Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 191. 
322.  Id. at 193. 
323.  Id. at 194 (King, J., concurring); see Sheffield, supra note 293, at n. 169. 
324.  Id. at 192–93. 
325.  Id. at 192. 
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connection therewith.”326  The plaintiffs argued that the highway 
siting decision fell into the latter clause as a “housing-related 
service.”327  However, the court stated, “[B]ecause this challenge to the 
highway site selection process is too remotely related to the housing 
interests that are protected by the Fair Housing Act, we affirm the 
district court’s dismissal of this count of the complaint for failure to 
state a claim under the statute.”328 
The court in Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Authority also 
decided against classifying the siting of a stadium as a housing-
related service for reasons similar to that of the Jersey Heights court.329  
The Laramore court found that it was likely that housing-related 
services within the scope of the FHA included police protection,  
fire protection and garbage collection, but decisions on where to 
locate a sports stadium are not within the purview of section 3604(b) 
of the FHA.330 
Similarly, the court in South Camden Citizens in Action v. New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection331 ruled that plaintiffs 
failed to state a claim under the FHA when the plaintiffs alleged that 
the granting of an air permit for the operation of a cement grinding 
facility in a predominantly African-American neighborhood 
amounted to constructive eviction.332  The plaintiffs argued that the 
operation of this facility diminished the quality and quantity of 
housing in the Waterfront South neighborhood where it would be 
 
326.  Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 192 (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) extends to 
housing and housing-related services). 
327.  Id. at 192–93. 
328.  Id. (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) extends to housing and housing-related 
services). 
329.  Laramore v. Ill. Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D.Ill., 1989); 
Edwards v. Media Borough Council, 430 F. Supp. 2d 445, 452-53 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(recognizing that § 3604(b) may cover police and fire protection, garbage collection, 
and similar municipal services, but rejecting the present claim based on defendant’s 
denial of a zoning variance for plaintiff’s property on the ground that this is instead 
“a discretionary decision comparable to administering city-owned properties or 
deciding where to site a highway, conduct that is not covered under § 3604(b)“). 
330.  Laramore, 722 F. Supp at 452.  
331.  S. Camden Citizens in Action, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 486. 
332.  Id. at 500. 
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located.333  They challenged the legality of the city of Camden’s pattern 
of siting industrial facilities that expelled high rates of environmental 
hazards in low-income and minority neighborhoods.334  Despite the 
adverse health and quality of life consequences of these pollutants on 
housing value, the plaintiffs did not prevail.335  The court cautioned 
against “warping [section 3604] into plenary review” and “extending 
the plain language of [the statute] to any official decision that has an 
indirect effect on the availability of housing.”336  Environmental 
hazards cases are not the only type of non-housing cases that have 
found little success under the FHA.337 
The South Camden court believed that the question at issue was, 
“Does [the defendant] provide a service to [the plaintiff] in a manner 
contemplated by the Fair Housing Act?”338  The court concluded that 
the cement-grinding permit was too indirectly tied to housing to be 
cognizable under section 3604(a).339  Like Laramore and Jersey Heights, 
the court here placed this issue in a group consisting of issues that 
have an effect on residents in a neighborhood, but were too far 
removed from housing to be within the intent of the FHA.340  The court 
distinguished these services from those that were “specific residential 
services” that provide “door-to-door ministrations.”341 
Locations of highways, roadways, stadiums and industrial 
facilities all affect the “economic competitiveness and quality of life” 
that the Proposed Rule seeks to enhance.342  Residents who live near 
highways experience adverse health consequences at disproportionately 
 
333.  S. Camden Citizens in Action, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 492. 
334.  Prakash, supra note 41, at nn. 253–257. 
335.  Id. at n.258. 
336.  Id. at n.260. 
337.  Id. at n.273. 
338.  S. Camden Citizens in Action, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 499. 
339.  Id. at 500; see Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268 (N.J. 1969) (“The 
general rule is, of course, that a tenant’s right to claim a constructive eviction will be 
lost if he does not vacate the premises within a reasonable time after the right comes 
into existence.”). 
340.  S. Camden Citizens in Action, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 502. 
341.  Id. at 503. 
342.  EPA, Near-Source Air Pollution Research, http://www2.epa.gov/air-research/
near-source-air-pollution-research (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
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higher rates than those who do not.343  Car emissions are responsible 
for as many as fifty percent of cancers caused by air pollution,344 and 
noise pollution increases the risk of hearing impairment.345  In the case 
of Jersey Heights, the highway prevented neighbors from reaching 
community assets.346  Neighborhoods located in and around stadiums 
are plagued by disproportionately high concentrations of health 
hazards.347  The concrete parking lots that usually consume large areas 
of square footage can cause runoff filled with pollutants that puddle 
into the water supply of the surrounding neighborhoods.348  In 
addition to contamination, this increases instances of flooding.349  The 
days when the stadium is full brings increased traffic to the area, 
resulting in health hazards that accompany numerous vehicles and 
their emissions.350  When there is a dearth of stadium visitors, the large 
parking lots, which could be used for economic development, take up 
space and prohibit the siting of neighborhood amenities.351  Residing 
in close proximity to any of these elements results in a lower property 
value for homeowners and has negative implications for the economic 
progress of a community.352  Yet, the issue of sports stadium location 
 
343.  See TEGAN K. BOEHMER ET AL., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY TO MAJOR HIGHWAYS-UNITED STATES, 2010 (2013). 
344.  The Harmful Effects of Vehicle Exhaust, ENVIRONMENT & HUMAN HEALTH, INC., 
http://www.ehhi.org/reports/exhaust/summary.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
345.  Meg Selig, What Did You Say?! How Noise Pollution is Harming You, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/changepower/2013
09/what-did-you-say-how-noise-pollution-is-harming-you. 
346.  Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 192–94. 
347.  Id. 
348.  See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, URBAN NONPOINT FACT SHEET: CLEAN WATER 
IS EVERYBODY’S BUSINESS (2003), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/urban_facts.cfm. 
349.  Id.  
350.  See Green Sports and Transportation: The Elephant in the Room, U. OF PENN.: 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Dec. 13, 2013), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article
/green-sports-transportation-elephant-room/. 
351.  Pat Garafolo & Travis Waldron, If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The 
Risky Economics of Sports Stadiums, ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.
com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-the-risky-
economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/. 
352.  See Anita Wright, Costs Far Outweigh Any Perceived Benefits of Stadium, 
COLORADOAN (Nov. 22, 2012), http://archive.coloradoan.com/article/20121122/OPIN
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was found to be outside of the scope of the FHA.353 
As described above, courts are rarely convinced that the subject 
matter of non-housing cases are closely related to housing to warrant 
relief under the FHA.  These courts emphasized that the Act was 
meant to be limited to specific fair housing problems, rather than 
encompass discriminatory acts resulting from any activity effecting 
residents in a neighborhood.  Despite the United States Supreme 
Court’s broad reading of the FHA,354 these narrow holdings have 
precluded many plaintiffs from recovering for injuries that have 
affected their residential property, which has obstructed the FHA’s 
goal of creating “truly integrated communities.”355 
In contrast, the court in Campbell v. City of Berwyn did find a non-
housing case cognizable under Section 3604(b).356  In Campbell, an 
African-American family moved into a predominantly white 
neighborhood and experienced racially motivated attacks on their 
home.357  The defendants provided twenty-four-hour police protection 
to the family, but then terminated this protection after a couple of 
weeks and replaced it with video surveillance.358  As in Southend, the 
Campbell court concluded that section 3604(b) “applie[d] to services 
generally provided by governmental units such as police and fire 
protection or garbage collection.”359 
The court in Campbell also concluded that plaintiffs failed to state 
a claim under section 3604(a) because the police protection did not 
create a barrier to housing, but rather affected an interest in property 
that was already owned by the plaintiffs.360  This court acknowledged 
the guidance provided in Southend.361 
 
ION04/311220031/Costs-far-outweigh-any-perceived-benefits-stadium. 
353.  Laramore, 722 F. Supp. at 452. 
354.  Prakash, supra note 41, at n.262. 
355.  Id. at n.269. 
356.  Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138, 1144 (N.D.Ill.1993); see also 
S. Camden Citizens in Action, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 502. 
357.  Campbell, 815 F. Supp. at 1140. 
358.  Id. at 1142. 
359.  Id. (quoting Southend, 743 F.2d at 1210.). 
360.  Id. at 1145. 
361.  Id. at 1143.  (“With respect to their Section 3604(a) claim, plaintiffs must allege 
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Part V: Taking the Proposed Rule Beyond Non-Housing 
 
Pursuant to the Proposed Rule, HUD’s position is that there is a 
connection among neighborhood assets, neighborhood stressors, and 
housing.362  The author posits that the measuring the existence of these 
socioeconomic factors in the AFH proves that HUD interprets the 
intent of the FHA to be extensive.  Specifically, that access to fair 
housing opportunities means that protected classes also have access 
to critical neighborhood assets.  The Proposed Rule intends to 
incorporate fair housing planning into development and other 
policies and practices that “influence how communities and regions 
grown and develop.”363  Including the measurement of non-housing 
elements as the litmus test for determining whether an entity is 
affirmatively furthering fair housing aligns with a framework that 
includes truly integrated living patterns as a quality of life that 
extends beyond one’s residence.  In order to facilitate a non-housing 
claim under section 3608, it is imperative that the United States 
Congress eradicate the judiciary’s misinterpretation of the intent of 
the FHA as shown by their reluctance to find in favor of plaintiffs 
bringing disparate impact claims and the refusal to allow private 
rights of action under section 3608. 
 
A. The Proposed Rule and Disparate Impact Claims 
 
Despite the recognition that the FHA permits not only 
discriminatory intent claims, but also disparate impact claims, courts 
have been conservative in providing relief for plaintiffs under the 
disparate impact theory, for fear of reaching beyond the scope 
 
that defendants’ discriminatory actions, or the discriminatory effects of such actions, 
affect the availability of housing to them.  See Southend, 743 F.2d at 1210.  Such actions 
must have a direct impact on plaintiffs’ ability, as potential homebuyers or renters, to 
locate in a particular area or to secure housing.  Id.  In Southend, plaintiffs argued, inter 
alia, that in predominately black areas, where the County held tax deeds, the County 
did not comply with its statutory obligation to maintain its properties.”  Id.). 
362.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43725. 
363.  Id. at 43711. 
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established by Congress.364  Seicshnaydre’s data shows that fewer 
than twenty percent of plaintiffs prevailed in their FHA disparate 
impact claims on appeal.365  In addition to reinforcing that the intent 
of the FHA be interpreted broadly, the Proposed Rule provides 
assistance to plaintiffs attempting to prove a prima facie case in a 
disparate impact claim brought under section 3604 of the FHA.366  This 
first step in the three-part, burden-shifting framework of these claims 
is often successfully accomplished by using statistics to show that an 
act or policy has a discriminatory impact on a protected class.367  The 
lack of data has proven a deciding factor in denying plaintiffs’ relief 
in many FHA disparate impact cases.368  The Proposed Rule will 
increase the availability of data that can be used in proving various 
aspects of a prima facie case (the increased information on access to 
critical neighborhood assets being the most significant one for 
purposes of non-housing cases).369 
The essence of the Proposed Rule is increasing the amount and 
utility of data related to housing and the segregation and integration 
of residential neighborhoods370—the shortcomings of the AI that  
were extensively examined by the GAO and detailed in Part II.A. of 
this Article. 
 
B. The Proposed Rule and a Private Right of Action 
 
The Proposed Rule also suggests that permitting a private right 
of action under section 3608 supports the intent of the FHA, as it is 
incongruent to prohibit a private right of action under section 3608 
while using the elements that consider an individual’s quality of life 
to measure the effectiveness of the same section.371 
Private enforcement mechanisms have been instrumental in 
 
364.  Seichshnaydre, supra note 66, at n.94. 
365.  Id. at n.222. 
366.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43727. 
367.  Id. 
368.  Seichshnaydre, supra note 66, at 207, nn.994–99; but see id. at 209–211. 
369.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43727. 
370.  Id. at 43715. 
371.  Id. 
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bringing about the minimal racial desegregation that has occurred,372 
but unfortunately there is no private right of action under section 
3608.  HUD has only accepted claims under section 3608 of the FHA 
when they also allege additional discrimination claims.373  Therefore, 
as previously discussed in Part I.B., a plaintiff must file suit under the 
APA, 42 U.S.C § 1983, or the FCA.374  One case in recent years found 
in favor of a plaintiff who brought a claim under the FCA and section 
3608 of the FHA.  The court in Westchester found that the county did 
not meet its obligation to affirmatively further fair housing in 
conformance with its acceptance of over HUD funding in the form of 
$52 million in Community Development Block Grant funds.375  This 
predominantly white county failed to mention race in its AI from 
2000-2006.376  As stated in Part I.B. of this Article, despite the glaring 
defiance of the affirmatively furthering mandate, Westchester County 
has still not fully complied with the settlement in this case.  If it  
were not such an anomaly for a private individual to successfully 
bring a claim under section 3608, perhaps compliance would not be 
so easy to evade. 
The Proposed Rule is tailored to benefit private actors as well as 
public actors.  HUD states that one goal of the Proposed Rule is to 
“provide relevant civil rights information to the community and other 
private and public sector stakeholders.”377  HUD aims to make the goal 
of affirmatively further fair housing more participatory.378  The 
Proposed Rule has the objective of bringing members of protected 
classes into the decision-making process regarding the use of the data 
collected.379  The Proposed Rule also requires that program participants 
incorporate community participation in the AFH.380  Despite the 
aforementioned references to be more inclusive of individuals, there is 
 
372.  Rothstein and Whyte, supra note 59, at n.91. 
373.  Sheffield, supra note 293, at 94–95. 
374.  Id. at 49, 305. 
375.  King, supra note 293, at n.91. 
376.  Westchester, 668 F. Supp.2d at 558. 
377.  Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. at 43711. 
378.  Id. 
379.  Id. at 43715. 
380.  Id. 
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no private right of action under section 3608 of the FHA. 
The Westchester court stated: 
At a minimum, when a grantee certifies that the grant will 
be ‘conducted and administered’ in conformity with the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act, and 
certifies that it ‘will affirmatively further fair housing,’ the 
grantee must consider the existence and impact of race 
discrimination on housing opportunities and choice in its 
jurisdiction.  In identifying impediments to fair housing 
choice, it must consider impediments erected by race 
discrimination, and if such impediments exist, it must 
take appropriate action to overcome the effects of those 
impediments.381 
A significant impediment to fair housing choice has been the 
denial of individuals’ right to bring a private cause of action alleging 
infringement of that choice.  Challenges to this barrier will find 
support for their arguments in the Proposed Rule. 
 
Conclusion 
 
According to floor debates in the Senate leading up to the 
enactment of the FHA, the underlying policy behind Title VIII is to 
encourage the dispersion of urban ghettos and to create more 
integrated neighborhoods.382  However, nearly fifty years later, that 
 
381.  Westchester, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 566. 
382.  See 114 Cong. Rec. 2985 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (noting that Title 
VIII will establish “a policy of dispersal through open housing . . . look[ing] to the 
eventual dissolution of the ghetto and the construction of low to moderate income 
housing in the suburbs.”); see also Stanley P. Stocker-Edwards, Black Housing 1860–
1980: The Development, Perpetuation, and Attempts to Eradicate the Dual Housing Market 
in America, 5 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 50 (1989).  Senator Walter Mondale stated that 
Title VIII represents “an absolutely essential first step” toward reversing the pattern 
of “two separate Americas constantly at war with one another.”  114 Cong. Rec. 2274 
(1968).  See also id. at 2524 (Statement of Sen. Brooks) (“Discrimination in the sale and 
rental of housing has been the root cause of the widespread patterns of de facto 
segregation which characterize America’s residential neighborhoods.”). 
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intention has not been fully realized.  A neighborhood is more than a 
collection of houses.  Where you live can dictate where you  
work, where your children go to school, and how healthy you are.  
Failing to incorporate these factors in the preeminent law intended  
to affirmatively further fair housing indicates a failure to understand 
the holistic composition of the very neighborhoods that the Act aims 
to integrate. 
The Proposed Rule presents an opportunity to breathe new life 
into words that have had sentimental meaning, but lacked the 
gravitas needed to create measurable changes in laws that overtly or 
covertly disproportionately bar minorities from resources needed to 
attain a higher quality of life.  HUD has focused on creating a technical 
roadmap for their fund recipients and others beholden to the 
mandates of section 3608.  HUD is hopeful that this will result in a 
decrease in litigation, and an increase in administrative relief and 
efficiency that evaded the AI process.  Without trivializing the 
importance of these benefits, the most promising benefit of the 
Proposed Rule is its return to the reason the FHA was enacted.  
Explicitly acknowledging that affirmatively furthering fair housing 
requires data showing the proximity of protected classes to not only 
housing, but also health, employment, education, and transportation 
amenities, recognizes the intent of the Act as not limited to the 
purchase, sale, rental, and siting of housing units.  It follows that 
policies related to these non-housing elements must be challenged if 
they do not comply with the mandates of the Act. 
Historically, this logic has been interrupted by courts’ perception 
that the reach of the FHA does not extend beyond traditional notions 
of housing discrimination.  Plaintiffs asserting that the siting of 
environmental hazards, inadequate police protection, and other 
neighborhood stressors in their predominantly African-American 
neighborhoods were not successful in claiming state activities that 
created such policies violated the FHA.  With this Proposed Rule, the 
intent of the FHA can be aligned with the reality of living patterns to 
affirmatively further fair housing. 
In accordance with the legislative intent that can be gleaned from 
congressional records, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
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Title VIII should be afforded a “generous construction.”383  The 
Proposed Rule opens the door for non-housing cases to be brought 
under section 3608.  This will increase the likelihood that a plaintiff 
bringing a disparate impact claim can successfully meet the burden of 
presenting a prima facie case, since it will make available data 
supporting that unintentional acts that have disproportionately 
negative effects on protected classes.  Individuals wishing to bring a 
private right of action under section 3608 are supported by the 
inclusion of individual rights in the language of the Proposed Rule.  
Honoring the generous construction that the 90th Congress intended 
begins with acknowledging that the strength of the Proposed Rule 
extends beyond data collection and technical assistance.  Leveraging 
these strengths through legal recourse is the true path to creating 
integrated neighborhoods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
383.  Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212. 
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La gran lucha:  
Latina and Latino Lawyers,  
Breaking the Law on Principle, and  
Confronting the Risks of Representation 
 
MARC-TIZOC GONZÁLEZ* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chicana, Chicano, and Mexican American law professors are rare 
in the United States.1  Although Michael A. Olivas began to teach law 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, 
mtgonzalez@stu.edu, @marctizoc.  For their encouragement and support, I thank 
Professors Meera E. Deo, Richard Delgado, Lauren Gilbert, Ian F. Haney López, 
Angela P. Harris, Michael A. Olivas, Cruz Reynoso, Ediberto Román, and Lupe S. 
Salinas.  For excellent research assistance, I thank St. Thomas Law students, Julio 
Menache, J.D. expected 2016, Gwendolyn Richards, J.D. expected 2016, and Jessica 
Biedron, J.D. expected 2017.  I dedicate this Article to the families of the “Ayotzinapa 
43,” rural Mexican students who were training to become educators until they were 
disappeared from the city of Iguala, state of Guerrero, México, after police and 
military forces assaulted them on September 26-27, 2014.  See, e.g., Mexico’s Missing 
Students: Were 43 Attacked by Cartel-Linked Police Targeted for Their Activism?, 
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.democracynow.org/2014/10/15/
mexicos_missing_students_were_43_attacked.  See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
MEXICO’S DISAPPEARED: THE ENDURING COST OF A CRISIS IGNORED (2013). 
1.  See Michael A. Olivas, The Education of Latino Lawyers: An Essay on Crop 
Cultivation, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 117, 129–30 (1994) (“[O]f the 94 [Latino or 
Latina law faculty in the United States in 1992-93], 51 are Mexican Americans, 17 are 
Puerto Ricans, 17 are Cuban, and the remainder are of ‘other’ Latino origin.”).  
Compare ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS. 2008-2009 STATISTICAL REPORT ON LAW FACULTY, RACE 
& ETHNICITY 11, 16 (2009) (reporting 334 Hispanic/Latino law professors in the AALS 
Directory of Law Teachers), with Meera E. Deo, Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal 
5 GONZALEZ MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  4:18 PM 
62 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIII 
in 1982, three decades after the first Mexican American law professor 
(Carlos Cadena in 1952),2 Professor Olivas holds the distinction of 
 
Academia, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 352, 356, 358 (2014) (explaining that the AALS 
stopped publishing law faculty demographic data in 2009 and reporting 337 
Hispanic/Latino law faculty, out of a total of 10,965 U.S. law faculty, in the last reported 
year of 2008-09); but see Miguel A. Méndez & Leo P. Martínez, Toward a Statistical Profile 
of Latina/os in the Legal Profession, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 59, 75 (2002) (noting the 
discrepancy between the 140 Latina/o law professors, not including administrators or 
visiting clinical law professors, counted by Professor Olivas in 2001, and the 241 full 
time Hispanic faculty members counted by the AALS for the 1999, and explaining the 
discrepancy from the fact that the AALS included the Latina/o professors at the three 
Puerto Rican law schools).  Because more recent AALS and more detailed information 
is not publicly available, one can only speculate at the current number of law professors 
who identify with particular Hispanic/Latino subgroups.  Using Professor Deo’s 337 
figure, and assuming arguendo that the proportion of Mexican American law faculty in 
the United States remains the same as it was in 1992-93 (about fifty-four per cent of the 
Latino total), which seems unlikely, there would have been about 182 Mexican 
American-identified U.S. law professors in 2008-09, who would constitute about 1.6 
percent of law faculty in the United States. 
2.  See Michael Olivas, Hernandez v. Texas: A Litigation History, 209, 216–19 in 
“COLORED MEN” AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ”: HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
MEXICAN-AMERICAN LAWYERING (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006) (discussing Cadena’s 
graduation from UT Austin Law in 1940, role in litigating Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 
475 (1954) (extending constitutional equal protection to Mexican Americans), and 
teaching at St. Mary’s School of Law); Olivas, supra note 1, at 128 (“The first Mexican-
American law professor was Carlos Cadena, who taught at St. Mary’s Law School from 
1952 to 1954 and from 1961 to 1965.  He was also co-counsel in Hernandez v. Texas, and 
is thought to be the first Chicano to have argued before the U.S. Supreme Court.”); 
Michael A. Olivas, The “Trial of the Century” that Never Was: Staff Sgt. Macario Garcia, the 
Congressional Medal of Honor, and the Oasis Café, 83 IND. L.J. 1391, 1399 (2008) (“In 1954, 
Cadena became the first Mexican-American law professor, joining the St. Mary’s Law 
faculty.”) [hereinafter Olivas, Trial of the Century]; Michael A. Olivas, The Accidental 
Historian or How I Found My Groove in Legal History, in A PROMISING PROBLEM: THE 
CURIOUS STATE OF CHICANA/O HISTORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (Carlos K. 
Blanton ed., forthcoming) (on file with author) (noting that Olivas became a law 
professor in 1982) [hereinafter Olivas, Accidental Historian]; Michael A. Olivas, 
Curriculum Vitae, http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/cv/MichaelOlivas2015.pdf  (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Olivas, Curriculum Vitae].  See 
also Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martínez, Crossover Dreams: The Roots of LatCrit 
Theory in Chicana/o Studies Activism and Scholarship, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143, 1151 (1999) 
(“The first [Latina law professors include] Rachel Moran and Berta Hernández, two 
prominent LatCrit scholars, [who] joined the academy in the 1980s.”). 
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being regarded as the Dean of Latina and Latino (Latina/o) law 
professors in the United States.3  For those in the know, his audacious 
“Dirty Dozen List” advocacy in collaboration with Hispanic National 
Bar Association colleagues may be the most obvious reason for this 
appellation and the respeto (respect) that it signifies.4  Professor 
Olivas’s historic advocacy for United States law schools to hire, retain, 
and grant tenure to Latina/o law professors, however, is only one 
aspect of his lifetime of scholarship, teaching, and service to the 
United States’ legal profession, diverse Latina/o communities, and the 
nation as a whole.5 
 
3.  See Johnson & Martínez, supra note 2, at 1150–51 (“Against this background 
of the Chicano movement, we encounter the Chicana/o law professors of the 1970s 
and early 1980s . . . .  Among these first Chicana/o law professors are scholar activists, 
including, but not limited to Leo Romero, Cruz Reynoso, and Richard Delgado. . . .  
Another person who fits within this long history of Mexican American scholar 
activists is Michael Olivas (roughly of this generation), considered to be the ‘Dean’ of 
Latina/o law professors, who began teaching law in 1982.”) (citations omitted); 
Ediberto Román & Christopher Carbot, Freeriders and Diversity in the Legal Academy: 
A New Dirty Dozen List?, 83 INDIANA L. REV. 1235, 1238 n.20 (2008) (“Due in part to his 
efforts associated with creating the Dirty Dozen List and his tireless efforts in assisting 
[Latina/os] with entering the academy, Professor Olivas is affectionately referred to 
as the Dean of all [Latina/o] law professors.”). 
4.  See Johnson & Martínez, supra note 2, at 1151 (“When Olivas began teaching 
there were only 22 Latina/o law professors, and, due in no small part to his efforts, 
there were 125 in the spring of 1998 . . . .  “To pressure law schools to increase the 
number of Latina/o law professors, Olivas, with the backing of the Hispanic National 
Bar Association, established the so-called ‘Dirty Dozen’ list, i.e., a select list of law 
schools in areas with a significant Latina/o population but with no Latina/o faculty.  
The well-publicized list placed pressure on law faculties to hire Latinos/as; [and] 
some schools did.  Olivas also conducted workshops for lawyers interested in law 
teaching at the annual Hispanic National Bar Association convention.”) (citations 
omitted); Román & Carbot, supra note 3, at 1238–39 (“This List, comprised of the top 
twelve U.S. law schools located in high [Latina/o] populated areas but lacking a single 
[Latina/o] professor on the faculty, served to increase awareness of the lack of 
diversity at some of the nation’s top legal institutions, as well as ‘shame’ these schools 
into remedying the dearth of diversity within their faculties.”) (citation omitted).  See 
also Olivas, supra note 2, at 128–38 (discussing the situation of the Latina/o law 
professoriate as of the 1992-93 academic year, and presenting an array of policy 
prescriptions to increase the hiring of Latina/o law professors). 
5.  See generally Olivas, Accidental Historian, supra note 2 (discussing Olivas’s early 
vocational choices, the arc of his scholarly career, and how his scholarship on higher 
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In this Article, I pay homage to Professor Olivas, as an exemplar 
of Latina/o law professors, by engaging with several works of his 
scholarship, particularly “Breaking the Law” on Principle: An Essay on 
Lawyers’ Dilemmas, Unpopular Causes, and Legal Regimes.6  I also explain 
how I understand myself to have benefited from Professor Olivas’s 
historic advocacy for diverse Latina/o communities.7  As developed 
below, I understand my scholarly engagement with Olivas, and both 
of our careers, in the context of what I call la gran lucha (the great 
struggle), “the understanding that our pasts are not merely 
multicolored: rather, our diverse heritages wind through centuries of 
socio-legal struggle, which transcend the current nation state.”8  I 
 
education law and immigration law led him to legal history); Olivas, Curriculum 
Vitae, supra note 2. 
6.  Michael A. Olivas, “Breaking the Law” on Principle: An Essay on Lawyers’ 
Dilemmas, Unpopular Causes, and Legal Regimes, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 815 (1991), reprinted 
in THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER 320–31 (Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic eds., 1998) [hereinafter LATINO/A CONDITION] and LATINOS AND THE LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 813–20 (Richard Delgado, Juan F. Perea & Jean Stefancic eds., 
2008) [hereinafter LATINOS AND THE LAW]. 
7.  See, e.g., Alfredo P. García, Walking the Walk for the Latina Professoriate 
(discussing how Professor Olivas supported and mentored García, the first Cuban 
American to become dean of a law school in the United States) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  Dean García joined the St. Thomas University 
School of Law faculty in 1989.  Id. at 1.  Twenty-two years later, I joined the St. Thomas 
Law faculty after four years of lawyering at the Alameda County Homeless Action 
Center and teaching undergraduate Ethnic Studies courses at San Francisco State 
University and the University of California, Berkeley.  See Marc-Tizoc González, 
Critical Ethnic Legal Histories: Unearthing the Interracial Justice of Filipino American 
Agricultural Labor Organizing, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 991, 1025–29 (2013) (discussing the 
author’s experiences as an activist, attorney, and educator based in Oakland, 
California, by explicating design and implementation of the course, “Interracial 
Justice at Law: Researching the Histories of San Francisco Bay Area Legal Advocacy 
Organizations,” developed as a U.C. Berkeley Chancellor’s Public Scholar, 2010-11). 
8.  González, supra note 7, at 1012.  Cf. Rachel Anderson, Marc-Tizoc González & 
Stephen Lee, Toward a New Student Insurgency: A Critical Epistolary, 87 CAL. L. REV. 
1879, 1898 n.78 (2006) (“La lucha refers to the people’s perpetual struggle for justice.  
El pueblo refers to the people communally working together; it also means ‘the town,’ 
connoting the polis.”); see also Virginia P. Coto, LUCHA, The Struggle for Life: Legal 
Services for Battered Immigrant Women, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749, 755 n.47 (1999) ("The 
word "Lucha" means "the struggle" in Spanish."). 
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deploy the concept of la gran lucha to frame my interpretation of 
Olivas’s career, and those of Latina/o law professors who evince 
principles similar to his, and to contextualize their (our) efforts within 
actual lineages and fictive genealogies of Latina/o lawyers across the 
twentieth century.9 
To embark toward that conclusion, I first discuss Professor 
Olivas’s thoughtful response to Professor Martha L. Minow’s article, 
Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change.10  In 
reviewing the three case studies that Olivas developed in order to 
extend Minow’s inquiry into three risks of legal representation, I also 
discuss the scholarly response to Olivas’s essay, from 1993 when the 
first law review publication cited to it, through 2013 when the twenty-
fourth did so.11  Along the way, I discuss how the case studies 
implicate similar risks of representation regarding reemerging socio-
legal situations, particularly the situation of women and children 
from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras who seek asylum in the 
United States (the risk of nonrepresentation), and the detention of 
people from other Latin American countries, on the basis of their 
unauthorized immigration status, who migrate to the United States in 
order to create a better life for themselves and their families (the risk 
of terminated representation).  Toward the end of Part I, I discuss the 
legal scholarship, by Olivas and others, on a famous Chicano lawyer, 
Oscar “Zeta” Acosta, who has been acclaimed for quashing the 
indictment of Chicano Movement activists in late 1960s Los Angeles.12 
Olivas’s scholarship on Acosta illuminated the risk of truncated 
representation and suggested one way to confront it: rather than 
accede to the criminalization of his clients, Acosta subpoenaed the in-
court testimony of over one hundred judges regarding their 
nomination practices for the Los Angeles grand jury, and he 
 
9.  See infra Part II (discussing the legal history of Chicana/o and other Mexican 
American lawyers in California and Texas). 
10.  See Martha L. Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for 
Social Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 723 (1991); Olivas, supra note 6. 
11.  See infra Appendix 1 (listing the twenty-four citing references to Olivas, supra 
note 6). 
12.  See infra Part I.C (discussing the risk of truncated representation). 
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ultimately proved that they violated constitutional equal protection.13
 Building upon the legal scholarship on Acosta, I conclude the 
Article by explaining why I interpret the work of Professor Olivas, 
particularly his scholarship, but also his teaching and service, under 
the concept of la gran lucha.  I explicate by discussing several twentieth 
century Mexican American lawyers in California who preceded 
Acosta, and I argue that they contextualize the work of Olivas, and 
other Latina/o law professors, within actual lineages and fictive 
genealogies of people who use the law to struggle against injustice.  
Learning how lawyers of diverse racialized ethnic identities 
confronted the risks of representation in the past can benefit lawyers, 
and other legal workers, who struggle against injustice today. 
 
I. Breaking the Law on Principle: Olivas’s Risk of  
 Representation Case Studies 
 
In this Part, I review the three case studies that Professor Olivas 
developed in order to extend Professor (now Harvard Law dean) 
Martha Minow’s inquiry into three risks of representation for lawyers 
whose clients “entertain breaking the law as one of their strategies for 
achieving social change.”14  While reviewing each case study, I gloss 
how other scholars have responded to Olivas’s essay and discuss how 
the case studies implicate similar and reemerging socio-legal 
situations (and their concomitant risks of representation).  I end the 
Part by briefly discussing a few apparently new socio-legal situations 
that implicate the three risks of representation, which militate for 
further research into how lawyers might confront the risks of 
representation in order to ethically represent people who seek social 
justice under, and beyond, the color of the law.15 
In 1991, almost a decade into his career as a law professor, 
 
13.  See infra notes 151–53, 277–85, 292–97 and accompanying text. 
14.  Minow, supra note 10, at 723–24. 
15.  On the “color of law” notion, and the state action doctrine, see generally 
Richard H.W. Maloy, “Under Color of” – What Does It Mean?, 56 MERCER L. REV. 565 
(2005), (cited approvingly in United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 141 n.1 (2d Cir. 
2006)). 
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Professor Olivas published an essay in response to Professor Minow’s 
inquiry into how lawyers and law students could learn from clients 
and communities who struggled to achieve social change outside of 
institutions and conduct deemed lawful in a particular historical 
moment.16  In Minow’s provocative phrasing, “[W]hat can and what 
should lawyers do for clients who entertain breaking the law as one 
of their strategies for achieving social change?”17  Olivas responded to 
Minow by focusing on the three risks of representation that she 
characterized as: 
inherent in the lawyer-client relationship that occur when 
the client breaks the law in order to pursue social, political, 
or legal change: a risk of nonrepresentation, where no 
accomplished lawyer will take the case; a risk of terminated 
representation, when ethical requirements may jeopardize 
an unpopular client’s defense; and a risk of truncated 
representation, where the lawyer’s choice of tactics may 
undermine the very premise of the client’s grievance.18 
As Olivas explained his essay’s purpose: 
I seek to extend [Minow’s] inquiry by posing several cases 
that elaborate upon her thesis, which I take to be that most 
legal education neither equips students to think strategically 
or ethically about enduring inequities in society, nor 
provides problem-solving experiences so that students can 
undertake social reform in life after law school.19 
He then presented three case studies to illustrate the risks of 
representation that Minow had identified.  Although each case study 
implicated all three risks of representation, in my view each case 
study highlighted a particular risk: (1) the risk of nonrepresentation 
for unaccompanied children from Central American countries who 
sought asylum in the United States in the late 1980s through federal 
 
16.  See Minow, supra note 10; Olivas, supra note 6. 
17.  Minow, supra note 10, at 723–24. 
18.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 815. 
19.  Id. at 819. 
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courts located in Texas;20 (2) the risk of terminated representation 
when lawyers organized boycotts of Israeli military courts in 1989 to 
protest their clients’ conditions of detention and lack of due process 
following the first Intifada;21 and (3) the risk of truncated 
representation through the startling litigation strategy attributed to 
Chicano lawyer Oscar “Zeta” Acosta.22  Acosta defended Chicano 
Movement activists in the late 1960s, including those who were 
indicted for felony conspiracy to commit various misdemeanor crimes 
allegedly committed while organizing the Chicano “blowouts” of 
March 1968, massive student walk-out strikes against the racist 
conditions of their East Los Angeles high schools.23  To quash the 
indictments, Acosta subpoenaed and interrogated more than one 
hundred judges in court, seeking to prove that their grand jury 
selection practices violated constitutional equal protection.24 
 
20.  Id. at 819–35.  See also Michael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children: 
Detention, Due Process, and Disgrace, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159 (1990) (discussing the 
detention of thousands of unaccompanied children in refugee camps without access 
to basic necessities) [hereinafter Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children]. 
21.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 820, 835–46.  Discussing the 1987 uprising against the 
conditions of the “Occupied Territories” (a.k.a., the Intifada) in detail is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but for a view contemporaneous to Olivas’s essay, see Richard 
A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in 
the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129 (1991). 
22.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 820, 846–54.  On the life and times of Oscar Z. Acosta, 
see OSCAR ACOSTA, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BROWN BUFFALO (1972) [hereinafter 
ACOSTA, BUFFALO]; OSCAR ACOSTA, THE REVOLT OF THE COCKROACH PEOPLE (1973) 
[hereinafter ACOSTA, REVOLT]; OSCAR “ZETA” ACOSTA: THE UNCOLLECTED WORKS: (Ilan 
Stavans ed., 1996) [hereinafter UNCOLLECTED WORKS].  Acosta was born on April 8, 
1935, in El Paso, Texas.  ILAN STAVANS, BANDIDO: OSCAR “ZETA” ACOSTA & THE 
CHICANO EXPERIENCE 125 (1995).  His date of death is unknown, but he disappeared 
off the coast of México in May 1974 and was declared legally dead on December 18, 
1986.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 854 n.154 (citing In re Estate of Oscar Zeta Acosta, Order 
No. P710333, Los Angeles Superior Court (Dec. 18, 1986)). 
23.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 820, 846–54.  On the late 1960s Chicano Movement 
in Los Angeles, see, e.g., MARIO T. GARCÍA & SAL CASTRO, BLOWOUT!: SAL CASTRO 
AND THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE (2011); IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, 
RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003); CARLOS MUÑOZ, JR., YOUTH, 
IDENTITY, POWER: THE CHICANO MOVEMENT (1989).  See also Walkout (Edward James 
Olmos dir., 2006). 
24.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 820, 846–54. 
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A. The Risk of Nonrepresentation 
 
Professor Olivas discusses the risk of nonrepresentation by 
focusing on “the case of unaccompanied refugee children, [whom] the 
government has openly and flagrantly precluded from receiving 
counsel.”25  He contextualizes the detention of “unaccompanied 
children who have felt the violence in their Central American 
countries” within the then-recent “Congressional action to apologize 
for the internment of [around 120,000] Japanese Americans during 
World War II and to make long overdue restitution for their 
appropriated property.”26  Possibly to forestall some readers’ protests 
that the Japanese “war relocation centers” should not be compared to 
refugee camps for Central American children, Olivas then details the 
grim conditions of confinement within the then-new camps, which 
the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) established 
in early 1989.27 
For example, Olivas discusses the “expansion of detention 
facilities in rural areas such as Florence, Arizona, and El Centro, 
 
25.  Id. at 819. 
26.  Id. at 820; see also COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF 
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 2–3 (1983), http://www.archives.gov/research/
japanese-americans/justice-denied/ (“This policy of exclusion, removal, and detention 
was executed against 120,000 people without individual review[.]”) [hereinafter 
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED]; MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 175 (2006)  (“Presuming all Japanese in America to be 
racially inclined to disloyalty, the United States removed 120,000 Japanese 
Americans—two-thirds of them citizens—from their homes on the Pacific Coast and 
interned them in ten concentration camps in the interior.”) (citation omitted); Denshō, 
http://www.densho.org (last visited July 27, 2015) (preserving oral histories of 
Japanese Americans detained by the United States during World War II); Adam 
Liptak, A Discredited Supreme Court Ruling That Still, Technically, Stands, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/us/time-for-supreme-court-to-ov
errule-korematsu-verdict.html?_r=0 (noting that the United States removed 110,000 
Americans of Japanese ancestry from their homes and confined them in detention 
camps during World War II). 
27.  See Olivas, supra note 6, at 821.  See also NGAI, supra note 26, at 169, 175–201 
(discussing the “mass incarceration [of Japanese Americans] in U.S. concentration 
camps from 1942 to 1945”). 
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California, as well as in six sites in South Texas: Los Fresnos, 
Raymondsville, Port Isabel, Hondo, Brownsville, and San Benito.”28  
Emblematic of the “ramshackle” condition of these “detention 
centers,” Olivas highlights, “[O]ne site in Texas has been sardonically 
dubbed ‘El Corralon’ (The Corral), while another is a former 
Department of Agriculture pesticide storage facility.”29  Citing to 
testimony before Congressional hearings, contemporary journalism, 
authoritative reports by government agencies and lawyers’ 
organizations, and reported judicial opinions, Olivas demonstrates 
that the detention centers failed to provide essential services to the 
children whom they confined, including health care, education, 
counseling, and access to legal services.30  He concludes, “Such 
coercive conditions have wreaked serious damage upon the children, 
who often have no family members to protect their interests and who 
are unaware of their rights under United States law.”31 
From the terrible conditions of the children’s confinement, Olivas 
then excoriates the INS practices that have deprived these children of 
their rights under constitutional due process and controlling 
statutes.32  He explains: 
The practice of detaining alien minors has advanced two 
ulterior motives.  First, the harsh practice is used to 
discourage other refugees from migrating to the United 
States—to show them that the United States “means 
business.”  Secondly, the practice of requiring parents or 
family members to appear in person and claim the 
children has been fashioned to “bait” undocumented 
families into revealing themselves to authorities.33 
Drawing upon then-recent federal district court opinions, Olivas 
details how the INS had “acted to deprive unaccompanied alien 
 
28.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 822. 
29.  Id. 
30.  See id. at 821–26. 
31.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 822. 
32.  Id. at 823–26. 
33.  Id. at 823. 
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minors of their rights to full hearings and other due process rights.”34  
For example, “the judge in Orantes-Hernandez found a ‘persistent 
pattern and practice of misconduct,’ use of ‘intimidation, threats, and 
misrepresentation,’ and evidence of ‘a widespread and pervasive 
practice akin to a policy’ concerning pressure on Salvadorans to 
concede their rights.”35  Olivas also decried “the remote locations of the 
facilities, INS policies on transfer and availability of legal resources, and 
poor response by organized bars,” concluding that, “legal assistance to 
unaccompanied children is virtually non-existent.”36  He highlighted 
that, “even though Laredo, Texas is hundreds of miles away from San 
Antonio, over eighty percent of the San Antonio region immigration 
caseload is in Laredo.”37  Most egregious, in his estimation, however 
was “the INS practice of transferring aliens as a means of depriving 
them of counsel.”38  Indeed, “in several instances, transfers have even 
been made after counsel was retained or as a blatant attempt to deny 
[the right to] counsel.”39 
Reading Olivas’s essay some twenty-four years after it was 
published, I am reminded of the phrase, plus ça change, plus c’est la 
même chose (the more things change, the more they stay the same).40  
 
34.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 824–25 (discussing Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665 
(C.D. Cal. 1988), rev’d by 913 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1990); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 
F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Perez-Funez v. INS, 611 F. Supp. 990 (C.D. Cal. 1984), 
modified by 619 F. Supp. 656 (C.D. Cal. 1985)).  See also Olivas, supra note 6, at 825–26 
(discussing Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1986); Comm. of 
Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 682 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Nuñez v. Boldin, 537 F. 
Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982)).  For further 
discussion of Flores, see infra note 60. 
35.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 824 (citing Orantes-Hernandez, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1504–
05 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornbugh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th 
Cir. 1990). 
36.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 824. 
37.  Id. at 824. 
38.  Id. at 825. 
39.  Id. at 825–26 (citation omitted). 
40.  The phrase is attributed to the French critic, journalist, and novelist, Jean-
Baptiste Alphonse Karr (Nov. 24, 1808, to Sept. 29, 1890), who coined it as an epigram 
in the January 1849 issue of his monthly journal Les Guêpes (The Wasps).  See Alphonse 
Karr, WIKIQUOTE, at https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Alphonse_Karr (last modified Mar. 
10, 2015); plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose, WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktio
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As a socially active law student, lawyer, and professor41 over the past 
dozen-or-so-years, I have read and heard myriad accounts of the 
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (“ICE”) 
of the Department of Homeland Security detaining people 
throughout the United States, on (un/reasonable?) suspicion of them 
lacking authorized immigration status.42  While I did not practice 
immigration law in this period, my Chicana/o identity,43 education in 
 
nary.org/wiki/plus_ça_change,_plus_c’est_la_même_chose (last modified Feb. 9, 
2015); accord Charles Sumner Stone, Jr., Thucydides’ Law of History, or from Kerner, 1968 
to Hacker, 1992, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1711, 1733 n.82 (1993); Kathryn A. Stephens, 
Introduction, 3 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 281, 282 n.9 (2013). 
41.  See Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 1892–1905 (theorizing insurgent student 
activism distilled from the author’s experience in Berkeley Law student organizations 
from 2002 to 2005); see also González, supra note 7, at 1026–29 (discussing the author’s 
creation of the course, “Interracial Justice at Law: Researching the Histories of San 
Francisco Bay Area Legal Advocacy Organizations” within the context of lawyering 
at the Oakland, California office of the Alameda County Homeless Action Center, 
teaching Ethnic Studies courses at San Francisco State University and U.C. Berkeley, 
and serving as a director or officer of, inter alia, the Berkeley Law Foundation, Centro 
Legal de la Raza, East Bay La Raza Lawyers Association, and National Lawyers Guild 
– San Francisco Bay Area Chapter). 
42.  See, e.g., RAQUEL ALDANA & STEVEN BENDER, SALT STATEMENT ON POST 9/11 
IMMIGRATION MEASURES (2007) (on file with author) (explaining the evolution of 
Congressional plenary power over immigration in order to increase awareness of 
how law has functioned to exclude noncitizens from fundamental rights); U.S. DEPT. 
HOMELAND SEC., BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ENDGAME 
OFFICE OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL STRATEGIC PLAN, 2003-2012 ii (Aug. 15, 2003) (on 
file with author) (planning to detain and deport “all removable aliens” in order “to 
maintain the integrity of the immigration process and protect our homeland”); ERIK 
CAMAYD-FREIXAS, STATEMENT OF DR. ERIK CAMAYD-FREIXAS FEDERALLY CERTIFIED 
INTERPRETER AT THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA 
REGARDING A HEARING ON “THE ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND CONVICTION OF 297 
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN POSTVILLE, IOWA, FROM MAY 12 TO 22, 2008” (June 13, 
2008), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Camayd-Freixas080724.pdf (co-
mmenting on the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of 297 undocumented workers 
who were detained following a raid of Agriprocessors, Inc., the nation’s largest 
kosher slaughterhouse and meat packing plant, located in Postville, Iowa, and 
critiquing the judicial process as marred by myriad irregularities, which undermined 
the defendants’ due process rights and defense against federal felony charges of 
identity theft). 
43.  See Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 1880 n.4 (discussing the author’s 
Chicana/o identity). 
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comparative ethnic studies and critical race theory,44 and affiliation 
with Latina and Latino Critical Legal (LatCrit) theory, praxis, and 
community45 have informed me about the colonialist and racist 
histories of United States immigration policies and practices,46 and 
motivated me to learn about their enforcement in the twenty-first 
century.  Olivas’s essay deepens and concretizes the insight that the 
people who have directed ICE over the past dozen years barely 
needed to dust off the playbooks of yesterday’s INS—both as to 
immigrants in general and, particularly, as to children from Central 
American countries seeking refuge in the United States. 
For example, when I first heard about ICE’s practice of quickly 
 
44.  See id. at 1892–1904 (discussing the author’s education in critical race theory, 
and experiences with LatCrit theory, praxis, and community through “insurgent 
student activism” at Berkeley Law from 2002-05); González, supra note 8, at 1026, 
1033–34 (discussing the author’s education in comparative ethnic studies at San 
Francisco State University). 
45.  See Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 1897 n.76 (citing several exemplars of 
critical race theory); González, supra note 7, at 1006–07 nn.35–39 (citing exemplars of 
various genres of critical outsider jurisprudence, including Asian American legal 
scholarship, critical race feminism, critical race theory, and LatCrit theory). 
46.  See, e.g., NGAI, supra note 26, at 96–224 (discussing pre-1965 immigration law 
and policy regarding Filipino, Mexican, Japanese, and Chinese communities); 
RONALD L. MIZE & ALICIA C.S. SWORDS, CONSUMING MEXICAN LABOR: FROM THE 
BRACERO PROGRAM TO NAFTA xiii (2011) (arguing that postwar immigration patterns 
of typical Mexican immigrant workers must be understood in the context of how 
North American consumption practices have shaped particular labor demands for 
low wages and marginalized conditions).  See also Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 
1902 (contextualizing the twentieth-century Bracero programs and 1954’s Operation 
Wetback within the aftermath of the 1846-48 United States invasion of México); 
Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair: Legisprudential and Historic Perspectives 
on the AgJobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 417, 425–33 (2000) (providing a brief 
history of U.S. guest worker programs); González, supra note 7, at 993 n.2, 1017 n.70 
and accompanying text (discussing the Bracero programs, which facilitated the entry 
of Mexican nationals to labor in the United States, predominantly in agriculture, from 
1942-64, and discussing the conquest, occupation, and colonization of las islas Filipinas 
(the Philippine Islands) by the United States in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century era of Asian exclusion, which subjected the archipelago’s 
inhabitants to the status of being American nationals); Marc-Tizoc González, Who 
were the Braceros? What was Operation Wetback? – How Mid-Twentieth-Century 
Immigration and Labor Law and Policy Shape Today’s Child Refugee Crisis 7 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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sending an “immigrant detainee” away to a distant “detention 
facility” in a rural part of the state, or out of the state entirely,47 it 
seemed not only outrageous but also lawless, as violating 
fundamental constitutional rights of due process and the assistance of 
counsel.  Similarly, to me the ubiquitous ICE raids that began under 
the rule of President George W. Bush seemed redolent of mid-
twentieth century travesties like 1954’s “Operation Wetback,” which 
deported over a million people who were deemed to be Mexican, 
including United States citizens of Mexican heritage, in a single year.48  
While I hope that few, if any, lawyers would deny that twentieth 
century history provides critical insights into the policies and 
practices that constitute or exacerbate injustice today, I have 
nevertheless spoken with many law students and lawyers who 
advance social justice under the color of law yet lack a deep and 
nuanced understanding of the socio-legal histories that contextualize 
 
47.  See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF 
IMMIGRANTS TO REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), INTER-AM. 
COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS., REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION 
AND DUE PROCESS, ORG. OF AM. STATES 137–40 (Dec. 30, 2010) (describing “pervasive 
use of transfers between detention facilities”). 
48.  See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 83 (noting that 3.8 million people 
were deported to Mexico from the start of Operation Wetback, and over the next five 
years, with only 63,515 receiving formal deportation hearings, and the deportees 
included many U.S. citizens); MIZE & SWORDS, supra note 46, at 1–2, 25–40 (discussing 
Operation Wetback in detail); NGAI, supra note 23, at 155–57 (contrasting Operation 
Wetback with the Mexican workers whom the United States admitted during the 
same period under the Bracero Program); González, supra note 46, at 7 (presenting a 
chronology of Operation Wetback); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My 
Grandfather’s Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 
34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 437–39 (1990) (“In 1954, over one million braceros were 
deported under the terms of ‘Operation Wetback,’ a ‘Special Mobile Force’ of the 
Border Patrol . . . .  The Bracero Program, dehydration and Operation Wetback all 
presaged immigration programs of the 1980’s.  During this time, the INS began 
‘Operation Jobs,’ a massive early 1980’s workplace-raid program of deportations[.]”) 
(citations omitted).  See generally JUAN RAMON GARCÍA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE 
MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980).  On the 
raids of homes by ICE agents searching for “immigration fugitives,” which the Bush 
Administration vastly expanded in 2006, see, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Report Says 
Immigration Agents Broke Law and Agency Rules in Home Raids, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/nyregion/22raids.html. 
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and shape present-day inequities.49  Olivas’s essay provides a 
powerful antidote to this historical amnesia. 
Indeed, as to children from Central American countries seeking 
refuge in the United States, Olivas’s essay seems positively prophetic.  
In 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
popular media in the United States noted a “surge” in unaccompanied 
children, primarily from the Central American countries of El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, seeking asylum in nearby 
countries, including the United States.50  The so-called surge in 
unaccompanied minors apprehended at the Southwest United States 
border with México, which received substantial media attention in the 
 
49.  See González, supra note 7, at 1020–21 (“Consequently, today’s students are 
left to the vagaries of their own educational institutions, social networks, and 
serendipities—rather than being able  to learn early and comprehensively about the 
existence of legal advocacy organizations that are dedicated to addressing the socio-
legal needs of . . . differentially racialized communities.”).  Accord Marie A. Failinger, 
Necessary Legends: The National Equal Justice Library and the Importance of Poverty 
Lawyers’ History, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 265, 284–87 (1998) (arguing persuasively 
for learning the history of the legal services movement); Olivas, Accidental Historian, 
supra note 2, at 21 (“I was astounded that I had been a law student, a legal scholar, 
and a Chicano, and I had never heard of the case [Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 
(1954)] or of him [Southern District of Texas Judge James DeAnda] in this capacity [as 
one of the Hernandez lawyers].”). 
50.  See, e.g., U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN ON THE RUN: 
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN LEAVING CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO AND THE NEED 
FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 4–5 (May 2014) [hereafter CHILDREN ON THE RUN] 
(documenting the increased number of asylum seekers from El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras since 2009, with a noteworthy “surge,” beginning in Oct. 2011, of 
unaccompanied and separated children from these countries, and from Mexico, 
seeking to enter the United States).  See also Children on the Run, N.Y TIMES (June 4, 
2014), http://nyti.ms/1kzi7lf; Ian Gordon, 70,000 Kids Will Show Up Alone at Our Border 
This Year. What Happens to Them?, MOTHER JONES (June/Aug. 2014), http://www.moth
erjones.com/politics/2014/06/child-migrants-surge-unaccompanied-central-america 
(reporting on “the child migrant surge,” noting that the United States Border Patrol 
apprehended 38,833 unaccompanied minors in fiscal year 2013, and projecting as 
many as 74,000 such apprehensions in fiscal year 2014); Julianne Hing, Three Myths of 
the Unaccompanied Minors Crisis, Debunked, COLORLINES (July 1, 2014), http://www.co
lorlines.com/articles/three-myths-unaccompanied-minors-crisis-debunked (report-
ing that “the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Women’s Refugee 
Commission have noted the jump in unaccompanied minor border crossings since 
late 2011”) (citation omitted). 
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summer of 2014, was first noted in fiscal year 2011 but the increase in 
people seeking asylum in the United States from El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras actually began in 2009.51 
The numbers are striking, and the scale is massive.  When Olivas 
wrote in 1991, “INS figures show[ed] over 880 alien children detained 
in Texas and 1,200 in California.”52  In fiscal year 2009 (October 1, 2008 
to September 30, 2009), the United States Customs and Border 
Protection (“CBP”) agency reported encountering 1,221 
“unaccompanied alien children” from El Salvador, 1,115 from 
Guatemala, 968 from Honduras, and 16,114 from México, at the 
Southwest border, totaling 19,418 children.53  In fiscal year 2011, CBP 
reported encountering 1,394 “unaccompanied alien children” from El 
Salvador, 1,565 from Guatemala, 974 from Honduras, and 11,768 from 
México, totaling 15,701 children.54  This figure was about eighty-one 
percent of the number reported for 2009 and apparently caused by the 
substantial decrease in CBP encounters with unaccompanied children 
from México.  By fiscal year 2014, however, CBP reported 16,404 
“unaccompanied alien children” from El Salvador, 17,057 from 
Guatemala, 18,244 from Honduras, and 15,634 from México, totaling 
67,399 children, or about 347 percent of the 2009 number and 429 
percent of the 2011 number.55  Finally, in contrast to the reported 
numbers of “unaccompanied alien children” encountered in 2014, CBP 
reported that it had apprehended 68,541 “unaccompanied alien 
children” at the Southwest border, plus an additional 68,445 family 
unit apprehensions.56 
 
51.  See CHILDREN ON THE RUN, supra note 50, at 4–5; see also SOUTHWEST BORDER 
UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN (FY 2014), U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, http:/ 
/www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children-2014 (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2015). 
52.  Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children, supra note 20, at 160.  
53.  U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, supra note 51. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id.  Accord Dan Restrepo & Ann Garcia, The Surge of Unaccompanied Children 
from Central America, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 2 (July 24, 2014). 
56.  U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, supra note 51.  Accord Cindy Carcamo, 
Nearly 300 Women, Children, Deported from Immigration Detention Centers, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-ff-new-mexico-
immigration-deportation-20140821-story.html (“In the last nine months, about 63,000 
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In the face of such numbers, the risk of nonrepresentation for 
unaccompanied refugee children is stark, and relatively few 
structural reforms have been implemented since Olivas highlighted 
the problem “of the children, many of whom have meritorious asylum 
claims, not being able to obtain counsel in time for counsel to be of 
significant assistance.”57  While the conditions of confinement may 
have improved slightly, they remain inadequate.58  ICE practices still 
seem designed to deprive these children of their rights, 
notwithstanding court orders to the contrary.59  Children in 
 
single parents with at least one child have been apprehended along the Southwest 
border, mainly in southern Texas.  At the same time, about the same numbers of 
children traveling without a parent have been apprehended along the border.”). 
57.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 833. 
58.  See, e.g., Carcamo, supra note 56 (discussing a Department of Homeland 
Security Office of Inspector General report finding “inadequate amounts of food, 
inconsistent temperatures and unsanitary conditions—at various immigration 
holding facilities for children”).  See also Anna Gorman, Immigration Detention Centers 
Failed to Meet Standards, Report Says, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2009), http://articles. 
latimes.com/2009/jul/29/nation/na-detention29; Karen McVeigh, Immigration Groups 
Allege Abuse of Migrant Minors by US Border Patrol, GUARDIAN (UK) (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/us-unaccompanied-migrant-
minors-abuse-border- patrol; Julia Preston, Official to Investigate Reports of 
Mistreatment of Minors Caught Crossing Border, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2014), at A19; 
Nicole Flatow, Feds Rush to Provide Basic Supplies for Surge of Migrant Kids Held in 
Makeshift ‘Warehouses’, THINKPROGRESS (June 8, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/imm
igration/2014/06/08/3446282/migrant-children-surge. 
59.  See, e.g., Wyl S. Hinton, The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-
americas-family-detention-camps.html (“As the pro bono project in Artesia continued 
into fall, its attorneys continued to win in court.  By mid-November, more than 400 
of the detained women and children were free on bond.  Then on Nov. 20, the 
administration suddenly announced plans to transfer the Artesia detainees to the ICE 
detention camp in Karnes, Tex., where they would fall under a new immigration 
court district with a new slate of judges.”).  According to Google Maps, Artesia, New 
Mexico is 541.9 miles away from Karnes, Texas.  See also Flores v. Holder, CV85-4544 
DMG (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015), http://media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2015/06/10/
16/08/1exeYm.So.91.pdf (“Tentative Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settle-
ment of Class Action and Defendants’ Motion to Amend Settlement Agreement”); 
Francisco Ordoñez, Lawyer: I Released Judge’s Words to Protect my Clients in Family 
Detention, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 11, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/news/nation-
world/national/article23772475.html (“U.S. District Court Judge Dolly Gee’s April 24 
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“detention centers” still lack the special protections provided to 
children in other contexts, including an effective right to counsel.60  
Moreover, despite being particularly vulnerable and in need of 
protection,61 Legal Services Corporation-funded programs (LSC 
programs) remain statutorily prohibited from serving these 
children,62 and biases against children from Central American 
countries have grown ever more pernicious.63  Finally, while 
 
tentative ruling, which has been kept secret for months, is a scathing rebuke of the 
Obama administration’s decision to significantly increase its use of family detention 
in response to a surge of mothers and children fleeing poverty and violence in Central 
America.”). 
60.  See, e.g., Sharon Finkel, Comment, Voices of Justice: Promoting Fairness through 
Appointed Counsel for Immigrant Children, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1105, 1006 (2001) 
(“Children in deportation hearings are entitled by statute to counsel, but this right is 
provided at no expense to the government.”) (citing Immigration and Nationality Act 
§ 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (Supp. 2000)).  See also Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz, Immigrant 
Detainees and the Right to Counsel, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/03/31/sunday-review/immigrant-detainees-and-the-right-to-counsel.html 
(reporting on the legal and practical reasons why detained immigrants lack counsel).  
61.  See, e.g., Finkel, supra note 60, at 1127-32 (arguing that the law should protect 
children because of their intrinsic vulnerability); Olivas, supra note 6, at 826–33 
(demonstrating U.S. law provides children with special protection in other contexts 
and arguing that children in immigration proceedings particularly need such 
protection); Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children, supra note 20, at 161–62 (same). 
62.  See Olivas, supra note 6, at 831 (“[T[he Legal Services Corporation (LSC) 
program is statutorily prohibited from serving these aliens.”) (citation omitted); 
Kevin R. Johnson & Amagda Pérez, Clinical Legal Education and the U.C. Davis 
Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Practice and Practice into Theory, 51 SMU L. 
REV. 1423, 1429 (1998) (“Congress worsened matters in the 1980s by restricting the 
ability of legal services organizations receiving national Legal Service Corporation 
funds to represent immigrants.”) (citations omitted); Clare L. Workman, Kids Are 
People Too: Empowering Unaccompanied Minor Aliens Through Legislative Reform, 3 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 223, 245 (2004) (“Only in rare cases would the 
government need to appoint an attorney, and it could easily accomplish this by 
removing restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation’s ability to serve aliens.”). 
63.  Accord Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!: 
Assessing “Dystopian Dreams” and “Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and 
Considering whether “Immigration Regionalism is an Idea whose Time has Come, 38 
FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 1, 3 (2010) (“The dystopian dream of immigration reform, of 
which Amerizona is just one version, is often strongly anti-immigrant, exclusionary, 
nativist, and even racist); Johnson & Pérez, supra note 62, at 1428 (“the troubles facing 
immigrants in this country have worsened considerably over time.  Indeed, the 1990s 
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pecuniary interests around the detention of immigrants and refugees 
may have existed in 1989-91, by 2015 the profitability of detaining 
immigrants and refugees had become so infamous as to obtain 
recognition in “mainstream” journalism.64 
Perhaps the only structural reform that has been implemented 
better today than when Olivas penned his essays on the subject some 
twenty-four years ago,65 is that organized bar associations, 
particularly the American Immigration Lawyers Association 
(“AILA”),66 non-LSC funded specialized legal advocacy organizations 
 
saw the worst outbreak of nativism and restrictionist legislation since early in the 
twentieth century.”) (citations omitted).  See generally JUSTIN AKERS CHACÓN & MIKE 
DAVIS, NO ONE IS ILLEGAL: FIGHTING RACISM AND STATE VIOLENCE ON THE U.S.-MEXICO 
BORDER (2006); IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT 
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997). 
64.  See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Companies Use Immigration Crackdown to Turn a Profit, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/asia/getting-
tough-on-immigrants-to-turn-a-profit.html (“In the United States—with almost 
400,000 annual detentions in 2010, up from 280,000 in 2005—private companies now 
control nearly half of all detention beds, compared with only 8 percent in state and 
federal prisons, according to government figures.”).  By “mainstream,” I mean 
journalism that is popular in the sense of widespread readership but which tends 
either to identify with the power elite, or to privilege their interests.  See Anderson et 
al., supra note 8, at 1895 n.68, 1879 n.86 (explaining the author’s usage of the word 
“mainstream” and the phrase “of the people,” in light of Chicana/o Studies texts and 
Latin American liberation philosophy conferences).  On the “power elite,” see C. 
WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 3–4 (new ed. 2000) (“The power elite is composed of 
men [sic] whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of 
ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major 
consequences . . . .  For they are in command of the major hierarchies and 
organizations of modern society.”).  Cf. The Richest People in America, FORBES, at http://
www.forbes.com/forbes-400/ (last visited July 12, 2015). 
65.  Olivas, supra note 6; Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children, supra note 20. 
66.  See Hinton, supra note 59 (reporting on the efforts of Denver lawyer Christina 
Brown, and others, to relocate to Artesia, New Mexico in order to organize a pro bono 
project of roughly 200 attorneys, law students, and paralegals to represent detained 
children and women).  See also CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project, AILA Doc No. 
14100656, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, (June 5, 2015), http://www.aila.org/
practice/pro-bono/find-your-opportunity/cara-family-detention-pro-bono-project 
(“Immigrants’ rights and immigrant legal services groups are announcing the 
establishment of a family detention project to provide legal services to children and 
their mothers detained in Karnes City and Dilley, Texas, and to advocate for the end 
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(e.g., Catholic Legal Immigration Network, the American 
Immigration Council, and the Refugee and Immigrant Center for 
Education and Legal Services),67 and law school-based legal clinics, 
have organized spirited pro bono publico efforts to represent some of 
the Central American women and children who are seeking asylum 
in the United States.68  Also, although they do not constitute a 
structural reform, detained women seeking asylum in the United 
States have organized profound protests against their conditions of 
confinement, including hunger strikes, which have increasingly 
received mainstream media coverage.69  In turn, for one who knows 
about the history of Central American peoples who sought asylum in 
the United States in the 1980s, today’s mass hunger strikes by 
 
of family detention”).  See generally Featured Issue: Central American Humanitarian Crisis, 
AILA Doc No. 14070148, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, (Mar. 30, 2015), 
http://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/central-american-humanitarian-crisis (linking 
to numerous resources on attempts to undermine protections for asylees and 
unaccompanied children, due process for children in removal proceedings, 
government resources, AILA member action items, etc.). 
67.  See CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project, supra note 66. 
68.  See, e.g., Johnson & Pérez, supra note 62, at 1426-27 (evaluating the benefits 
of clinical legal education for subordinated communities through a case study of the 
Immigration Law Clinic at the University of California at Davis School of Law).  See 
also Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Learning Through Service In a Clinical Setting: The Effect 
Of Specialization On Social Justice And Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 307, 324 (2001) 
(arguing for teachers of immigration law clinics to help students “see the full picture 
of the social and legal needs” of their clients); Liz Robbins, Program Providing Legal 
Help to Immigrants Will Expand Beyond New York City, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/nyregion/program-providing-legal-help-to-
immigrants-will-expand-beyond-new-york-city.html?_r=0 (reporting on the second 
cohort of New York’s new Immigrant Justice Corps, http://justicecorps.org). See 
generally IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CORPS, http://justicecorps.org (last visited July 28, 2015). 
69.  See, e.g., Wyl S. Hinton, A Federal Judge and a Hunger Strike Take on the 
Government’s Immigrant Detention Facilities, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/04/06/magazine/a-federal-judge-and-a-hunger-strike-take-on-the-
governments-immigrant-detention-facilities.html (“Last week, after pro-longed 
confinement, 78 young women at a facility in Karnes County, Tex., took the drastic 
final measure of prisoners everywhere:  They announced a ‘hunger strike’ and 
declared their refusal to work or ‘use any service in this place’ until conditions 
improve.”).  
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detained women evoke the original Sanctuary Movement,70 and must 
be understood within the context of the resurgence of “sanctuary 
cities” over the past decade.71 
A comprehensive review of the current situation of Central 
American people seeking asylum in the United States is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  One takeaway point, however, is that Olivas’s 
description of the structural conditions faced by children from Central 
America who sought asylum in the United States in the late 1980s feels 
almost prescient.  By commenting critically on several timely 
controversies, Olivas informed a strain of subsequent legal 
scholarship on the subject.72  Indeed, nineteen of the twenty-four law 
review articles that cite to his essay did so for propositions related to 
the conditions of refugee children and their unmet needs for legal 
representation.73  In contrast, relatively few scholars engaged with 
 
70.  See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 
DUKE L.J. 891, 909–12 (2008) (discussing the public interest response to the refugee 
crisis of the 1980s and how the Sanctuary Movement, “in which churches were turned 
into sanctuaries for refugees denied legal entrance[,]” established new organizations 
to advocate for the rights of people seeking asylum in the United States).  For early 
legal scholarship on the Sanctuary Movement, see, e.g., Michele Altemus, The 
Sanctuary Movement, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 683 (1988); Toney Anaya, Sanctuary: Because 
There Are Still Many Who Wait for Death, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (1986); Douglas L. 
Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury A Government’s Weapon against the 
Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5 (1986); Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in 
Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271 
(1987); Paul Wickham Schmidt, Refuge in the United States: The Sanctuary Movement 
Should Use the Legal System, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79 (1986); Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note, 
The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement: A Comparison of History, 
Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429 (1987). 
71.  See, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local 
Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2006); Cristina 
M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
567 (2008); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is A “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133 (2008); 
Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 
573 (2010); Kara L. Wild, The New Sanctuary Movement: When Moral Mission Means 
Breaking the Law, and the Consequences for Churches and Illegal Immigrants, 50 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 981 (2010). 
72.  See infra Appendix 1 (listing the twenty-four citing references to Olivas, supra 
note 6). 
73.  In chronological order, see Elizabeth Kay Harris, Comment, Economic 
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other aspects of his essay, including his case studies on the risks of 
terminated and truncated representation.74 
 
B. The Risk of Terminated Representation 
 
While some people may believe that the conflict between the state 
of Israel and the people of Palestine is endemic or inevitable, perhaps 
 
Refugees: Unprotected in the United States by Virtue of an Inaccurate Label, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 269 (1993); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political 
Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, BYU L. REV. 1139 (1993); 
Jonathan O. Hafen, Children’s Rights and Legal Representation—The Proper Roles of 
Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 423 (1993); 
Harold Hingju Koh, America’s Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 139 (1994); 
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions Of Confinement and The 
Porous Border of The Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995); 
Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in 
the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42 (1995); Gail Quick Goeke, Substantive and 
Procedural Due Process for Unaccompanied Alien Juveniles, 60 MO. L. REV. 221 (1995); 
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical 
Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997); Johnson & Pérez, 
supra note 62 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy 
Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 525; Michael A. Olivas, Immigration Law Teaching and Scholarship in the Ivory 
Tower: A Response to Race Matters, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 613; Finkel, supra note 60; Lopez, 
supra note 68; Michelle Rae Pinzon, Was the Supreme Court Right? A Closer Look at the 
True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 29 (2003); 
Workman, supra note 62; Lisa A. Cahan, Constitutional Protections of Aliens: A Call for 
Action to Provide Adequate Health Care for Immigration Detainees, 3 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMEDICAL L. 343 (2007); Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599 (2009); Kevin R. 
Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Reb ellious Lawyering, 
98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010) [hereinafter “Johnson, Racial Profiling in America”]. 
74.  See, e.g., Aoki & Shuford, supra note 63, at 21 n.67 (citing Olivas, supra note 6, 
for the proposition that “most legal education neither equips students to think 
strategically or ethically about enduring inequities in society, nor provides problem-
solving experiences so that students can undertake social reform in life after law 
school”); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated 
Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461, 503 (1993) (describing briefly all three of Olivas’s case 
studies); Johnson & Martínez, supra note 2, at 1151 nn.54, 57 (discussing Olivas’s case 
study of Oscar Z. Acosta). 
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especially those who think of themselves as not directly implicated by 
it, Professor Olivas’s essay reminds its readers that this conflict is 
historical, not natural.75  Hence, people (including lawyers)—not 
natural forces—act within and without the rule of law in order, inter 
alia, to manage, mitigate the harms of, profit from, promulgate, 
survive, and/or seek an end to, the conflict.  Under such a view, 
contesting the legality of the myriad conflicting claims between the 
state of Israel and the people of Palestine appears fundamental to the 
conflict’s origin, historical evolution, and future. 
Olivas begins his case study of the risk of terminated 
representation by acknowledging “the historical complexity and 
instability of the Middle East” and then quickly draws his readers’ 
attention to a fact that has likely been overshadowed by other aspects 
of the conflict:76 “At several times since 1989, Arab and Israeli lawyers 
who defend Palestinians in Israeli military courts have organized 
boycotts and withheld their legal services in order to draw attention 
to the unsatisfactory conditions of detainment.”77  Responding to 
Minow, whose consideration of the risk of terminated representation 
focused on lawyers who might avoid representing law-breaking 
clients or believe themselves ethically required to terminate 
representation,78 Olivas deploys this remarkable case study of a work 
 
75.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 836–42 (describing lawyers’ responses to the Intifada 
based on discussion with Professor Jordan Paust, one of three fact finders sent to the 
Occupied Territories by the International Commission of Jurists in 1989, as well as 
published reports by the United States Department of State, lawyers’ organizations, 
international nongovernmental organizations, and contemporary journalism).  N.B. I 
follow Olivas in noting, “as in many issues how one views this conflict determines 
how one labels items, actions, and places . . . .  Therefore, I stipulate that many of the 
place names have alternative designations, and my choices conformed with the 
sources of citations, not with any ideological or political predisposition.”  Id. at 836 
n.69. 
76.  See id. at 838–39 (noting that the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 1989 made no mention of “the lawyers’ boycott or the 
conditions that prompted the work stoppage.”). 
77.  Id. at 836. 
78.  See Minow, supra note 10, at 743 (“If the client consults the lawyer before 
breaking a criminal law, some additional problems arise.  The lawyer might feel it 
appropriate to breach the client’s confidence and thereby terminate effective 
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stoppage by Arab and Israeli lawyers to address “when persons who 
break the law for political reasons may not find representation.”79  As 
he refines the question: “[W]hat are a lawyer’s obligations when faced 
with mass prosecutions and inadequate resources, under 
circumstances in which the political reasons for the conflict are 
seemingly intractable?”80 
While not unprecedented, the idea of lawyers organizing to strike 
against a venue seems extraordinary,81 and the prosecutions following 
the Intifada were of a massive scale.  As Olivas explains, “The Intifada 
began in 1987, and by July 1989, more than 30,000 Palestinians had 
been arrested and detained by the Israeli Defense Forces (“IDF”); by 
March 1991, the number had grown to more than 70,000.”82  To 
provide legal process for these detentions, the state of Israel 
established new “temporary courts in both the West Bank and Gaza, 
in Nablus, Ramallah, Jenin, Hebran, Kalkilya, Tulkaren, Gaza City, 
and Khan Yunis.”83  The mass detentions and prosecutions quickly 
raised a number of serious concerns regarding international law 
standards and due process, including, inter alia, warrantless arrests, 
no effective right to counsel, no right to habeas corpus, no procedures 
to notify detainees’ families or lawyers of their whereabouts, 
indefinite detention with no bail hearings before a judge, no written 
verdicts or sentencing guidelines, and limited rights of appeal.84 
For example, Olivas discusses the IDF military orders and 
emergency defense regulations, which provided for no absolute right 
to see a lawyer but instead vested discretion to grant access to a 
lawyer with “the Prison Commander [upon] being convinced that the 
request to see a lawyer was made for the purpose of dealing with the 
legal affairs of the detainee and that it would not impede the course 
 
representation, or the lawyer might decide to withdraw from representing someone 
who plans to break the law.”). 
79.  Olivas, supra note 6, at at 836. 
80.  Id. 
81.  For example, Olivas notes several strikes by legal aid lawyers in New York 
City in 1982 and 1991.  See id. at 843. 
82.  Id. at 836 (citation omitted). 
83.  Id. at 836. 
84.  Id. at 839–42. 
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of the investigation.”85  Additionally, “The arrest and detention 
policies [were] allowed by Military Order to be secret, and all Israeli 
soldiers or police officers [were] authorized to make warrantless 
arrests.”86  Also, “suspects need not be brought before a judge for 
eighteen days, and with an extension hearing before a military judge, 
six months of detention can be ordered unless charges have been filed; 
[and] there are no deadlines for the state to try a case.”87 
These were some of the conditions that led to the lawyers’ “many 
attempts to bring problems to the attention of IDF officials, Israeli Bar 
officers, and court administration,” before deciding that “they had no 
choice but to strike.”88  Their first work stoppage began on January 3, 
1989, and “they returned to the courts on March 12.  By July 1989, 
conditions for the lawyers and their clients had deteriorated to the 
extent that they felt compelled to call another strike, which lasted 
from July 20 to August 20, 1989.”89  In essence, their demands were for 
conditions that would make it possible to meaningfully represent 
detained individuals in military courts.90  In Olivas’s estimation, “It is 
far from clear what alternatives they had, or what effect their work 
stoppage had on their working conditions.”91  He continues, “[S]ome 
conditions improved slightly as a result of the publicity, but the 
underlying political causes remained unresolved.”92 
Perhaps because the idea of unionized lawyers seems 
paradoxical (although some lawyers in the United States are 
unionized),93 or perhaps because the possibility that lawyers might 
 
85.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 837 (citation omitted). 
86.  Id. at 839 (citation omitted). 
87.  Id. (citation omitted). 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. (citation omitted). 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. at 841. 
92.  Id. 
93.  See, e.g., Christine Clark, Should Lawyers Unionize?, LIFE OF THE LAW (Jan. 8, 
2014), http://www.lifeofthelaw.org/2014/01/should-lawyers-unionize/; Legal Services 
Staff Association UAW/NOLSW 2320, http://lssa2320.org (last visited June 25, 2015); 
Molly McDonough, Should Lawyers Form their own Unions?, ABA J. (Mar. 11, 2009), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/should_lawyers_form_their_own_unions; 
Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Attorney Labor Unions, NYSBA J. (Jan. 2007), http://papers.ss
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refuse to represent individuals in order to protest a particular 
jurisdiction or venue seems unthinkable, taboo, or verboten, I find 
Olivas’s description of the 1989 lawyers’ strike against the IDF 
military courts provocative and generative.  The idea of striking 
lawyers feels particularly powerful when counterpoised against the 
past and present policies, and conditions of detention for Central 
American women and children seeking asylum in the United States.  
A lawyers’ strike might also be an effective strategy against recent 
mass detention practices for people from other Latin American 
countries. 
Consider, for example, the judicial proceedings following the 
May 2008 ICE raid at the Agriprocessors, Inc. meat processing plant 
in Postville, Iowa, which the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Iowa held in two trailers and a ballroom at the 
National Cattle Congress in Waterloo, Iowa.94  Despite the fact that the 
judicial process blatantly violated fundamental due process rights, 
 
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=955039; UAW LOCAL 2320 NATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATION OF LEGAL SERVICES WORKERS, http://nolsw.org (last visited June 25, 2015). 
94.  CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 42, at 6 (“The NCC is a 60-acre cattle fairground 
that had been transformed into a sort of concentration camp or detention center.  
Fenced in behind the ballroom / courtroom were 23 trailers from federal authorities, 
including two set up as sentencing courts[.]”).  See also Donna Ackermann, A Matter 
of Interpretation: How the Language Barrier and the Trend of Criminalizing Illegal 
Immigration Caused a Deprivation of Due Process Following the Agriprocessors, Inc. Raids, 
43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 363 passim (2010); Sioban Albiol, R. Linus Chan & Sarah 
J. Diaz, Re-Interpreting Postville: A Legal Perspective, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 31 passim 
(2008); Erik Camayd-Freixas, Raids, Rights and Reform: The Postville Case and the 
Immigration Crisis, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1 passim (2008); Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 143–45 (2009); 
Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1301–04 (2010); 
Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and 
Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 30–34 (2009); Johnson, Racial Profiling in 
America, supra note 73, at 1041–42; Allison L. McCarthy, Note, The May 12, 2008 
Postville, Iowa Immigration Raid: A Human Rights Perspective, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 passim (2010); Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes: The Postville 
Raid and the Misinterpretation of Federal Criminal Law, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651 passim 
(2009); Robert R. Rigg, The Postville Raid: A Postmortem, 12 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 271 
passim (2011); Khari Taustin, Still in “The Jungle”: Labor, Immigration, and the Search for 
a New Common Ground in the Wake of Iowa’s Meatpacking Raids, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 
283, 304–09 (2010). 
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not a single lawyer, nor judge, involved in those proceedings 
effectively protested the mass adjudications of around three hundred 
people—“mostly illiterate Guatemalan peasants with Mayan last 
names.”95  As the federally certified interpreter, Dr. Erik Camayd-
Freixas, testified in July 2008 before the Congressional Subcommittee 
on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and 
International Law, the judicial process following the Postville raid 
was rife with problems, including inter alia: 
(2) The court failed to maintain physical separation and 
operational independence from the ICE prosecution.  (3) 
There was inadequate access to legal counsel….  (5) At 
initial appearance there was no meaningful presumption 
of innocence.  (6) Many defendants did not appear to 
understand their rights, particularly the meaning and 
consequences of waiving their right to be indicted by a 
grand jury.  (7) There was no bail hearing, as bail was 
automatically denied pursuant to an immigration 
detainer.  (8) The heavier charge of aggravated identity 
theft, used to leverage the Plea Agreement, was lacking in 
 
95.  CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 42, at 6.  While 697 arrest warrants were sworn 
out, “late shift workers had not arrived, so ‘only’ 390 were arrested: 314 men and 76 
women; 290 Guatemalans, 93 Mexicans, four Ukrainians, and three Israelis who were 
not seen in court.”  Id. at 7.  See also id. at 9 (explaining how the prosecution and court 
circumvented the writ of habeas corpus by expediting the defendants’ arraignments); 
Kristina M. Campbell, Imagining a More Humane Immigration Policy in the Age of Obama: 
The Use of Plenary Power to Halt the State Balkanization of Immigration Regulation, 29 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 415, 444 (2010) (noting egregious due process violations in the 
Postville raid); Chacón, supra note 94, at 145–47 (identifying three corrosive effects of 
mass plea proceedings on the administration of justice); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 531 n.243 (2009) 
(commenting on the recent deflation of due process even when immigrants are 
ostensibly accorded formal criminal procedural protections in worksite raids); Eagly, 
supra note 94, at 1304 (noting that the “short-fuse exploding plea offer precluded 
meaningful evaluation by defense attorneys of whether . . . immigration relief might 
be possible”); McCarthy, supra note 94, at 298–301 (critiquing a judicially-imposed 
one-week deadline for defense counsel to accept a uniform plea agreement); Moyers, 
supra note 94, at 652–53 (arguing that the accelerated judicial process was premised 
upon two flawed interpretations of federal law). 
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foundation and never underwent the judicial test of 
probable cause.  (9) Many defendants did not appear to 
understand their charges or rights, insisting that they 
were in jail for being in the country illegally (and not for 
document fraud or identity theft), and insisting that they 
had no rights.  (10) Many defendants did not know what 
a Social Security Number is or what purpose it serves.  
Because “intent” was an element of each of the charges, 
many were probably not guilty, but had no choice but to 
plead out.96 
Camayd-Freixas elaborated: 
Echoing what I think was the general feeling, one of my 
fellow interpreters would later exclaim: “When I saw 
what it was really about, my heart sank. . . .”  Then began 
the saddest procession I have ever witnessed, which the 
public would never see, because cameras were not 
allowed past the perimeter of the compound (only a few 
journalists came to court the following days, notepad in 
hand).  Driven single-file in groups of 10, shackled at the 
wrists, waists and ankles, chains dragging as they 
shuffled through, the slaughterhouse workers were 
brought in for arraignment, sat and listened through 
headsets to the interpreted initial appearance, before 
marching out again to be bused to different county jails, 
only to make room for the next row of 10.97 
Legal scholars have subsequently accorded with many of the 
initial impressions of Camayd-Freixas and his colleague (and myself) 
that the Postville raid blatantly violated due process and other 
constitutional guarantees.98  Indeed, the following year the United 
States Supreme Court, in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, held that 
prosecutors of the federal felony of identity theft, under which the 
 
96.  CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 42, at 3–4. 
97.  Id. at 6. 
98.  See sources cited supra note 95.  
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Agriprocessors, Inc. workers were charged, must “show that the 
defendant knew that the means of identification at issue belonged to 
another person.”99  In other words, the federal crime of identity theft 
has a restrictive mens rea requirement.  While the United States Courts 
of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit held a different view at the time of 
the adjudication of the Postville raid,100 Olivas’s case study on the risk 
of terminated representation provides an empowering “counter-
memory” that lawyers, and other agents of the judicial process, need 
not accede in “helping legitimize or even abetting the INS [now ICE] 
in its pernicious practices.”101  While some people might excuse the 
Postville raid prosecutors and judges for simply applying controlling 
case law to the National Cattle Congress proceedings,102 history may 
 
99.  Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 657 (2009) (“We conclude that § 
1028A(a)(1) requires the Government to show that the defendant knew that the means 
of identification at issue belonged to another person.”) (emphasis added).  For 
discussions of Flores-Figueroa, see Campbell, supra note 95, at 444 nn.174–75; Chacón, 
supra note 94, at 144 n.52; Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and 
the Right to Know the Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 47, 49 n.175 (2010); Eagly, supra note 94, at 1303 n.133; Rigg, supra note 94, at 274 
n.19. 
100.  See Moyers, supra note 94, at 662 (“The application of § 1028A(a)(1) was 
proper, however, because in the Eighth Circuit [at the time of the adjudication of the 
Postville raid in May 2008], the Government need not prove that a defendant knew 
that the means of identification the defendant transferred, used, or possessed 
belonged to another actual person.”).  Moyers was “a judicial clerk in the Northern 
District of Iowa during the criminal process in Waterloo, Iowa, following the raid at 
Agriprocessors in Postville.”  Id. at 651. 
101.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 835.  On the concept of counter-memory, see GEORGE 
LIPSITZ, TIME PASSAGES: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 213–
14, 228–31 (1990) (defining counter-memory as “a way of remembering and forgetting 
that starts with the local, the immediate, and the personal. . . . [looking] to the past for 
the hidden histories excluded from dominant narratives. . . . [to] reframe and refocus 
dominant narratives purporting to represent universal experience”). 
102.  But see Julia Preston, Immigrants’ Speedy Trials After Raid Become Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/us/09immig.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on criticism following the revelation of a 117-page 
manual prepared by the district court to expedite the prosecutions following the 
Postville raid, which “included a model of the guilty pleas that prosecutors planned 
to offer as well as statements to be made by the judges when they accepted the pleas 
and handed down sentences”). 
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view the defense lawyers less charitably.103  They seem to have 
allowed themselves to become complicit in an extraordinary judicial 
travesty that required the formal participation of defense lawyers, yet 
only a single one of them objected meaningfully by refusing to comply 
with the process at its start.104 
Camayd-Freixas himself wrestled with this dilemma, explaining: 
I seriously considered withdrawing from the assignment 
for the first time in my 23 years as a federally certified 
interpreter, citing conflict of interest….  The question was 
did I have one.  Well, at that point there was not enough 
evidence to make that determination….  Moreover, as a 
professor of interpreting, I have confronted my students 
with every possible conflict scenario, or so I thought.  The 
truth is that nothing could have prepared me for the 
prospect of helping our government put hundreds of 
innocent people in jail.  In my ignorance and disbelief, I 
reluctantly decided to stay the course and see what 
happened next.105 
Although Professor Camayd-Freixas is probably not exceptional for 
having seriously scrutinized his professional ethics following the 
Postville raid, his decision not only to witness the entire extraordinary 
judicial process but also to write publicly and to testify before 
 
103.  But see Moyers, supra note 94, at 673–81 (discussing the attorney 
negotiations over the Postville raid plea agreements).  See also infra notes 108 and 118, 
and accompanying text (noting the defense attorneys’ deliberation over collectively 
rejecting the plea offers and requesting trials for each of the 305 clients criminally 
charged after the raid). 
104.  See Moyers, supra note 94, at 665–67 (discussing how the district court 
selected the approximately twenty defense attorneys from its Criminal Justice Act 
panel, and noting that one of them refused the assignment); Preston, supra note 102 
(“One defense lawyer who received the scripts from prosecutors on the day of the 
raid said he became convinced that the hearings had been organized to produce 
guilty pleas for the prosecution.  As a result, the lawyer, Rockne Cole, declined to 
represent any of the arrested immigrants and ‘walked out in disgust,’ he wrote in a 
letter to a Congressional subcommittee that is scrutinizing the raid and the legal 
proceedings that followed.”). 
105.  CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 42, at 8. 
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Congress on it does seem exceptional, if not unique.106 
Even assuming that all of the officers of the court held at the 
National Cattle Congress in May 2008 reflected deeply on how 
participating in that extraordinary venue comported (or failed to 
comport) with their professional responsibilities,107 history 
demonstrates that none of them chose to stop or slow down the 
process by terminating representation.  While some of “the defense 
attorneys discussed among themselves the possibility of collectively 
rejecting the plea offers and requesting trials for each of the 305 clients 
criminally charged after the raid[,]”108 the idea of a work stoppage or 
work slowdown by terminating representation appears not to have been 
contemplated.  I find this unfortunate, for if any of the lawyers, other 
officers of the court, or even essential court personnel had struck or 
slowed down the court at the National Cattle Congress, they might 
have triggered a remedy under habeas corpus and thereby led to a 
better result for the people whom ICE detained and subjected to 
criminal prosecution, as well as for the overall rule of (authority 
under) law.109 
 
106.  See CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 42, at 2–3, 8 (discussing Camayd-Freixas’s 
deliberations on his duty as a court interpreter under Federal Criminal Code and 
Rules, Rule 604 (1989)).  See also Moyers, supra note 94, at 651 (noting that Moyers was 
a judicial clerk in the Northern District of Iowa during the criminal process in 
Waterloo, Iowa, following the raid at Agriprocessors in Postville). 
107.  See CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 42, at 13–14 (reporting Camayd-Freixas’s 
conversation with a U.S. District Court judge regarding their deliberation over the 
decision to charge the Postville defendants with aggravated identity theft, when so 
many of them lacked knowledge of the identities that they were alleged to have stolen). 
108.  Moyers, supra note 94, at 680 (citation omitted). 
109.  The people detained under alleged violation of the immigration laws and 
charged with felony identity theft could have received a fair trial on the merits, or at 
least a plea bargain that was actually, as opposed to merely formally, voluntary.  See 
Moyers, supra note 94, at 674 (“Based on the evidence available to me, the plea 
agreements were the product of a subtle systemic coercion; . . .  The plea agreements 
were not coerced in a strict sense; the terms were negotiable and the plea agreements 
were entered into voluntarily.  The presence of a negotiable and voluntary agreement 
for each defendant, however, did not create meaningful free choice.”).  See also 
Ackermann, supra note 94, at 393–34 (discussing how a narrative-based colloquy 
would have forced the court to address whether an indigenous language-speaking 
defendant actually understood the proceedings when translated into Spanish); Eagly, 
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While it might seem uncharitable to criticize the attorneys who 
agreed to represent the people who were detained and arrested in the 
Postville raid, the district court’s adjudication at the National Cattle 
Congress recalls Olivas’s question, “What do we [lawyers] do when 
the state regime is the law breaker?”110  One response might be simply 
to show up and do one’s job, to the best of one’s ability within the 
myriad constraints of the law and the situation.  Lawyers who 
seriously consider Professor Olivas’s case study on the Arab and 
Israeli lawyers, who confronted the risk of terminated representation 
by deciding collectively to strike IDF tribunals in 1989, might answer 
differently.  Such lawyers might organize themselves in order to 
create the conditions where they (we?) could collectively cry out, 
“¡Huelga!” (Strike!), or if a full work stoppage seemed strategically 
unsound, then such lawyers might instead whisper for a work 
slowdown, perhaps through a concerted “work-to-rule” action or 
another form of “uncivil obedience,”111 especially when confronted 
 
supra note 94, at 1303 (“By the time the Supreme Court . . . interpreted the aggravated 
identity theft statute so that it could not be used . . . as prosecutors did in Postville . . . 
the Postville defendants had already served their time and been deported.”) (citation 
omitted); Rigg, supra note 94, at 278 (“Again, the focus of the manual [used to 
adjudicate the Postville raid defendants] was on speed and ease of processing clients 
into guilty pleas rather than any concern for effective representation and adequate 
research and investigation by defense counsel.”).  The legal system as a whole could 
have avoided the corrosive tarnish that comes with papering over gross injustices.  
Accord Albiol et al., supra note 94, at 98–99 (“Taken as a whole, it seems that the fast-
track process was  . . . a comprehensive failure to protect the integrity of our judicial 
system . . . thereby boosting their funding numbers – while circumventing the 
individuals’ rights to due process of law.”); Camayd-Freixas, supra note 94, at 12 (“In 
Postville, with the fast-track criminalization of workers, DHS/ICE was also seen to co-
opt and gain deterministic control over the judiciary[.]”); Chacón, supra note 94, at 
145–47 (discussing three kinds of corrosive effects from the mass plea agreement 
procedures of and following the Postville raid, such as those deployed under 
“Operation Streamline,” which United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 
2009), held to have violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11).  See generally 
PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA CARTA MANIFESTO: LIBERTIES AND COMMONS FOR ALL 17, 
212–13 (2008) (discussing the notion of “authority under law,” or that “the King is, 
and shall be, below the law”). 
110.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 835. 
111.  See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 872 n.65 (2015) (citing JEREMY BRECHER, STRIKE! 251 (revised ed. 2014) for 
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with a judicial process that seems all too hasty. 
Of course, a work stoppage or work slowdown might violate a 
lawyer’s professional ethics, and Professor Olivas anticipated this 
possibility in his 1991 essay.112  As he noted, “if a refusal to participate 
would sabotage the [judicial] process, there would be a swift 
deployment of contempt citations or Rule 11 sanctions, and likely 
disciplinary action taken against the lawyers.”113  For example, earlier 
in his essay, Olivas noted how Rule 11 sanctions were brought against 
two of his heroes, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
(“LDF”) director Julius Chambers and famed radical lawyer William 
Kunstler.114  Rule 11 sanctions were levied against Chambers, and 
upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, “for charges 
 
the proposition that “work slowdowns and work-to-rule actions were common labor 
tactics in 1930s and were variously called ‘the conscious withdrawal of efficiency,’ 
‘striking on the job,’ or ‘sabotage’”).  See also WE ARE EVERYWHERE: THE IRRESISTIBLE 
RISE OF GLOBAL ANTICAPITALISM 457 (Notes from Nowhere ed., 2003), http://www.we
areeverywhere.org, cited in Bulman-Pozen & Pozen at 818 n.32 (“The notion of the 
work-to-rule is brilliantly simple—workers follow every rule, no matter how foolish, 
inefficient, or ill-advised.  They break no laws, cause as much disruption as a strike, 
yet everyone still gets paid!”). 
112.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 842–46 (discussing how United States professional 
norms and disciplinary codes, as exemplified by the then-new Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct, would likely subject striking lawyers to professional 
discipline under rules designed to reduce dilatory tactics and unreasonable 
courtroom behavior). 
113.  Id. at 842.  See also id. at 818–19, 842–46. 
114.  Id. at 818.  For more on Julius Levonne Chambers (Oct. 6, 1936–Aug. 2, 2013), 
see April Dudash, Julius Chambers, Former NCCU Chancellor, Dies, HERALD SUN (Aug. 
3, 2013), http://www.heraldsun.com/news/x807783733/Julius-Chambers-former-
NCCU-chancellor-dies; Douglas Martin, Julius Chambers, a Fighter for Civil Rights, Dies 
at 76, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/us/julius-
chambers-a-fighter-for-civil-rights-dies-at-76.html; Julius L. Chambers Papers, J. 
MURRAY ATKINS LIBRARY UNIV. OF N. CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE, http://library.uncc.ed
u/manuscript/ms0085 (last visited June 29, 2015).  For more on William Moses 
Kunstler (July 7, 1919–Sept. 4, 1995), see WILLIAM KUNSTLER: DISTURBING THE UNIVERSE 
(Emily Kunstler and Sarah Kunstler dirs., 2010); WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER, MY LIFE AS A 
RADICAL LAWYER (1994); DAVID LANGUN, WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED 
LAWYER IN AMERICA (1999); David Stout, William Kunstler, 76, Dies; Lawyer for Social 
Outcasts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/05/obituaries/
william-kunstler-76-dies-lawyer-for-social-outcasts.html. 
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stemming from an employment discrimination case brought by the 
LDF against the United States Army.”115  Kunstler’s attorneys were 
subjected to sanctions sought by opposing counsel after he “filed suit 
against prosecutors and public officials in North Carolina, alleging 
harassment of Native Americans during a criminal investigation.”116 
Thus, as Olivas explains through an exploration of the then-
recently adopted Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 
with only a few narrow exceptions, the risk of incurring court 
sanctions and/or professional discipline would likely deter lawyers’ 
work stoppages in the United States.  For example, Olivas explains 
relevant portions of Texas State Bar Rule 3.04 (modeled after 
American Bar Association Model Rule 3.4), which: 
requires that a Texas lawyer not “engage in conduct 
intended to disrupt the proceedings” or “knowingly 
disobey, or advise the client to disobey, an allegation 
under the standing rules of or a ruling by a tribunal except 
for an open refusal based either on an assertion that no 
valid obligation exists or on the client’s willingness to 
accept any sanctions arising from such disobedience.”117 
Under such a regime, lawyers contemplating a work stoppage or 
work slowdown “out of principle rather than apathy” (as Olivas 
characterized the status quo ante as to the nonrepresentation of 
unaccompanied refugee children in 1991) would need to refuse 
openly to proceed at all, or at least at the rate demanded.  Further, 
they would need to argue that no valid obligation exists to proceed at 
all (an argument certain to fail), or at the rate demanded (an argument 
with a fighting chance), or that their clients were willing to accept the 
sanctions arising from such disobedience (an argument that seems 
unlikely given the vulnerability of detained immigrant workers facing 
punishment for alleged federal felonies). 
Notwithstanding what actually transpired in 2008, imagine if the 
Postville raid defense lawyers had struck the courts at the National 
 
115.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 818 (citation omitted). 
116.  Id. (citation omitted). 
117.  Id. at 845 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 9 (Tex. Stat Bar Rule 3.04(c)(5), (d)). 
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Cattle Congress.118  They likely would have faced a disciplinary 
proceeding under the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 
32:3.2, “A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
consistent with the interests of the client[,]” or Rule 32:3.5(d), “A 
lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct intended to disrupt a 
tribunal.”119  Alternatively, such lawyers might be subjected to 
discipline under Rule 32:3.4(c), “A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open 
refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]”120 
Of course, the hypothetically striking lawyers could assert that 
their conduct comports with the Iowa Rule 32:3.4 exception, as “an 
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;” 
however, as noted above, such an argument seems doomed to fail for 
an outright work stoppage, and it is unclear if it would be persuasive 
even as to a work slowdown—unless the slowdown took the form of 
a work-to-rule action (discussed below).  Also, Rule 32:3.2 and Rule 
32:3.5 lack any similar express exception.  Moreover, even if the 
striking lawyers were ultimately not sanctioned for a violation of 
professional responsibility, they would very likely be immediately 
subject to punishment for contempt of court. 
Indeed, Olivas concludes his case study of the risk of terminated 
representation by musing that “striking lawyers held in contempt 
would likely find themselves incarcerated, with their only avenue of 
appeal [being] a habeas corpus proceeding.”121  While the courts 
might grant the clients of striking lawyers time to secure new counsel, 
“the clients’ principles of noncompliance would be undermined . . . 
 
118.  According to a judicial clerk who participated in the criminal process 
conducted by the Northern District of Iowa at the National Cattle Congress after the 
Postville raid, some of “the defense attorneys discussed among themselves the 
possibility of collectively rejecting the plea offers and requesting trials for each of the 
305 clients criminally charged after the raid.”  Moyers, supra note 94, at 680 (citation 
omitted). 
119.  Iowa R. Civ. P. 32:3.2 (adopted Apr. 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005); Iowa R. 
Civ. P. 32:3.5(d) (adopted Apr. 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005). 
120.  Iowa R. Civ. P. 32:3.4(c) (adopted Apr. 20, 2005, effective July 1, 2005). 
121.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 846. 
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while the real injury would fall on the lawyers’ head.”122  Clearly, it 
would take extraordinary circumstances to justify such an action, yet 
the flawed judicial process following the Postville raid of May 2008 
arguably constituted precisely the extraordinary circumstances that 
could justify a work stoppage, or even better, a principled work-to-
rule slowdown of the judicial process in order to secure a better 
result—for the people whom ICE detained and subjected to criminal 
prosecution—as well as for the overall rule of (authority under) law.123 
Returning to the hypothetical lawyers’ work-to-rule slowdown, 
precisely because “ICE agents had sought Miranda waivers from each 
of the workers at the Agriprocessors plant and interviewed each about 
his or her immigration status”124 prior to them having a chance to meet 
with an attorney, the defense attorneys might have challenged the 
validity of the Miranda waivers at their clients’ initial appearances.  
Additionally, or in the alternative, the lawyers might have advised 
their clients to reject the waiver of indictment in the proposed plea 
agreement.125 Ultimately, it appears that the initial appearances 
provided the lawyers with the critical opportunity to object 
meaningfully to the overly hasty judicial process.  This was the time 
for a strike, or at least a work-to-rule slowdown, of the judicial process 
at the National Cattle Congress.  Denied any meaningful opportunity 
to meet with their clients prior to the initial appearances, and being 
presented with client discovery files containing purported Miranda 
waivers and summaries of statements made to ICE agents,126 the 
approximately twenty lawyers might have openly refused to obey the 
rules of the district court at the National Cattle Congress by asserting 
that no valid obligation existed for the initial appearances to be so 
truncated as to violate fundamental rights to due process or the 
venerable writ of habeas corpus.127  Instead of acceding to the court’s 
 
122.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 846. 
123.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
124.  Moyers, supra note 94, at 668 (citation omitted). 
125.  See Moyers, supra note 94, at 669.  See also Rigg, supra note 94, at 278 (dis-
cussing prosecution by information and by indictment). 
126.  See Moyers, supra note 94, at 669–70. 
127.  See sources cited supra note 94. 
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(and prosecutors’) demands, the defense lawyers collectively might 
have demanded a meaningful opportunity to meet with their clients 
prior to the initial appearances.  If they had done so, it is almost certain 
that the court at the National Cattle Congress would not have been 
able to process the approximately 300 criminal defendants within the 
limit of habeas corpus—to be arraigned within seventy-two hours of 
their arrest.128 
In history, of course, neither a strike, nor a slowdown occurred.  
Instead, the court process proceeded as quickly as it had been 
designed to function,129 and the defendants were all sentenced within 
ten days of the May 12, 2008, Postville raid.130  While this course of 
conduct may have comported with the Iowa Rules of Professional 
Conduct, in light of Professor Olivas’s case studies on the risk of 
terminated and truncated representation, I find this result profoundly 
unfortunate for two reasons. 
First, it seems likely that knowledge of possible court sanctions 
and/or professional discipline worked to deter the defense lawyers 
from enacting their contemplated work-to-rule slowdown.131  While 
the four lawyers who agreed to be interviewed on the matter 
explained that their clients desired speedy resolutions and certainty 
 
128.  Accord CAMAYD FREIXAS, supra note 42, at 9 (“While we waited to be 
admitted, the attorney pointed out the reason why the prosecution wanted to finish 
arraignments by 10am Thursday: according to the writ of habeas corpus they had 72 
hours from Monday’s raid to charge the prisoners or release them for deportation[.]”); 
Moyers, supra note 94, at 669 (“To avoid habeas problems, the USAO was required to 
charge a defendant within 72 hours of arrest at the raid.”) (citation omitted).  See also 
Eagly, supra note 94, at 1304–05 (discussing constitutional and statutory limits on the 
pretrial detention of people arrested without a warrant, and the rights of criminal 
defendants, including noncitizens, under the Bail Reform Act of 1984).  See generally 
LINEBAUGH, supra note 109 (discussing the origins of habeas corpus). 
129.  See Moyers, supra note 94, at 675–82 (discussing the truncated processes of 
plea negotiations, plea hearings, and sentencing hearings). 
130.  See CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 42, at 2 (noting that the hearings started on 
May 13, 2008 and ended on May 22, 2008). 
131.  See supra note 108 and accompanying text (noting the lawyers’ 
contemplation of collectively rejecting the proposed plea agreements and requesting 
trials for all of the defendants). 
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regarding their terms of punishment,132 by the time that the lawyers 
were attempting to negotiate favorable plea agreements, the critical 
moment of the defendants’ initial appearances had already passed, 
and with it the best chance for an effective work-to-rule slowdown 
was lost. 
Second, and as important, the mechanistic—albeit, formal—
judicial process enacted at the National Cattle Congress following the 
Postville raid featured egregious violations of due process and other 
constitutional protections, which enabled the government to 
propagate legal violence,133 primarily by judicial mistreatment, with 
concomitant corrosive effects on the democratic justifications of the 
rule of “authority under law.”134 
Among myriad others, Minow and Olivas have expressed 
concerns for the institutional role of the courts in justifying democratic 
rule.135  For example, Minow opined: 
Consent to be governed, one might argue, must be 
withheld in the face of the competing demands of equally 
 
132.  See Moyers, supra note 94, at 675–77, 680–81. 
133.  In theorizing how protest, repression and race functioned in the Chicano 
Movement, Ian Haney López explains, “Judicial bias and police malpractice together 
imposed a reign of legal violence on East Los Angeles . . .  Many Chicanos insisted 
that legal violence against the Mexican community proved that Mexicans were non-
white . . . . ‘Law’ for Chicanos . . . means the police and the courts, and legal violence 
refers principally to the physical force these institutions wield.  Law carried out on 
the streets—as opposed to law on the books—convinced many Mexicans that they 
were Chicanos.”  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 8–9.  See also Ian F. Haney López, 
Protest, Repression, and Race: Legal Violence and the Chicano Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
205, 207 (2001) (“I contend in this Article that legal violence, encompassing both 
judicial mistreatment and police brutality, substantially contributed to the emergence 
of a Chicano movement that stressed a non-White Mexican identity.”). 
134.  Accord Chacón, supra note 94, at 145–47 (discussing three corrosive effects 
of mass plea agreement proceedings).  See also LINEBAUGH, supra note 109, at 17, 212–
13 (discussing the notion of “authority under law”).  But see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE 
CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 5 (2014) (“the Court has frequently failed, 
throughout American history, at its most important tasks, at its most important 
moments . . . .  Now, and throughout American history, the Court has been far more 
likely to rule in favor of corporations than workers or consumers; it has been far more 
likely to uphold government abuses of power than to stop them.”). 
135.  See Minow, supra note 10, at 738; Olivas, supra note 6, at 856. 
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important or even more important principles and 
allegiances.  Or else one might urge that consent to the 
government’s authority must be earned continually and 
anew.136 
Notwithstanding his approval of these principles, however, 
Olivas noted, “this view assumes a fundamental fairness, competition 
in the marketplace of ideas, and participation in the polity.”137  He 
continued: 
In the three case studies above, however, these basic 
ingredients were lacking: unaccompanied refugee 
children are victims of proxy wars, a cruel and unjust 
refugee policy, and inhumane conditions of confinement; 
thousands of Palestinians, especially Palestinian children, 
find themselves enmeshed in an oppressive situation not 
of their own making, under a rule of power, not of law; 
and Chicano community organizers found no satisfaction 
in their formal complaints about inadequate educational 
conditions, and were judged not by a grand jury chosen 
from their peers.138 
The judicial process at the National Cattle Congress following the 
Postville raid seems to have presented a similar situation, where the 
“basic ingredients” were lacking.  We cannot know what might have 
happened had defense lawyers, prosecutors, judges, court 
interpreters, or other essential court personnel declared a strike or 
slowdown by terminating representation, or by a principled work-to-
rule action.  However, we can imagine that in addition to predictable 
charges of contempt of court and/or professional disciplinary 
proceedings, their collective action might have garnered exactly the 
kind of mainstream media coverage that can promote social change 
by forcing “the [legal] system to confront its political 
underpinnings.”139  Indeed, the Postville raid and its flawed judicial 
 
136.  Minow, supra note 10, at 738. 
137.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 856. 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. at 854. 
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process received substantial scrutiny by the mainstream media.140  If 
a necessary component of the judicial process (e.g., the defense 
attorneys) had struck against the court held at the National Cattle 
Congress, or conducted a work-to-rule slowdown, their jail sentences 
for contempt of court might have catalyzed the consciousness of the 
other actors in that surreal venue, awakening them from the cynical 
and mechanistic process that passed for the “rule of law.” 
Even if the defense lawyers failed to persuade their colleagues 
across the bar (or bench) to join them, had they struck or declared a 
principled work-to-rule slowdown, they could have avoided 
complicity with the farce of law that the nominally judicial process 
following the May 2008 Postville ICE raid now emblematizes.141  
Finally, had lawyers, or other legal workers, stopped or slowed down 
these proceedings in 2008, perhaps the idea of striking against the 
federal immigration courts in New Mexico and Texas, which have 
been processing much of the 2014 to 2015 “surge” in Central American 
women and children seeking asylum in the United States, might be 
regarded as a potential protest strategy. 
Of course, the idea of a work stoppage or work-to-rule slowdown 
may seem especially wrong for lawyers whose practice focuses on 
representing immigrants or refugees who have been detained.  
Beyond general professional duties to provide access to justice by 
zealously representing the unrepresented, or underrepresented,142 
these lawyers might find the notion of withdrawing from 
representation, or even momentarily “terminating” representation for 
the vulnerable class of people who constitute their client base, 
strategically backwards, morally repugnant, or even antithetical to 
their basic commitments as lawyers.  Additionally, some scholars of 
legal ethics believe that lawyers have no business violating the law on 
 
140.  See, e.g., Preston, supra note 102.  Accord Eagly, supra note 94, at 1301 
(“Postville’s large-scale prosecution received enormous media attention[.]”.  
141.  See sources cited, supra notes 94–95. 
142.  See generally ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at Preamble (6), 
(9) (1983), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publica
tions/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_t
able_of_contents.html. 
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principle.143  Others argue that lawyers, in particular, have a special 
duty to protest conditions that are ostensibly under the color of law 
but which they perceive as violating a superior law (e.g., rights 
guaranteed under the United States Constitution).144 
I argue, in light of the terrible histories of mass detentions within 
and mass deportations from the United States (e.g., Japanese 
Internment during World War II and 1954’s Operation Wetback),145 
that lawyers, and other officers of the court, who encounter mass 
detentions and mass prosecutions in the twenty-first century should 
think seriously about past instances when lawyers struck against a 
 
143.  See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Lawyers and Social Change Lawyering: Confronting 
a Plural Bar, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 756–60 (1991) (surveying “arguments against 
lawyers’ involvement in social change lawbreaking”). 
144.  See, e.g., id. at 761–66 (discussing the views of lawyers who work with 
historically oppressed client groups in hopes of generating legal and social change, 
including Bill Robinson of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Bob Gnaizda of the 
California Rural Legal Assistance Program, Mary Kaufman of the National Lawyers 
Guild Mass Defense Office, Ken Cockrel of the Black Workers Congress, Charles 
Garry, legal counsel to the Black Panther Party, Sheila Okpaku of the Community 
Law Office in Harlem, and Oscar Acosta of the Chicano Movement).  Abrams draws 
her discussion of these lawyers’ views primarily from MARLISE JAMES, THE PEOPLE’S 
LAWYERS (1973).  For a contemporary collection of interviews with lawyers who 
represented people seeking social change, see ANN FAGAN GINGER, THE RELEVANT 
LAWYERS (1972).  For a recent and influential work on these themes, see CAUSE 
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). 
145.  On Japanese Internment, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); 
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 26, at passim; Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 
1944 (contextualizing the special registration of resident immigrants following 
September 11, 2001, within the mass internment of Japanese Americans in the 1940s 
and the mass deportation of Mexican Americans in the 1930s and 1950s); Dale Minami 
et al., Sixty Years after the Internment: Civil Rights, Identity Politics, and Racial Profiling, 
11 ASIAN L.J. 151 passim (2004) (discussing the historical relevance of the internment 
of Japanese Americans following the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor for the 
“war at home” following September 11); Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond the Citizen/Alien 
Dichotomy: Liberty, Security, and the Exercise of Plenary Power, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. 
L. REV. 389, 401–03 (2005) (arguing that the internment of Japanese Americans 
provide “the most directly applicable precedents for the post-September 11th 
arbitrary and indefinite detention and interrogation of at least two U.S. citizens, Yaser 
Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla”).  On Operation Wetback, see MIZE & SWORDS, supra 
note 46, at 1–2, 25–40; NGAI, supra note 26, at 155–56; Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 
1902; González, supra note 46, at 7; Olivas, supra note 48, at 437–39. 
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jurisdiction to protest its fundamental judicial failures.  While 
lawyers’ strikes or work slowdowns in the United States may be so 
rare as to seem simultaneously unthinkable and unprofessional, the 
threads of history that Professor Olivas preserved should not be 
forgotten.  His case study of Arab and Israeli lawyers who confronted 
an untenable system of military justice that was hastily deployed to 
process tens of thousands of people could inform all lawyers (and 
other professionals involved in the administration of justice).  Indeed, 
in light of the decade-plus “preventive detention” of people whom 
the government has declared to be “enemy combatants” and “held” 
(imprisoned) at the United States military base at Guantánamo, Cuba, 
inter alia, under the suspicion of international terrorism, but without 
any substantive criminal charge being filed,146 more lawyers, and 
other officers of the court, should seriously consider how to 
collectively confront the risk (and opportunity) of terminated 
representation. 
While this strategy may subject lawyers to court sanctions or 
professional discipline, “when the state regime is the law breaker”147 
lawyers should not a priori rule out the strategy of a work stoppage or 
declared work-to-rule slowdown, for failing to carefully consider 
such strategies may well manifest the third risk of representation that 
Minow articulated and Olivas developed, the risk of truncated 
representation. 
 
 
 
146.  See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 134, at 77–88 (discussing the post-9/11 
“preventive detention” cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Rasul v. Bush, 
542 U.S. 466 (2004), Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 733 (2008)); Saito, supra note 145, at 
400–01, 403–06 (discussing the different detention conditions and judicial procedures 
accorded to John Walker Lindh, in contrast to Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla, 
and arguing that colonialism, racism, religious discrimination, and theories of 
“Otherness” explain the different treatment of certain subjects, who despite being 
United States citizens nevertheless lack the full rights of citizenship).  See also Carol 
Rosenberg, Detention at Guantánamo Grinds On: 13 Years and Counting, MIAMI HERALD 
(Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/
guantanamo/article3977792.html. 
147.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 835. 
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C. The Risk of Truncated Representation 
 
In the first extended treatment by a scholar writing in a law 
review, Professor Olivas selected legendary Chicano lawyer Oscar 
“Zeta” Acosta to discuss the risk of truncated representation.148  As 
Minow defined it: 
Lawyers who are willing to represent lawbreakers, and 
who find no obligation to breach the confidences of those 
clients, may nonetheless betray a contrast between their 
own perspectives and that of their clients in the course of 
representation.  The grave risk is that lawyers will defend 
politically motivated lawbreakers in ways that 
recapitulate the very failure of the legal system that 
inspired the lawbreaking actions.  In other words, there is 
a danger that the defense will pursue avenues that 
undermine the client’s purposes or beliefs.149 
Olivas apparently selected Acosta as an exemplar of an attorney 
who resolved the risk of truncated representation by rebelling—
arguably, in an ethical manner—against the politically inspired 
prosecution of his clients.150  In Acosta’s grandiose and intransigent 
words: 
No other lawyer has ever cross-examined a hundred 
judges.  There is no precedent, nobody to show me how 
to do the job.  So, as is my custom, I decide to go right for 
the throat of those dirty old men who sit over us in 
 
148.  See Olivas, supra note 6, at 846–54.  See also Abrams, supra note 143, at 766.  
For additional sources on the life and times of Oscar Z. Acosta, see sources cited, supra 
note 22. 
149.  Minow, supra note 10, at 747. 
150.  See Olivas, supra note 6, at 848 (“These books [authored by Acosta about his 
representation of Chicano protestors in Los Angeles following their 1968 indictments] 
certainly fulfill Martha Minow’s criterion of lawyering for the other half.”).  See also 
id. at 854 (“Acosta’s defense tactics, challenging the racial composition of the grand 
jury process  . . . led to acquittals of the defendants in both trials on all the major 
charges.  His combination of acute political instincts and deft lawyering did not 
compromise his clients’ interests, and largely vindicated them.”). 
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judgment.  If they won’t give us back our lands, at least 
we’ll have a drop of their blood for our trouble.  I’m billed 
as the only revolutionary lawyer this side of the Florida 
Gulf.  And it’s true: I’m the only one who actually hates 
the law.151 
In less grandiose but no less intransigent rhetoric, Acosta 
explained: 
I relate to the court system first as a Chicano and only 
seldom as a lawyer in the traditional sense.  I have no 
respect for the courts and I make it clear from the minute 
I walk in . . .  The one thing I’ve learned to do is how to 
use criminal defense work as an organizing tool….  I take 
no case unless it is, or can become, a Chicano movement 
case.  I turn it into a platform to espouse the Chicano point 
of view so that that affects the judge, the jury, the 
spectators.152 
Twenty-four years later, what can be learned from revisiting 
 
151.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 853 (quoting ACOSTA, REVOLT, supra note 22, at 214).  
See also HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 30, 33 (discussing the synergy between 
Acosta’s personality, disdain for the legal system, substance abuse, and brilliance for 
representing the Chicano Movement cases).  For another view on “revolutionary 
lawyering,” see William P. Quigley, Revolutionary Lawyering: Addressing the Root 
Causes of Poverty and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101 (2006).  For another 
Chicano’s view on socio-legal struggles for justice within the United States, see, e.g., 
GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW 
PRACTICE (1992); Gerald P. López, Foreword: Latinos and Latino Lawyers, 6 CHICANO L. 
REV. 1 (1983); Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984); Gerald P. 
López, The Idea of a Constitution in the Chicano Tradition, 37 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1987); 
Gerald P. López, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious 
Collaboration, 77 GEO L.J. 1603 (1989); Gerald P. López, Shaping Community Problem 
Solving around Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2004); Gerald P. López, 
Keynote Address: Living and Lawyering Rebelliously, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2041 (2005). See 
generally Rebellious Lawyering Institute, http://rebelliouslawyeringinstitute.org (last 
visited July 7, 2015).  Synthesizing Olivas’s essay with López’s influential scholarship 
on rebellious lawyering is beyond the scope of this Article but promises generative 
future work regarding models of lawyering that were innovated and evolved by 
Chicana/o, Mexican American, and other Latina/o attorneys. 
152.  Abrams, supra note 143, at 766 (quoting JAMES, supra note 143, at 349). 
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Olivas’s case study on Acosta?  Because other scholars have produced 
substantial scholarship on Acosta’s lawyering, in particular his 
constitutional challenge to discriminatory grand jury selection 
practices in Los Angeles County,153 instead of revisiting the details of 
his flamboyant lawyering strategy and tactics, below I make two 
observations—the impact of Olivas’s scholarship on Acosta and the 
limited possibilities for Acosta’s style of “revolutionary” lawyering 
today. 
First, Olivas’s early exploration of this subject likely opened the 
way for other socio-legal scholars to consider, or reconsider, the 
impact of Acosta’s lawyering, and thus contributed toward informing 
new generational cohorts of law students and lawyers to learn from 
Acosta’s efforts.  For example, in rough chronological order, socio-
legal scholars who wrote about Acosta after Olivas include: Richard 
Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Ian F. Haney López, Mary Romero, 
Steven W. Bender and Keith Aoki, Anthony V. Alfieri, and Tom I. 
Romero, II.154  While some of these scholars may have learned about 
Acosta from other experiences or textual sources,155 the inclusion of 
 
153.  See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at passim; STAVANS, supra note 22, at 
79–82; Haney López, supra note 133, at passim; Ian F. Haney López, Institutional 
Racism: Judicial Conduct and A New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 
passim (2000); Olivas, supra note 6, at 846–54. 
154.  See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at passim; Anthony V. Alfieri, 
Color/Identity/Justice: Chicano Trials, 53 DUKE L.J. 1569 passim (2004); Steven W. Bender 
& Keith Aoki, Seekin’ the Cause: Social Justice Movements and Latcrit Community, 81 OR. 
L. REV. 595, 606 (2002); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo and Revisionism: Relearning the 
Lessons of History, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 820–21 (2005); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 
73, at 503; Haney López, supra note 133, at passim; Haney López, supra note 153, at 
passim; Mary Romero, Review Essay: Brown Is Beautiful, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 211 passim 
(2005) [hereinafter Romero, Brown is Beautiful]; Tom I. Romero, II, The Color of Water: 
Observations of A Brown Buffalo on Water Law & Policy in Ten Stanzas, 1 U. MIAMI RACE 
& SOC. JUST. L. REV. 107, 107, 110, 113 (2011), reprinted in 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 
329 (2012) [hereinafter Romero, Color of Water]; Jean Stefancic, Latino and Latina Critical 
Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1509, 1514, 1560 (1997).  See also 
Alfredo Mirandé, Rascuache Lawyer: A Paradigm of Ordinary Litigation, 1 U. MIAMI RACE 
& SOC. JUST. L. REV. 155, 159, 168–69 (2011) (discussing Acosta as an exemplar of 
“rascuache lawyering”). 
155.  In addition to Acosta’s two books, ACOSTA, BUFFALO, supra note 22, and 
ACOSTA, REVOLT, supra note 22, which are classic texts of Chicana/o Studies, legal 
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Olivas’s essay by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic in two 
annotated bibliographies published in the mid-1990s156 preceded their 
excerpting passages from Acosta’s autobiographical essay and 
Olivas’s essay for their 1998 book, The Latino/a Condition: A Critical 
Reader, and doubtlessly influenced their later casebook collaborations 
with Juan F. Perea and others.157  Independently (judging by citations), 
Ian F. Haney López’s concentrated focus on Acosta’s lawyering in two 
of his articles from the early 2000s,158 and his book on the subject, 
Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice,159 was not directly 
informed by Olivas’s essay.  Subsequent law review scholarship on 
Acosta has either reviewed Haney López’s treatment of Acosta’s 
lawyering,160 focused on Acosta’s constitutional challenge against 
discriminatory grand jury selection practices,161 or deployed Acosta’s 
literary persona as the Brown Buffalo to innovate LatCrit theory.162 
Although Oscar “Zeta” Acosta may be obscure to mainstream 
 
scholars who have written about Acosta in law review articles have cited to texts 
including, inter alia, JAMES, supra note 143 (published in 1973); STAVANS, supra note 22 
(published in 1995), and UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22 (published in 1996). 
156.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 73, at 503; Stefancic, supra note 154, at 1560. 
157.  See LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 6, at 320–38 (excerpting Olivas’s essay 
and Acosta’s autobiographical essay); LATINOS AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 813–20, 
832–40 (same); RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 1212 
(Juan F. Perea, Richard Delgado, Angela P. Harris, Jean Stefancic & Stefanie M. 
Wildman eds., 2000, 2d ed. 2007) (citing UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22; and 
Olivas, supra note 6). 
158.  Haney López, supra note 133; Haney López, supra note 153. 
159.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23.  Haney López notes, “I first began this [book] 
project more than a decade ago while I was still in law school[.]”  Id. at 312.  He earned 
his J.D. at Harvard Law School in 1991.  See Ian F. Haney López 1 (Aug. 2012), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/facultyCVPDF.php?facID=301 
(curriculum vitae).  He also notes that in 1992 he spoke with the trial judge in these 
cases, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Arthur L. Alarcón.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 
23, at 262 n.118.  For biographical information about Judge Alarcón, see sources cited 
infra note 236 and accompanying text. 
160.  See, e.g., Bender & Aoki, supra note 154; Delgado, supra note 154; Romero, 
Brown is Beautiful, supra note 154. 
161.  See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 155; Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: 
Legacies of Justice and Injustice, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 182 (2005); Mirandé, 
supra note 154. 
162.  See Romero, Color of Water, supra note 154. 
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legal scholars in the United States, he nevertheless has a place in the 
minds of lawyers who have considered how to represent politically 
motivated lawbreakers (to use Minow’s evocative phrasing) in ethical 
ways that will support—not undermine—their clients’ purposes and 
beliefs.  In assessing the impact of Olivas’s essay, with hopes of 
broadening its reach in the decades to come, citations show that 
Olivas’s scholarship on Acosta directly informed Richard Delgado 
and Jean Stefancic, who excerpted Acosta’s reflections and Olivas’s 
discussions on how to use legal representation to reinforce clients’ 
principles, purposes, or beliefs.163  Thus, Olivas’s essay facilitated later 
generational cohorts of law students (and the lawyers they became) 
to consider how Acosta used the representation of Chicano 
Movement activists to confront the legal violence of politically 
motivated prosecutions that had been tainted by discriminatory court 
practices pertaining to grand jury selection.164 
Much as the 1989 republication of Acosta’s two novels165 
 
163.  See sources cited, supra note 154. 
164.  See Olivas, supra note 6, at 850–52 (discussing that the indictments were han-
ded down three months after the Chicano walkouts, which was just before the 
California primary election in which Los Angeles County District Attorney Evelle 
Younger was a candidate for state Attorney General).  Accord GARCÍA & CASTRO, supra 
note 23, at 199–200 (presenting Sal Castro’s beliefs about district attorney Younger’s 
motivation to gain political mileage by indicting the Chicano Movement activists for 
planning the massive East Los Angeles high school student strikes of 1968 and that 
the arrests were part of a Republican strategy to discredit Senator Robert Kennedy 
and Senator Eugene McCarthy, who had expressed public support for the student 
strikes, by arresting the activists the weekend before the June 4, 1968 primary 
election); HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 168 (“At the outset Acosta and the 
defendants charged that the prosecutions reflected local politics. The arrests fell on 
the weekend preceding California primary elections.”).  Following Acosta, Haney 
López calls this case the East L.A. Thirteen and the subsequent case in which Acosta 
challenged the grand jury indictment of Chicano Movement activists the Biltmore Six.  
See id. at 3–4, 31–40.  Respectively, their legal citations are Castro v. Superior Court, 88 
Cal. Rptr. 500 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1970) and Montez v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736 
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1970).  See Olivas, supra note 6, at 849 n.121, 852 n.139 (noting the 
case citations).  Contemporary journalism on the second case reportedly used the 
phrase “Biltmore Seven.”  See Yvette C. Doss, The Lost Legend of the Real Dr. Gonzo, 
L.A. TIMES (June 5, 1998).  Haney López prefers “Biltmore Six” because that is the 
number of people who were ultimately tried.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 36. 
165.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 847 n.121. 
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facilitated the early 1990s research conducted by Olivas, Haney 
López, and other scholars into Acosta’s lawyering in defense of 
Chicano Movement activists,166 Olivas’s early scholarship on Acosta 
informed Delgado, Perea, and Stefancic’s decision to include excerpts 
regarding Acosta in their books.167  While Olivas notes that he first 
read Acosta’s novels shortly after their original publication in 1972 
and 1973,168 their republication provided him with the opportunity to 
reappraise their significance for lawyering and legal education, to 
research contemporary and subsequent reviews of the books’ literary 
significance for Chicana/o Studies, and to investigate Acosta’s 
papers.169  Similarly, several years after the republication of Acosta’s 
novels, Latin America and Latino Studies Professor Ilan Stavans 
published two books regarding Acosta (in 1995 and 1996).170  In turn, 
Acosta’s novels and Stavans’s books informed Haney López’s 
extensive scholarship on Acosta’s self-styled revolutionary Chicano 
lawyering,171 which together with the books by Delgado and 
Stefancic,172 and Delgado, Perea, and Stefancic,173 provide a robust set 
 
166.  See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23; STAVANS, supra note 22; UNCOLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 22; Haney López, supra note 133; Haney López, supra note 153; 
Olivas, supra note 6. 
167.  See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
168.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 847.  
169.  See Olivas, supra note 6, at 847–48.  See also Salvador Güereña, Guide to the 
Oscar Zeta Acosta Papers, CEMA 1, DEPARTMENT OF SPECIAL COLLECTIONS, UNIVERSITY 
OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA LIBRARY (1998), http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark
:/13030/tf187004xn/entire_text/ (1998). 
170.  STAVANS, supra note 22; UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22. 
171.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23; Haney López, supra note 133; Haney López, 
supra note 153. 
172.  LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 6. 
173.  LATINOS AND THE LAW, supra note 6.  For symposium essays responding to 
the publication of this casebook, see Rodolfo F. Acuña, On Pedagogy, 12 HARV. LATINO 
L. REV. 7 (2009); Keith Aoki & Kevin R. Johnson, Latinos and the Law: Cases and 
Materials: The Need for Focus in Critical Analysis, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 73 (2009); 
Steven W. Bender, Knocked Down Again: An East L.A. Story on the Geography of Color 
and Colors, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 109 (2009); Richard Delgado et al., Author’s Reply: 
Creating and Documenting a New Field of Legal Study, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 103 
(2009); Gerald P. López, Changing Systems, Changing Ourselves, 12 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 15 (2009); Michael A. Olivas, The Art and Science of Casebooks, 12 HARV. LATINO L. 
5 GONZALEZ MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  4:18 PM 
Winter 2016] LA GRAN LUCHA 109 
of resources for lawyers, law students, and others who might be 
interested in learning from Acosta’s style of lawyering today—
notwithstanding the seemingly limited possibilities for it—which 
comprises the second of my two observations on Olivas’s case study 
on Oscar “Zeta” Acosta. 
As Olivas noted, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Arthur L. 
Alarcón cited Acosta for contempt of court twice during the second of 
the two Chicano Movement trials in which Acosta challenged the 
grand jury indictment, Montez v. Superior Court (also known as the 
Biltmore Six).174  Acosta spent a total of seven days in jail for his 
conduct during that trial.175  The image and reality of a lawyer in jail 
under such circumstances did not start, or stop, with Acosta,176 but his 
 
REV. 1 (2009); Lisa R. Pruitt, Latina/os, Locality, and Law in the Rural South, 12 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 135 (2009); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Latinos: Discrete and Insular No More, 
12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 41 (2009); Leticia M. Saucedo, National Origin, Immigrants, and 
the Workplace: The Employment Cases in LATINOS AND THE LAW and the Advocates’ 
Perspective, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 53 (2009). 
174.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 854.  Accord HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 38 (“Judge 
Alarcon twice jailed Acosta for contempt of court.”).  On the colloquial name for the 
case, see supra note 164. 
175.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 38. 
176.  For three examples of lawyers who served time in jail, consider Mahatma 
Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Lynne Stewart.  See, e.g., THE CASE OF LYNNE STEWART: 
A JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ATTACK ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS passim (National Lawyers Guild 
ed. 2005) (discussing the conviction of 65-year-old attorney Lynne Stewart under 
charges of conspiracy, making false statements, and providing and concealing 
material support to terrorist activity for issuing a press release regarding her client in 
2000); THE GANDHI READER: A SOURCEBOOK OF HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS 59–71 (Homer 
A. Jack ed., 1994) (discussing Gandhi’s first imprisonment, where he was sentenced 
to hard labor at the Johannesburg, South Africa jail in 1908 for failing to show his 
registration certificate, which he had burned, in Satyagraha resistance to the “Black 
Act,” the Transvaal Asiatic Registration Act of 1906); Stephen Ellmann, Two South 
African Men of the Law, 28 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 431, 433–37 (2014) (discussing 
Nelson Mandela’s 1962 trial for leaving South Africa without a passport and inciting 
people to strike, attainment of his LL.B., and successful defense of his law license 
while imprisoned at Robbins Island); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Mandela to 
Mthwana: Providing Counsel to the Unrepresented Accused in South Africa, 75 B.U. L. REV. 
1, 8–9 (1995) (discussing the anti-Apartheid symbolism of Mandela’s pro se 
representation against charges of leaving South Africa without a passport and 
incitement to strike). 
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punishment for contempt of court provides a sobering reminder of the 
complexity and insidiousness of legal violence.  Indeed, for those who 
may have found impractical my earlier discussion of the possibilities 
of a work stoppage by terminated representation or of a work-to-rule 
slowdown, I call attention to Olivas’s assessment of Acosta’s 
lawyering strategies, “Acosta’s trial tactics of twenty years ago landed 
him in jail for contempt.  Today, I doubt he could remain licensed for 
the same strategy, even though the political powerlessness that 
characterized Latinos in 1970 is even more acute in the 1990s.”177  I 
agree with Olivas’s conclusions, as I find all accounts of Acosta’s 
lawyering audacious and brazen. 
Of course, I have never been charged with contempt of court, nor 
otherwise been threatened directly with jail time, so perhaps Acosta’s 
self-professed hatred for the law is beyond my legal imagination.  At 
the same time, many years before I became a lawyer, I confronted 
conduct that I interpreted as racially motivated police harassment, as 
well as instances of express white supremacist racism.178  Also, as a 
 
177.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 856–57. 
178.  Here are two anecdotes.  First, on Easter Sunday, April 3, 1994, a police 
officer detained and questioned me while I was sitting in a downtown Sacramento 
park beside a public artwork that had been defaced with a graffito.  Suspicious of me 
for this vandalism, the officer interrogated me, patted me down, looked nearby for 
evidence of any tool that I might have used, and asked for my driver’s license.  
Innocent, I complied without protest but with growing frustration until the officer 
said that the graffito was “Mexican graffiti” and took my photograph with a Polaroid 
camera, at which time I expressed my indignation.  Posing flippantly for the camera, 
I asked him, “Is anything that you are doing legal?”  In response the officer shoved 
my license back into my hand and ordered me to leave the park, which I immediately 
did.  (For a description of a similar police practice of photo-graphing Chicana/o youth 
elsewhere in California at around the same time, here under the express pretense that 
they were gang members, see Cruz Reynoso, Cultural Diversity: Reality and Ideal, 6 LA 
RAZA L.J. 209, 210 (1993).)  
Four years earlier, I had begun to confront members of the several neo-Nazi skinhead 
youth gangs that populated Sacramento and its environs.  See generally SKINHEADS IN 
AMERICA: RACISTS ON THE RAMPAGE, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER INTELLIGENCE 
REPORT SPECIAL EDITION 18, 26 (n.d.), http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/
files/downloads/publication/Skinheads_in_America_0.pdf (discussing the neo-Nazi 
“American Front” skinheads).  In the Sacramento of my youth, skinheads accosted 
me in high school, on the street, and in several other locales.  While I personally 
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lawyer at the nonprofit Alameda County Homeless Action Center in 
Oakland, California, from November 2006 until December 2010, I 
represented impoverished individuals who sought Social Security 
disability benefits.179  During those four years, working in a job 
perhaps similar to the one that Acosta fled prior to representing the 
Chicano Movement cases discussed above,180 I encountered conduct 
from judges that I interpreted as, biased, perhaps unconsciously, on 
the bases of race, gender, and class.181  Even though I practiced law 
 
avoided physical violence, others were not so fortunate.  See Tim Grieve, Over the 
Edge, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 2, 1990), at F1 (reporting on the Aug. 21, 1990 fight 
between rival skinhead gangs in Sacramento, which resulted in the murder of Paul 
Carallo, a young man affiliated with the Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice).  As one 
response to this violence, I joined a nascent community group, Anti-Racist Action, 
organized against white supremacy at my high school, and participated in a Nov. 17, 
1990, march and rally against white supremacy at the state capitol.  See Maria E. 
Camposeco, 150 Protest Over Racist Skinheads, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 18, 1990), at B3.  
See generally A History of Anti-Racist Action, ANTI-RACIST ACTION, http://antiracistactio
n.org/?page_id=30 (last visited July 13, 2015). 
179.  See González, supra note 7, at 1026–27 (noting the author’s work at the 
Alameda County Homeless Action Center).  See also supra note 7 (discussing the 
author’s experience as an activist, attorney, and educator based in Oakland, 
California).  See generally Alameda County Homeless Action Center, http://homeless
actioncenter.org (last visited July 7, 2015). 
180.  See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 30 (noting Acosta’s “brief stint as a legal 
aid attorney”); Olivas, supra note 6, at 848 (quoting “Acosta’s description of his first 
legal job, in Oakland, California Legal Services”). 
181.  For example, one day in court, I represented two women in separate hearings 
before the same Social Security Administration administrative law judge.  In the 
morning, my client was an African-American woman with neither any drug-related 
conviction, nor any other evidence conflicting with her testimony as to when she had 
stopped her prior admitted substance abuse.  The judge denied her claim for disability 
benefits primarily on the basis that he found her testimony not credible.  In the 
afternoon, my client was a racially White woman whose conviction for driving under 
the influence of alcohol conflicted with her testimony as to the duration of her sobriety.  
The judge approved her claim, finding her substance abuse immaterial to her disability 
claim.  While I felt frustrated during the first hearing, suspecting that the judge might 
be subjecting my client to invidious stereotypes about African-American women and 
crack, a student intern (who was a racially White woman and had accompanied me to 
both hearings), interpreted the cases starkly in terms of race.  As I recall, she explained 
how similar my clients appeared to each other in terms of their flat affect and medical 
histories.  From her point of view, the different treatment seemed explicable only by 
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with the myriad benefits of an education in law that featured critical 
race theory, LatCrit theory, and other genres of critical outsider 
jurisprudence,182 as a Chicana/o who was active in the local bar,183 and 
while living in the same community as the office where I worked, I 
often felt perplexed at how to object effectively to seemingly invidious 
discrimination against my clients—in terms that would not unduly 
antagonize the judge.184  Worried about not prejudicing my client’s 
interests by objecting insolently to conduct that I believed evidenced 
invidious animus, implicit bias, unconscious racism, or common 
sense racism,185 I instead chose to build and preserve the record in 
 
race: indeed, the second client’s racial Whiteness apparently functioned to trump 
evidence of record that contradicted her testimony, whereas the first client’s racial 
Blackness apparently rendered her testimony not credible. 
182.  See supra note 44 (noting the author’s education in critical outsider 
jurisprudence and comparative ethnic studies).  Indeed, I studied Racism on Trial in 
my second semester at Berkeley Law with Haney López and after already having 
gained a passing knowledge of Oscar Zeta Acosta from my graduate education at San 
Francisco State University.  Approximately four and a half years later I began 
teaching undergraduate students at San Francisco State University and U.C. Berkeley 
in courses that I redesigned, which syllabi included Racism on Trial.  See González, 
supra note 7, at 1025–29 (discussing the author’s experience of teaching 
undergraduate Ethnic Studies courses). 
183.  See supra note 41 (noting the author’s service to local bar associations). 
184.  See supra note 181 (discussing an anecdote of judicial conduct that the 
author perceived as evidencing invidious discrimination). 
185.  For a recent analysis of invidious animus, see Susannah W. Pollvogt, 
Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2013).  The literature on implicit 
bias and unconscious racism has become voluminous.  For two classic texts on the 
subject, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 
(1995) and Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).  For several recent articulations, see 
Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563 (2013); Andrew W. Bribriesco, Latino/a Plaintiffs and the 
Intersection of Stereotypes, Unconscious Bias, Race-Neutral Policies, and Personal Injury, 13 
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373 (2010); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1489 (2005); Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the 
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005).  For the theory of race and racism as 
common sense, see HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 110–30.  For a precursor theory, 
see Haney López, supra note 153, especially pages 1774–76.  
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order to prevail on appeal—a strategy that almost always ultimately 
worked—but at an immeasurable human cost to my impoverished 
clients, who were compelled to wait for a seemingly interminable 
period before receiving their disability benefits. 
Thus, I feel impressed by Acosta’s style of confronting the risk of 
truncated representation by objecting audaciously and brazenly to the 
invidious discrimination under which his clients had been indicted.  
While I have been willing to contest racist acts to which I, or a friend, 
was directly subject, as a lawyer I have been careful to safeguard my 
clients’ individual cases before the judge.  In contrast, Acosta directly 
contested the white supremacist legal violence arrayed against his 
clients, worrying less about their individual interests and more about 
how their cases implicated the broader Chicano Movement.186  
Although controversial, this choice was likely ethical, for Acosta’s 
clients knew, or quickly came to learn, who they were getting when 
they agreed for him to represent them.  As politically prepared 
Chicano Movement activists, most of them were willing to subject 
themselves to representation by a “revolutionary” lawyer who not 
only understood their experiences of racism in Los Angeles but 
dedicated himself to translating their experiences of racism into 
evidence of unconstitutional discrimination in the grand jury 
selection process.187 
 
186.  See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing Acosta’s 
understanding of how to use criminal defense work as an organizing tool for the 
Chicano movement).  Accord HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 29–30, 40 (discussing 
Acosta’s dedication to the Chicano Movement); Olivas, supra note 6, at 854 
(concluding that Acosta’s challenge to the grand jury selection process combined 
“acute political instincts and deft lawyering [that] did not compromise his clients’ 
interests, and largely vindicated them”). 
187.  Compare GARCÍA & CASTRO, supra note 23, at 204, 213 (“Right from there I 
[Sal Castro] didn’t have too much confidence in Oscar [Acosta].  He was erratic, and 
I found out later he was a druggy.  I was glad that I also had the ACLU lawyers 
working on my case and those of the others arrested . . . . I told Acosta that I could 
afford another lawyer so he would be free to help the others.  He was too unstable 
and crazy.”), with HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 40 (“Acosta and the defendants 
conceived of these cases as vehicles to promote the Chicano movement, and they 
attempted to use the courts as a stage upon which to unmask judicial bias against 
Mexicans.”), and Olivas, supra note 6, at 854 n.13 (“[East L.A. Thirteen defendant Carlos 
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Perhaps this fact, clients who are politically prepared, who 
perhaps even expect, to receive punishment for their social activism,188 
most limits the possibilities for Acosta’s style of revolutionary 
lawyering today.  This is not to say that such clients do not exist.  One 
need only consider the young people who began coming out as 
“Undocumented and Unafraid” since 2010,189 the “Occupy Wall 
Street” protests that erupted in 2011,190 and the “Black Lives Matter” 
 
Muñoz] chose not to hire Acosta as his lawyer, as he believed Acosta wanted to plead 
him guilty and ‘make martyrs out of all of us.’  While his esteem for Acosta grew over 
the two trials, [Muñoz] felt Acosta was a publicity hound and careless lawyer.”).  See 
also HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 233 (“[After the Biltmore Six acquittals] Acosta was 
fed up with being a movement lawyer.  On several occasions he ran into conflict with 
his clients, with both sides wondering about the other’s true commitment.  And he 
had also tired of practicing a profession that he hated.”) (citation omitted). 
188.  Accord HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 164–77 (theorizing the emerging 
common sense of protest, legal repression, and race in the Chicano Movement and 
how it led activists to expect legal violence). 
189.  See, e.g., UNDOCUMENTED AND UNAFRAID: TAM TRAN, CINTHYA FELIX, AND THE 
IMMIGRANT YOUTH MOVEMENT (Kent Wong et al. eds., 2012); DREAMS DEPORTED: 
IMMIGRANT YOUTH AND FAMILIES RESIST DEPORTATION (Kent Wong & Nancy 
Guardernos eds., 2015); Raquel Aldana, Beth Lyon & Karla Mari McKanders, Raising 
the Bar: Law Schools and Legal Institutions Leading to Educate Undocumented Students, 44 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 5 (2012); Laura Corrunker, “Coming Out of the Shadows”: Dream Act 
Activism in the Context of Global Anti-Deportation Activism, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 143 (2012); René Galindo, Undocumented & Unafraid: The DREAM Act 5 and the 
Public Disclosure of Undocumented Status as a Political Act, 44 URB. REV. 589 (2012); 
Jayesh M. Rathod, Protecting Immigrant Workers Through Interagency Cooperation, 53 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1157, 1164 (2011); Natasha Rivera-Silber, “Coming Out Undocumented” in 
the Age of Perry, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 71 (2013); Rose Cuison Villazor, The 
Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
190.  See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, All Assemble: Order and Disorder in Law, Politics, 
and Culture, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 949 (2014); David Dana & Nadav Shoked, Public, by 
Necessity, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 341 (2014); Trina Jones, Occupying America: Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., the American Dream, and the Challenge of Socio-Economic 
Inequality, 57 VILL. L. REV. 339 (2012); Sarah Kunstler, The Right to Occupy: Occupy Wall 
Street and the First Amendment, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 989 (2012); Robin Lipp, Note, 
Protest Policing in New York City: Balancing Safety and Expression, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 275 (2015); Janos D. Marton, Representing an Idea: How Occupy Wall Street’s 
Attorneys Overcame the Challenges of Representing Non-Hierarchical Movements, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107 (2012); Udi Ofer, Occupy the Parks: Restoring the Right to 
Overnight Protest in Public Parks, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1155 (2012); Stephen Tower, 
Comment, Not in My Front Yard: Freedom of Speech and State Action in New York City’s 
5 GONZALEZ MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  4:18 PM 
Winter 2016] LA GRAN LUCHA 115 
movement that emerged in 2012 after George Zimmerman killed 
Trayvon Martin.191  Similarly, thinking about the lawyers who 
represent Wikileaks Editor-in-Chief Julian Assange192 and national 
security whistleblower Edward Snowden193 reinforces the 
understanding that a substantial number of people are willing to 
break the law on principle in order to effect social change.  At the same 
time, however, after decades of kulturkampf (culture war) and other 
forms of revanchism (right-wing revenge-taking),194 the number of 
 
Privately Owned Public Spaces, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 433 (2013); Christine Verbitsky, Note, 
The Occupy Wall Street Movement and the Constitution: Protesters Preoccupied with the 
First Amendment, 29 TOURO L. REV. 1003 (2013); Timothy Zick, Book Review, Liberty’s 
Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly by John D. Inazu, 91 TEX. L. REV. 375 (2012). 
191.  See About Us, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2015) (“#BlackLivesMatter was created in 2012 after Trayvon Martin’s 
murderer, George Zimmerman, was acquitted for his crime, and dead 17-year old 
Trayvon was post-humously [sic] placed on trial for his own murder.”).  See also 
Mario L. Barnes, Taking A Stand?: An Initial Assessment of the Social and Racial Effects of 
Recent Innovations in Self-Defense Laws, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3179 (2015); Jim Freeman, 
Supporting Social Movements: A Brief Guide for Lawyers and Law Students, 12 HASTINGS 
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 192 (2015); Laverne Lewis Gaskins, Justice Demands That 
Black Lives Matter, NBA NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG. 26 (Dec. 2014); Justin Hansford & Meena 
Jagannath, Ferguson to Geneva: Using the Human Rights Framework to Push Forward A 
Vision for Racial Justice in the United States After Ferguson, 12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY 
L.J. 121 (2015); Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: 
Can’t We All Just Get Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 339 (2015); L. Song Richardson, Police 
Racial Violence: Lessons from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961 (2015); Arneta 
Rogers, Note, How Police Brutality Harms Mothers: Linking Police Violence to the 
Reproductive Justice Movement, 12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 205 (2015). 
192.  See JUSTICE FOR ASSANGE, https://justice4assange.com (last visited Oct. 17, 
2015).  See generally WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks.org/index.en.html (last visited Oct. 
17, 2015). 
193.  See Russell Brandom, Edward Snowden’s Lawyer will Keep your Secrets, THE 
VERGE (June 24, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/6/24/5818594/edward-snow
dens-lawyer-jesselyn-radack-will-keep-your-secrets; Charlie Savage & Matt Apuzzo, 
Snowden Retained Expert in Espionage Act Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/us/snowden-retained-expert-in-espionage-act-defense.html. 
194.  On revanchism in the United States, see NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN 
FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST CITY 44–47 (1996); Marc-Tizoc 
González, Hunger, Poverty, and the Criminalization of Food Sharing in the New Gilded Age, 
23 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 231, 235–36, 257–59, 279–80 (2015).  On 
kulturkamp, see, e.g., Francisco Valdes, “We Are Now of the View”: Backlash Activism, 
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people who are willing to break the law on principle in the United 
States may be a relatively small proportion of the populace.  Also, 
what Olivas feared in 1991 continues to constrain the possibilities for 
Acosta’s style of revolutionary lawyering today.  As Olivas noted 
then: 
I have a nagging fear that much of the monkey wrenching, 
in law and curriculum, will be done by those who do not 
share my politics.  And they rule the world, not I.  The 
expanded use of sanctions, such as those directed at two 
of my heroes, William Kunstler and Julius Chambers, 
makes me believe that the interests of neither Linda 
Brown nor the Chicago Seven could be vigorously 
defended in today’s climate.  Derrick Bell can be monkey 
wrenched in a law class.  Jerry Falwell can sue Hustler, all 
the way to the Supreme Court, but Andrea Dworkin is 
threatened with sanctions if she argues that Hustler 
literally harms women.195 
Notwithstanding today’s obvious crackdowns and more subtle 
constraints on dissent, however, it is well worth remembering Oscar 
“Zeta” Acosta and his strident defense of Chicano Movement activists 
in Los Angeles.  Indeed, I look forward to cultivating broader 
knowledge and critical discourse over what Acosta, and his 
contemporary and predecessor Chicana/o, Mexican American, and 
other Latina/o lawyers attempted and accomplished in the twentieth 
century.196  As I explain below, contextualizing lawyers’ work within 
 
Cultural Cleansing, and the Kulturkampf to Resurrect the Old Deal, 35 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1407 (2005). 
195.  Olivas, supra note 6, at 855 (citations omitted). 
196.  See, e.g., “COLORED MEN” AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ”, supra note 2 (discussing the 
rise of Mexican American lawyering through an examination of the four Mexican 
American lawyers, Carlos Cadena, James de Anda, Gus Garcia, and Johnny Herrera, 
who established constitutional equal protection for Mexican Americans); IN DEFENSE OF 
MY PEOPLE: ALONSO S. PERALES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC 
INTELLECTUALS (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2013) (discussing the life and times of Alonso S. 
Perales (1898-1960), the third Mexican American attorney in the state of Texas); Michael 
Bennett & Cruz Reynoso, California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA): Survival of a Poverty 
Law Practice, 1 CHICANO L. REV. 1 passim (1972) (discussing the origins and initial 
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la gran lucha, can help them—rather, us—create socio-legal conditions 
under which more people may suffer less injustice under the color of 
law. 
 
II. La gran lucha 
 
Engaging with Olivas’s essay on lawyers’ dilemmas, unpopular 
causes, and legal regimes has deepened my appreciation for the  
three risks of representation that Martha Minow identified—
nonrepresentation, terminated representation, and truncated 
representation.  Contemplating Olivas’s three case studies and 
applying their insights to recent and ongoing controversies, I find that 
his scholarship offers critical insights into the socio-legal conditions 
that tend to keep legal representation out of reach for certain 
populations.  Furthermore, his work evinces a breath of “critical 
hope”197 as to how lawyers might organize themselves to stop, or at 
least slow down a law breaking regime, and an absurd memory of the 
Chicano Movement that nonetheless proves instructive for the kinds 
of identities and relationships that might empower lawyers whose 
clients contemplate breaking the law on principle in order to 
transform their socio-legal situation. 
Much more could be written, and I hope that my contribution 
will encourage other scholars in future years to apply Olivas’s insights 
to, inter alia, the emerging youth movements of today, such as 
#BlackLivesMatter and the Dreamers, those who are “Undocumented 
 
struggles of California Rural Legal Assistance); Michael A. Olivas, From a “Legal 
Organization of Militants” into a “Law Firm for the Latino Community”: MALDEF and the 
Purposive Cases of Keyes, Rodriguez, and Plyler, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1151 (2013) 
(discussing the origins and organizational evolution of the Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund); Tom I. Romero, II, MALDEF and the Legal Investment in a 
Multi-Colored America, 18 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 135, 136 n.10 (2007) (discussing the 
origins of MALDEF and describing its 1967 founding as the Mexican American Legal 
Defense (MALD) by San Antonio, Texas attorney Peter Tijerina). 
197.  See PAOLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF HOPE: RELIVING PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 
2 (Robert R. Barr trans., Continuum Publ’g Co. 2004) (discussing the need for critical 
hope, “based on the need for truth as an ethical quality of the struggle”). 
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and Unafraid.”198  Instead of delving into current social movements, 
however, I end this Article by discussing my conceptualization of la 
gran lucha, and how I perceive myself in relationship to Olivas, Acosta, 
and actual lineages and fictive genealogies of attorneys of Mexican 
heritage who attempt to use the law to transform socio-legal 
conditions so that more people may suffer less, and so that the power 
elite may be brought down to a point where their authority comes 
beneath the rule of law.199 
 
A. Lineages of Struggle 
 
As noted at the start of this Article, by la gran lucha, I mean “the 
understanding that our pasts are not merely multicolored: rather, 
our diverse heritages wind through centuries of socio-legal 
struggle, which transcend the current nation state.”200  This concept 
derives from my experiences as a Chicana/o who was born and 
raised amidst the contradictions of the final quarter of the twentieth 
century, experienced predominantly in my hometown of 
Sacramento, California (1975-1996), with a sojourn in the Inland 
Empire of Southern California (1996-1998), and a dozen years in the 
San Francisco Bay Area (1998-2010), where I lived longest in 
Oakland, California (2002-2010).  From 2002 to 2005, I trained to 
become a lawyer at Berkeley Law, during the start of the War on 
Terror(ism) and the years when the Supreme Court of the United 
States barely upheld the constitutionality of racially conscious 
affirmative action in higher education.201  Through my formal 
education in law and concurrent “insurgent” student activism,202 I 
transfigured my then-recent graduate education in interdisciplinary 
social science, visual anthropology, and comparative ethnic studies 
into what has become a decade-plus engagement with one of the 
 
198.  See sources cited, supra notes 189 & 191. 
199.  On the notion of authority under law, see LINEBAUGH, supra note 109, at 17, 
211–12. 
200.  See sources cited and discussed supra note 8. 
201.  See Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 1892–1905; González, supra note 7, at 1026. 
202.  On insurgent student activism, see Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 1892–1905. 
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academic movements sparked by the previous decades’ 
organization of critical legal studies, feminist critical legal theory, 
critical race theory, and other genres of critical outsider 
jurisprudence—LatCrit theory, praxis, and community.203 
As a Chicana/o law student enrolled amidst a critical mass of 
other students de colores (of colors) who had inherited a set of student 
organizations that reached back to the Power-Identity movements of 
the 1960s, I benefited immeasurably from engaging with my peers in 
various actions and campaigns, endeavoring to reform our law school 
and to intervene in the broader social struggles of our times by 
playing our position as student activists at one of California’s elite law 
schools.204  While working alongside my peers, I oriented my 
education in law to study under critical race theorists who were 
affiliated with LatCrit theory, praxis, and community, like Angela P. 
Harris and Ian F. Haney López, and I engaged in the production of 
 
203.  For my contributions to the published LatCrit symposia, in reverse 
chronological order, see Marc-Tizoc González, Habeas Data: Comparative Constitutional 
Interventions from Latin American against Neoliberal States of Insecurity and Surveillance, 
90 CHI. KENT L. REV. 641 (2015) (Afterword for LatCrit symposium “Toward Equal 
Justice in Law, Education and Society”); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández & 
Marc-Tizoc González, Fifteen Years of Reconstructing the World, 14 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 243 (2011) (Foreword for LatCrit XV symposium); Marc-Tizoc González & 
Christopher J. Curran, Food Justice as Interracial Justice, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
207 (2011) (Article for LatCrit symposium for the South-North Exchange on Theory, 
Culture, and Law on “The Global Politics of Food”); Marc-Tizoc González, Yanira 
Reyes, Belkys Torres & Charles Venator Santiago, Afterword: The LatCrit Task Force 
Recommendations: Findings and Recommendations of a Self-Study of the LatCrit Board, 
2009, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 853 (2010) (Afterword for LatCrit XIV 
symposium); Marc-Tizoc González, Latina/o (Public/Legal) Intellectuals, Social Crises 
and Contemporary Social Movements, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 787 (2010) 
(Essay for LatCrit XIV symposium) [hereinafter González, Latina/o (Public/Legal) 
Intellectuals] Marc-Tizoc González, Yanira Reyes-Gil, Belkys Torres & Charles 
Venator Santiago, Afterword: Change and Continuity: An Introduction to the LatCrit 
Evolution Taskforce Recommendations, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 303 (2009) (Afterword 
for LatCrit XIII symposium); Marc-Tizoc González, Counter-Disciplinarity in the 
Critical Education Tradition in LatCrit Theory, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 107 (2009) 
(Cluster Introduction for LatCrit XIII symposium); Marc-Tizoc González, Tracing the 
Critical Education Tradition in LatCrit Theory, Praxis & Community, 4 FIU L. REV. 85 
(2008) (Cluster Introduction LatCrit XII symposium). 
204.  See Anderson et al., supra note 8, at passim. 
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socio-legal knowledge at the Berkeley La Raza Law Journal.205  As a 
member and officer of La Raza Law Students Association and the 
Coalition for Diversity, I learned that some of my peers and I shared 
actual kinship regarding past, and ongoing, struggles for social 
justice.206  I also had the opportunity to read Ian F. Haney López’s 
Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice,207 which analyzed 
historical events that were vital to my familial history. 
For example, my mother, Petra M. Valadez (born in 1944 in 
Sanderson, Texas), was a Chicana schoolteacher in Los Angeles 
County in 1968.208  Her parents, Ramón V. Valadez (May 11, 1898 – 
October 6, 1976) and María M. Valadez (August 6, 1911 – July 5, 1996), 
immigrated to Sanderson, Texas in 1929 from Allende, Coahuila, 
México.  La familia (the family) Valadez migrated to Salinas, California 
in December 1946, where they worked in the fields and packing sheds 
of the Salinas Valley until the late 1960s.209  Petra M. Valadez 
graduated from Gonzales High School in 1961, and she earned her 
B.A. in 1965 and her California teaching credential in 1966 from 
California State University, Hayward (now CSU East Bay).210  As a 
schoolteacher, she became active in the Chicano Movement in Los 
Angeles until she was arrested during the April 24, 1969, protest of 
Governor Ronald Reagan’s speech recounted by Haney López as 
leading up to the case of the Biltmore Six.211 
While Haney López focused on Oscar “Zeta” Acosta’s defense 
against the criminal prosecution of the alleged arson and conspiracy 
to commit arson in several of the upper floors in the Biltmore Hotel,212 
as my mother relates it, a group of Chicana/o Movement activists 
stood up just as Governor Reagan started his speech and began to clap 
loudly in order to disrupt it.  Immediately after they stood, however, 
 
205.  See Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 1896–98. 
206.  See, e.g., id. at 1898–1903; González, Latina/o (Public/Legal) Intellectuals, supra 
note 203, at 792–93. 
207.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23. 
208.  See González, supra note 7, at 991, 1032 n.119. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. at 1032 n.119. 
211.  See Montez, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736; HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 35. 
212.  See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 36–40. 
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police officers rushed to arrest them.213  Though charges against her 
were eventually dropped because, as she explains, the police 
photograph barely failed to include her, her arrest nevertheless 
resulted in the temporary suspension of her teaching credential.214  
Unable to work as an educator, she left Los Angeles for Sacramento 
to live with a sister, and in 1969, she enrolled in the Mexican American 
Education Project at Sacramento State College (later California State 
University, Sacramento).215  During her studies in Sacramento, she 
met my father. 
Alfonso Z. González (August 2, 1931 – May 1, 2006) was born in 
Sacramento to José Z. González (April 16, 1903 – August 27, 1967) and 
Josephine Z. González (August 27, 1904 – March 20, 1990).216  His 
parents met in Pocatello, Idaho, after emigrating separately from 
different parts of México, José from Aguas Caliente, Aguas Caliente 
and Josephine from Gómez Palacio, Durango.  They married on 
March 15, 1925.  Shortly thereafter, their oldest son, Florentino, 
 
213.  Accord HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 35. 
214.  Cf. GARCÍA & CASTRO, supra note 23, at 207–08, 213–20 (discussing Sal Castro’s 
experience of being barred from teaching at Lincoln High School, allegedly under a state 
education code prohibiting an indicted felon from teaching; his temporary 
reassignment to a non-teaching job; and the community protest of his reassignment, 
including a weeklong sit-in at the school district office where the Los Angeles Board of 
Education met, which ultimately persuaded the board to reinstate him).  Although 
reinstated to teach in the 1968–69 academic year, Castro experienced reprisals from 
various school officials for the next five years.  See id. at 221–34, 244–46, 248. 
215.  See Mexican American Education Project, INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
EDUCATION, https://sites.google.com/site/democracyandeducationorg/chicano-mexi
can-american-digital-history-project/mexican-american-education-project (last visi-
ted Oct. 17, 2015).  See also Petra Valadez, A Rationale and a Teaching Unit for 
Changing the Social Studies and Educational Curricula to Institute Sensitized 
Representation of the Chicano Experience (1972) (unpublished M.A. thesis, California 
State University, Sacramento) (on file with author). 
216.  See Robert D. Davila, Attorney an Activist for Latino Justice, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
May 4, 2006, at B1.  The following account derives from published documents as 
noted below, my recollection of familial stories, my nascent genealogical research, 
and several texts that I wrote for college classes in 1996 and 1997 and for a 2003 speech 
that I delivered at the occasion of a Mexican American Educational Association 
scholarship being named after my then living father.  (All unpublished documents on 
file with author). 
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contracted diphtheria.  On the advice of a doctor, they migrated from 
Pocatello to Sacramento in 1927 so that he could benefit from the 
warmer clime.  Accompanying José, Josephine, and their children 
(Florentino and Dora) were Josephine’s mother, Luisa Zúñiga and 
little sister, Julia Z. Orñelas.217  In Sacramento, they found seasonal 
work at the Libby, McNeil & Libby cannery, until José obtained a job 
as a welder with the railroad in 1937.218 
Raised in the neighborhood of Oak Park, Sacramento,219 Alfonso 
Z. González was a member of what Chicana/o Studies scholars have 
named the Mexican American Generation.220  Like most of his siblings, 
 
217.  Interview with Rosemarie Sánchez, Sacramento, California (Aug. 1, 2015). 
218.  Accord Davila, supra note 216; González, supra note 7, at 1033.  For a 
discussion of labor organizing at this cannery with emphasis on the role of Mexican 
American women, see VICKI L. RUIZ, CANNERY WOMEN, CANNERY LIVES: MEXICAN 
WOMEN, UNIONIZATION, AND THE CALIFORNIA FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY, 1930–1950, 
at 57, 103–10 (1987).  My notes are discrepant regarding for which railroad José 
worked, with some stating the Southern Pacific and others the Union Pacific.  Several 
of my cousins, however, believe that it was the Southern Pacific.  In 1996 the two 
railroad companies merged.  See Southern Pacific Railroad, UNION PACIFIC, https://
www.up.com/aboutup/special_trains/heritage/southern_pacific/index.htm (last visi-
ted Oct. 17, 2015). 
219.  On the history of Oak Park, Sacramento, see generally SACRAMENTO’S OAK 
PARK (Lee M.A. Simpson ed., 2004).  For an early account of a Mexican immigrant’s 
acculturation to life in Sacramento, see ERNESTO GALARZA, BARRIO BOY 189–266 (1971).  
For other accounts of growing up in early to mid-twentieth century Mexican 
American families in and around Sacramento, see RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF 
MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ (1982); RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, DAYS OF 
OBLIGATION: AN ARGUMENT WITH MY MEXICAN FATHER (1992); RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, 
BROWN: THE LAST DISCOVERY OF AMERICA (2002); Michael Nava, Gardenland, 
Sacramento, California, in HOMETOWNS: GAY MEN WRITE ABOUT WHERE THEY BELONG 21 
(John Preston ed., 1991). 
220.  For influential explanations of the formation of the “Mexican-American 
Generation” under a theory of successive “political generations” of people of Mexican 
heritage in the United States, see MARIO T. GARCÍA, MEXICAN AMERICANS: LEADERSHIP, 
IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY, 1930–60, at 1–7, 13–22 (1990); GEORGE J. SÁNCHEZ, BECOMING 
MEXICAN AMERICAN: ETHNICITY, CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN CHICANO LOS ANGELES, 
1900–1945, at 11–13 (1993) (arguing that a new Mexican American ethnic identity 
emerged in the 1930s through processes of cultural adaptation without substantial 
economic mobility).  See also DAVID GUTIÉRREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN 
AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 69–116 (1995) 
(discussing Mexican American ethnic politics prior to 1940); HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 
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he attended C.K. McClatchy High School, where he befriended one of 
the daughters of California governor Earl Warren, who would direct 
her chauffeur to pick up her friends and drive them to school in her 
limousine.221  As he described it, Sacramento’s small Mexican 
American community of that time centered around community 
dances and other cultural events organized by the Mexican consulate 
office and other local organizations.222  Encouraged to consider 
attending college through conversations with the governor’s 
daughter and her friends, who often discussed where they planned to 
enroll, when asked, González answered that he would attend the 
University of California, Berkeley (U.C. Berkeley).  After graduating 
from high school in 1949,223 he enrolled at Sacramento City College, 
where he earned his A.A. in 1951.224  The following year, he 
 
23, at 70–84 (discussing the Mexican American generation with a focus on its evolving 
racial identity); F. ARTURO ROSALES, CHICANO!: THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN 
AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 90–127 (1996) (discussing the Mexican American 
generation through civil rights organizations and labor struggles). 
221.  Although I have yet to verify the name of the governor’s daughter, Earl 
Warren was governor during 1943 to 1953, which includes the period when Alfonso 
Z. González was in high school.  Earl Warren, THE GOVERNOR’S GALLERY, CALIFORNIA 
STATE LIBRARY, http://governors.library.ca.gov/30-Warren.html (last visited Oct. 17, 
2015).  Warren had three daughters, Virginia, Dorothy, and Nina Elizabeth, who were 
born in 1929, 1931, and 1934 respectively.  See Patricia Sullivan, Socialite Virginia 
Warren Daly, 80, Dies, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.washington
post.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/03/AR2009030303561.html; Alden Whitman
, Earl Warren, 83, Who Led High Court In Time of Vast Social Change, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 10, 1974), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0319.
html; The Warren Children, LIFE 42-44 (July 26, 1948); From the Washington Post, 
Daughter of Chief Justice Warren Dies, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 26, 1986), http://arti
cles.latimes.com/1986-11-29/news/mn-16243_1_chief-justice-warren. 
222.  Cf. Kelly Johnson, Sacramento Mexican Consulate Relocates to Natomas, 
SACRAMENTO BUSINESS J. (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/
news/2011/02/04/sacramento-mexican-consulate-moves.html (noting the consulate 
office’s then-68-year history in Sacramento).  On the role of consulate offices in 
Mexican American history, see generally GILBERT G. GONZÁLEZ, MEXICAN CONSULS 
AND LABOR ORGANIZING: IMPERIAL POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (1999). 
223.  THE MEXICAN AMERICAN DIRECTORY 81–82 (Arturo Palacios ed., 1969); 
Davila, supra note 216. 
224.  FELICIANO RIVERA, A MEXICAN AMERICAN SOURCE BOOK WITH STUDY 
GUIDELINE 126 (1970). 
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matriculated to U.C. Berkeley.225  His studies were interrupted, 
however, when the United States Army drafted him into the Korean 
War.226  González served in military intelligence and was assigned to 
a base in Germany,227 from which he traveled widely in Europe while 
on leave.  A few years later, he obtained an early honorable discharge 
in order to resume his studies, which he completed in 1956, earning a 
B.A. in the Regional Group Major on Hispanic America.228  He then 
worked for a year as a social worker for the Sacramento County 
Welfare Department in an in-home health care program for the 
elderly before enrolling in law school in the fall of 1957.229  As he told 
it, part of his motivation to become a lawyer came from his 
grandmother, Doña Luisa, who told him that she aspired for him to 
become a doctor or a lawyer.230  At the same time, she instilled in him 
her dicho (proverb) to feel proud of being Mexican en su carne y hueso 
(in his flesh and bones). 
Although González related that several Mexican students were 
enrolled at Boalt Hall (U.C. Berkeley’s law school) with him, he 
recalled being one of only three Mexican American law students 
 
225.  See INTERNATIONAL HOUSE BERKELEY ALUMNI DIRECTORY 1993, at 27 (dating 
the start of González’s residence at the U.C. Berkeley International House as 1952). 
226.  In order to obtain a grave marker from the government, the author 
confirmed González’s military service shortly after his death.  González was 
discharged honorably with the rank of corporal as a veteran of the Korean War. 
227.  My notes on the location of the base where González was stationed are 
contradictory.  Earlier notes indicate the base was at Stuttgart, Germany.  Later notes 
state that the base was in Giessen, Germany.  According to the United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs, González’s detailed military record was destroyed 
in the July 12, 1973 fire at the National Personnel Records Center in Overland, 
Missouri.  See generally Walter W. Stender & Evans Walks, The National Personnel 
Records Center Fire: A Study in Disaster, 37 AMER. ARCHIVIST 521 (1974), https:// 
www.archives.gov/st-louis/military-personnel/NPRC_fire_a_study_in_disaster.pdf. 
228.  THE MEXICAN AMERICAN DIRECTORY, supra note 223, at 81; RIVERA, supra note 
224, at 126.  The Regional Group Majors reflect an earlier organization of the 
university.  See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA – GENERAL CATALOGUE 79–80 (Sept. 21, 
1942) (on file with author) (describing the Regional Group Majors and specifying the 
requirements for the Regional Group Major on Hispanic America). 
229.  See THE MEXICAN AMERICAN DIRECTORY, supra note 223, at 81; Davila, supra 
note 216. 
230.  See RIVERA, supra note 224, at 126; Davila, supra note 216. 
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enrolled during those years, which he believed to have been the 
largest concentration up until that time.231  One of those students was 
a young man named Cruz Reynoso, who was a 3L (third-year law 
student) when Alfonso Z. González was a 1L (first-year law student).  
For many readers, Cruz Reynoso needs no introduction.  Professor of 
Law Emeritus at the U.C. Davis School of Law and inaugural holder 
of the Boochever and Bird Chair for the Study and Teaching of 
Freedom and Equality, he was the first Mexican American to serve on 
the California Courts of Appeal (Third District, from 1976 to 1982) and 
the Supreme Court of California (from 1982 to 1986).232  After the 
politicization of the California judicial reconfirmation process 
 
231.  Accord ANDREA GUERRERO, SILENCE AT BOALT HALL: THE DISMANTLING OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 2 (2002) (noting that only twenty students enrolled at Boalt Hall 
from 1911 to 1964 identified as Latino) (citation omitted).  See also BOALT HALL 
PROFESSIONAL DIRECTORY (Sept. 8, 1992) (on file with author).  This 33-page document 
lists Latina/o Boalt Hall alumni alphabetically by last name, along with their year of 
graduation, known job, and contact information.  Including González, it features twelve 
Latino (all male) alumni who graduated before 1961: Augustus L. Castro, Class of 1936, 
Renzo A. Del Pero, Class of 1939, Alejandro F. DeSantos, Class of 1956, Alfonso Z. 
González, Class of 1960, Richard A. Ibañez, Class of 1936, G. Ernest López, Class of 1952, 
Raymond E. Mellana, Class of 1948, Cruz Reynoso, Class of 1958, Richard R. Rivera, 
Class of 1950, Albert J. Salera, Class of 1956, Edward E. Serres, Class of 1960, and Robert 
J. Soares, Class of 1958.  Id. at 6, 9, 13, 15, 17, 19, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30. 
232.  See KENNETH C. BURT, THE SEARCH FOR A CIVIC VOICE: CALIFORNIA LATINO 
POLITICS 299–300 (2007); Cruz Reynoso, Brief Remembrances: My Appointment and 
Service on the California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, 1976-1987, 13 BERKELEY LA 
RAZA L.J. 15, 15 (2002). See also CRUZ REYNOSO: SOWING THE SEEDS OF JUSTICE (Abby 
Ginzberg dir. 2010), http://www.reynosofilm.com; Bennett & Reynoso, supra note 196, 
at passim; Kristina Horton Flaherty, Cruz Reynoso Honored as ‘Legal Giant,’ CAL. BAR J. 
(Oct. 2009), http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/Archive.aspx?articleId=96466&categoryId= 
96412&month=10&year=2009; Alan Houseman, Interview with Cruz Reynoso, NAT’L 
EQUAL JUST. LIBRARY, GEO. U. L. CTR. ORAL HIST. COLLECTION (Aug. 12, 2002) http:// 
www.law.georgetown.edu/library/collections/nejl/reynoso-transcript.cfm; NPR Staff, 
At Age 80, Trailblazer Keeps Fighting for Justice, NPR (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.
npr.org/2011/09/28/140876184/at-age-80-trailblazer-keeps-fighting-for-justice; Keith 
Roberts, An Inter-view with Justice Cruz Reynoso, 51 THE JUDGE’S J. 4 (Summer 2012); 
Cruz Reynoso, U.C. DAVIS SCHOOL OF LAW, https://law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/reynoso/ 
(last visited July 13, 2015). Reynoso’s papers have recently been archived. Cruz 
Reynoso Papers D-401, U.C. DAVIS SPECIAL COLLECTIONS, http://www.oac.cdlib.org/f
indaid/ark:/13030/c8ns0x5r/admin/ (last visited July 20, 2015) (describing the 
collection and providing links to three inventories).  
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successfully targeted him for removal from that Court, along with 
Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justice Joseph Grodin,233 
Reynoso worked at the Sacramento office of the Los Angeles-based 
law firm of O’Donnell & Gordon,234 and then at Kaye, Scholer, 
Fierman, Hays & Handler.235  He then returned to academia, teaching 
at the UCLA School of Law from 1991 to 2001 and the U.C. Davis 
School of Law from 2001 to 2006, before transitioning into emeritus 
status.236  Throughout his career, he also served on numerous boards 
and commissions,237 including the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights from April 19, 1993 to December 7, 2004.238  Among Reynoso’s 
myriad awards and honors, President Clinton awarded him the 
Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor of the United States, on 
 
233.  See BURT, supra note 232, at 310; Alma Cook, State Election Returns: Final 
Compilations, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-11-06/news/
mn-16714_1_returns; Flaherty, supra note 232; Philip Hager, Reynoso Uses Media 
Campaign in Effort to Retain Judgeship, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 1986), http://arti
cles.latimes.com/1986-10-19/news/mn-6219_1_cruz-reynoso; Houseman, supra note 
232, at paras. 64 & 66; NPR Staff, supra note 232; Reynoso, supra note 232, at 27.  The 
history of his reconfirmation campaign, Friends of Reynoso, has yet to be told. But see 
CRUZ REYNOSO: SOWING THE SEEDS OF JUSTICE, supra note 232 (referencing the campaign). 
234.  Frank Clifford, Defeated Justice Reynoso to Join L.A.-Based Law Firm, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 3, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-01-03/local/me-2197_1_law-firm. 
235.  Philip Hager, Justice Prevails: Cruz Reynoso Was Swept Off the State Supreme 
Court With Rose Bird, but Now He’s Found New Causes and a New Career, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 13, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-13magazine/tm-885_1_supreme-
court-justices. 
236.  See Flaherty, supra note 232; Houseman, supra note 232, at paras. 66 & 68; 
NPR Staff, supra note 233; Roberts, supra note 232, at 4. 
237.  See, e.g., Hager, supra note 233 (noting Reynoso’s service on the board of 
directors for the Latino Issues Forum, the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, and his membership 
on the California Post-Secondary Education Commission and a California Bar 
commission on legal aid). 
238.  U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: 
AGENCY LACKS BASIC MANAGEMENT CONTROLS, GAO/HEHS-97-125, 37 (July 1997) 
(dating Reynoso’s appointment to the Commission as Apr. 19, 1993 and the 
commissioners’ concurrence to President Clinton’s designation of Reynoso as Vice 
Chair on Nov. 19, 1993); Erica Werner, Top Two Commissioners Resign From Civil Rights 
Panel, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A45327-2004Dec7.html. 
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August 9, 2000.239  In all, Reynoso is a famed Latino leader, civil rights 
lawyer, and prolific scholar. 
My aim now is to contextualize Reynoso and González as two of 
the small number of Mexican American attorneys in postwar 
California.  These earlier generational cohorts of attorneys can be 
imagined as constituting a fictive genealogy of Latina/o lawyers who 
confronted the risks of representation on behalf of clients who broke 
the law—sometimes on principle and other times merely by being in 
the United States.  For example, Reynoso graduated from Boalt Hall 
in 1958, studied Mexican Constitutional Law in Mexico City on a Ford 
Foundation fellowship, joined the State Bar of California in May 1959, 
and began his law practice in El Centro, a small town in Imperial 
County, California.240  González graduated from Boalt Hall in 1960, 
joined the California Bar in June 1962, and became the first Mexican 
American attorney in private practice in Sacramento.241  He regarded 
Hurtado v. Superior Court242 as his most important case.  Hurtado 
involved a claim of wrongful death, arising from a January 19, 1969 
 
239.  See BURT, supra note 232, at 318; Regina McConahay, Law Professor Cruz 
Reynoso Receives Presidential Medal of Freedom, UCLA NEWSROOM (Aug. 10, 2000), 
http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/Law-Professor-Cruz-Reynoso-Receives-1677. 
240.  See U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW BOALT HALL ALUMNI DIRECTORY 2010, at 134, 
187 (2010) [hereinafter BOALT HALL ALUMNI DIRECTORY]; BOALT HALL PROFESSIONAL 
DIRECTORY, supra note 231, at 25; Houseman, supra note 232, at paras. 2 & 4; Reynoso, 
supra note 232, at 17; Cruz Reynoso, Democracy and Diversity, ERNESTO GALARZA 
COMMEMORATIVE LECTURE 10 (1987), http://web.stanford.edu/dept/csre/pdfs/
Second_Annual_Lecture_1987.pdf; Roberts, supra note 230, at 4; Cruz Reynoso, STATE 
BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/29470 (last visited July 
13, 2015). 
241.  See BOALT HALL ALUMNI DIRECTORY, supra note 240, at 188; BURT, supra note 
232, at 217; Attorney Search – Alfonso Zuniga Gonzalez, STATE BAR OF CAL., http:// 
members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/33140 (on file with author); BOALT HALL 
PROFESSIONAL DIRECTORY, supra note 231, at 13; Davila, supra note 216.  Burt calls him 
“Sacramento’s first Mexican-American attorney.”  BURT, supra note 232, at 229.  
González, however, related that one Mexican American attorney preceded him in 
Sacramento although this man (whose name I have forgotten) worked for a 
government agency. 
242.  11 Cal. 3d 574, 582, 522 P.2d 666, 671 (1974) (holding that the state should 
apply its own law in a tort claim filed in California by a resident of a foreign state or 
country, where the foreign jurisdiction has no interest in having its own law applied). 
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automobile accident, brought by the next of kin (widow and children) 
of a Mexican national, Antonio Hurtado, who was a resident and 
domiciliary of the state of Zacatecas and “was in California 
temporarily and only as a visitor.”243  At the trial court, the defendants 
argued unsuccessfully to apply Zacatecas law to limit their liability.244  
The California Court of Appeal for the Third District, however, 
reversed, limiting the plaintiffs to “the maximum amount recoverable 
under Mexican law… 24,334 pesos or $1,946.72 at the applicable 
exchange rate of 12.5 pesos to one dollar.”245  After carefully 
considering the matter, the Supreme Court of California held that  the 
state should apply its own law because the foreign jurisdiction had no 
interest in having its own law applied.246  In essence, Hurtado stands 
for the proposition that a Mexican life is not worth less than the life of 
a California resident. 
 
B. Fictive Genealogies 
 
Neither Reynoso, nor González, however, were among the first 
California attorneys of Mexican heritage.247  Because my research into 
 
243.  Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d at 578. 
244.  Id. 
245.  Id. at 579; see also Hurtado v. Super. Ct. Cnty. of Sacramento, 35 Cal. App. 3d 
176, 110 Cal. Rptr. 591 (Ct. App. 1973).  Online inflation calculators show that $1,946.72 
in 1969 equals $12,621.59 in 2015.  See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
246  Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d 574. 
247.  A contemporary Mexican American of similar national stature to Cruz 
Reynoso should be mentioned here. Mario G. Obledo (Apr. 9, 1932 – Aug. 18, 2010), 
the “Godfather of the Latino Movement,” earned his LL.B. from the St. Mary 
University School of Law in 1960 (and later his J.D.), and he joined the State Bar of 
Texas in April 1961.  See Emma Brown, Mario G. Obledo, 78, Latino Civil Rights Pioneer, 
Dies, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2010); Kenneth C. Burt, In Memoriam: Mario Obledo, 
Godfather of the Latino Movement, 1932–2010, 23 HARV. J. HISPANIC POL’Y 107 (2010-
2011); Charles E. Cantú, Observations on the Evolution of Minorities in the Law: From Law 
School to Practice, 4 SCHOLAR 185, 186 (2002); Douglas Martin, Mario Obledo, Hispanic 
Civil Rights Leader, Dies at 78, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2010); Elaine Woo, Mario Obledo 
Dies at 78; California Secretary of Health and Welfare, Latino Civil Rights Leader, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 21, 2010).  See generally Mario G. Obledo Papers, U.C. DAVIS SPECIAL 
COLLECTIONS, http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c8zw1nzz/admin/.  The 
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the histories of Mexican American lawyers in California is nascent, 
here, I only name and briefly describe a small set of predecessors to 
Reynoso and González.  For example, legal historians believe that the 
first Mexican American lawyer to argue before the United States 
Supreme Court was Manuel Ruiz, Jr. (July 25, 1905 – 1986).248  Ruiz 
earned his LL.B. from the University of Southern California Law 
School (now, USC Gould School of Law) in 1930, as that school’s first 
known Latino alumnus, joined the California Bar in June of that year, 
and has been dubbed the “California Dean of Mexican-American 
Lawyers.”249  From 1935 to 1968, Ruiz was an attorney of record in 
forty-six reported judicial opinions in state and federal courts.250  In 
 
many organizations that he helped create and lead include, inter alia, the Hispanic 
National Bar Association, La Raza Lawyers, Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (MALDEF), National Coalition of Hispanic Organizations, and 
Southwest Voter Registration Education Project.  He led MALDEF as it moved its 
headquarters from San Antonio, Texas to San Francisco, California in 1970, and 
taught at Harvard Law School as a fellow in 1974-75 until California Governor Jerry 
Brown appointed him in 1975 to be Secretary of the California Health and Welfare 
Agency.  BURT, supra note 232, at 298; KENNETH BURT, THE HISTORY OF MAPA AND 
CHICANO POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA 22 (1982) [hereinafter BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA]; 
ROSALES, supra note 220, at 264.  Obledo’s biography merits serious scholarly 
attention, which is beyond the scope of this Article.  Several later highlights in his 
career, however include that he ran unsuccessfully for California governor in 1982, 
served as president of the League of United Latin American Citizens and chair of the 
National Rainbow Coalition during the 1980s, and received the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom in 1998 from President Bill Clinton.  David Reyes, Seasoned Activist’s Passions 
Burn Bright Again, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/02/
news/mn-9476.  
248.  IN DEFENSE OF MY PEOPLE, supra note 196, at xii-xiii (discussing Ruiz, noting 
his years of birth and death, citing Buck v. California, 353 U.S. 99 (1952), and explaining 
the evidence that indicates Ruiz was the first Mexican American lawyer to argue 
before the Supreme Court).  See also C. Del Anderson, Guide to the Manuel Ruiz Papers, 
1931-1986, MANUEL RUIZ PAPERS, M0295, DEPT. OF SPECIAL COLLECTIONS, STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES (1998), http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf9199
p0dg/entire_text/ (noting Ruiz’s date of birth but not death). 
249.  MUÑOZ, supra note 23, at 45; One Hundred Years of Law and Ardor 1900-2000, 
USC TROJAN FAMILY MAGAZINE (Summer 2000), http://www.usc.edu/dept/pubrel/
trojan_family/summer00/Law/law_pg2.html; Anderson, supra note 248, at 3; 
Attorney Search – Manuel Ruiz, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.
gov/fal/Member/Detail/11771 (on file with author). 
250.  On July 20, 2015, the author conducted a WestlawNext search for “Manuel 
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1941, he helped to found and lead the Coordinating Council for Latin 
American Youth.251  In that capacity, he supported the Sleepy Lagoon 
Defense Committee and protested the so-called Zoot Suit Riots of June 
1943.252  In recognition of his leadership and anti-discrimination 
advocacy, in 1943, Governor Earl Warren appointed Ruiz to the 
California Committee on Youth in Wartime (later the California Youth 
Committee).253  In 1963, he helped incorporate the Mexican American 
Political Association (MAPA),254 and the following year he was elected 
to serve as MAPA Legal Counsel.255  Active in the MAPA leadership, 
five years later, he nevertheless lost his campaign for MAPA 
President.256  In 1970, however, President Richard Nixon appointed 
Ruiz (who was a Republican) to the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, which had just published its report, Mexican Americans and the 
 
Ruiz, Jr.” and filtered for reported cases.  The original search produced forty-seven 
cases and the filter resulted in forty-six.  WestlawNext, https://lawschool.west
law.com/ (follow “WestlawNext” hyperlink; then search “Manual Ruiz, Jr.”; then 
click “Cases” and narrow by “Reported”). 
251.  See MARK BRILLIANT, THE COLOR OF AMERICA HAS CHANGED: HOW RACIAL 
DIVERSITY SHAPED CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 1941-1978, at 82; BURT, supra 
note 232, at 41.  See also Ariela J. Gross, “The Caucasian Cloak”: Mexican Americans and 
the Politics of Whiteness in the Twentieth-Century Southwest, 95 GEO. L.J. 337, 356–57 
nn.105–07 (2007). 
252.  BRILLIANT, supra note 251, at 82; BURT, supra note 232, at 41–44.  On the 
Sleepy Lagoon murder and the so-called Zoot Suit Riots, see generally LUIS ALVAREZ, 
THE POWER OF THE ZOOT: YOUTH CULTURE AND RESISTANCE DURING WORLD WAR II 
(2008); ROGER BRUNS, ZOOT SUIT RIOTS (2014); EDWARD J. ESCOBAR, RACE, POLICE, AND 
THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL IDENTITY: MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE LOS ANGELES 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, 1900-1945 (1999); MAURICIO, MAZÓN, THE ZOOT-SUIT RIOTS: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF SYMBOLIC ANNIHILATION (1988); EDUARDO OBREGÓN PAGÁN, MURDER 
AT THE SLEEPY LAGOON: ZOOT SUITS, RACE, AND RIOT IN WARTIME L.A. (2003); 
CATHERINE S. RAMÍREZ, THE WOMAN IN THE ZOOT SUIT: GENDER, NATIONALISM, AND THE 
CULTURAL POLITICS OF MEMORY (2009); MARK A. WEITZ, THE SLEEPY LAGOON MURDER 
CASE: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND MEXICAN-AMERICAN RIGHTS (2010); American 
Experience, Zoot Suit Riots, PBS (2001), http://www.–pbs.org–/wgb–h/–ame–x/–
zoot/index.html. 
253.  BRILLIANT, supra note 251, at 82; Burt, supra note 232, at 47–48, 102; 
Anderson, supra note 248, at 3. 
254.  Anderson, supra note 248, at 3. 
255.  BURT, supra note 232, at 217. 
256.  Id. at 273. 
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Administration of Justice in the Southwest,257 and in 1971, Ruiz spoke at 
the MAPA installation and awards banquet.258  The following year, he 
self-published Mexican American Legal Heritage in the Southwest.259 
Ruiz himself was not the first Mexican American attorney of 
California.260  Rather, Ruiz can be understood as one in a fictive 
genealogy of Mexican American lawyers of California.  For example, 
Richard A. Ibañez (October 6, 1910 – November 30, 2007) graduated 
from Boalt Hall in 1936, joined the California Bar in November 1937, 
and served as a Los Angeles Superior Court judge from 1975 to 
1994.261  Enrique P. “Hank” López, believed to be the first Mexican 
American alumnus of Harvard Law School, graduated in 1948 and 
 
257.  Anderson, supra note 248, at 3.  See also U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
MEXICAN AMERICANS & THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST (1970), 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112057601483;view=1up;seq=1.  
258.  BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA, supra note 247, at 17.  
259.  MANUEL RUIZ, JR. MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE IN THE SOUTHWEST 
(1972, 2d ed. 1974).  For further information about Ruiz, see María G. Mendoza, 
Manuel J. Ruiz, Jr.: The First Latino to Argue Before the United States Supreme Court 
(Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.researchgate.net/publica
tion/249789056_Manuel_J._Ruiz_Jr._The_First_Latino_to_Argue_Before_the_United
_States_Supreme_Court.   
260.  See, e.g., BURT, supra note 232, at 31–32 (naming attorneys Ernesto R. Orfila 
and A.P. ‘Tony’ Entenza”).  Entenza joined the California Bar in February 1922.  
Attorney Search – Entenza, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov
/fal/Member/Detail/8364 (on file with author).  Orfila joined the California Bar in July 
1918.  Attorney Search – Orfila, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.
ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/577 (on file with author).  Searching for “Orfila” in the 
California Bar website also produces a nineteenth century Mexican American 
attorney, Antonio Orfila, who joined the bar in October 1887.  See id.  As with all 
critical ethnic legal-histories, the roots of Mexican American lawyers transcend the 
twentieth century.  
261.  See BOALT HALL ALUMNI DIRECTORY, supra note 240, at 184; BURT, supra note 
232, at 72–73; SÁNCHEZ, supra note 220, at 322 n.7; Attorney, Former Family Law Judge, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/25/local/me-
passings25.S2; Attorney Search – Richard Ibanez, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members
.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/15940 (on file with author).  Ibañez may have been 
one of the first two Latino alumnus of Boalt Hall.  See BOALT HALL PROFESSIONAL 
DIRECTORY, supra note 241, at 6, 15 (listing Ibañez and Augustus L. Castro as members 
of the Class of 1936).  
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was admitted to the California Bar in January 1949.262  Carlos M. Terán 
was admitted to the bar in June 1949, appointed to the Los Angeles 
Municipal Court in 1957, and elevated by Governor Edmund G. “Pat” 
Brown, Sr. to the Los Angeles Superior Court in 1959.263  Arthur L. 
Alarcón (August 14, 1925 – January 28, 2015), the judge who presided 
over several of the Chicano Movement cases litigated by Oscar “Zeta” 
Acosta, earned his LL.B. in 1951 from the University of Southern 
California Law School and joined the California Bar in January 1952264 
(Acosta himself joined the California Bar in June 1966).265  Louis García 
 
262.  BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA, supra note 247, at 4–5; Attorney Search – Henry 
Lopez, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/20558 (on 
file with author); Burt A. Folkart, Enrique (Hank) Lopez; Attorney, Activist, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 25, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/1985-10-25/local/me-14459_1_lopez.  
Kenneth Burt names him “Henry ‘Hank’ Lopez.”  BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA, supra note 
247, at 4.  His California Bar webpage lists him as “Henry Preston Lopez.”  Attorney 
Search – Henry Lopez, supra.  His obituary names him “Enrique (Hank) Lopez,” and 
that is the name under which he published.  See, e.g., ENRIQUE HANK LOPEZ, THE 
HARVARD MYSTIQUE: THE POWER SYNDROME THAT AFFECTS OUR LIVES FROM SESAME 
STREET TO THE WHITE HOUSE (1979). 
263.  BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA, supra note 247, at 5; Attorney Search – Carlos 
Teran, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/21096 (on 
file with author); Monica Rodriguez, Services for Retired Pomona Judge Carlos M. Teran 
Planned Friday, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (June 18, 2009), http://www.contracosta
times.com/california/ci_12624944. 
264.  See Attorney Search – Arthur Alarcon, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://
members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/22743 (on file with author); Cal. App. Ct. 
Legacy Project, Interviewee Biography: Justice Arthur L. Alarcón (n.d.) (on file with 
author); Press Release, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Cir. Pub. Info. Office, Court of 
Appeals Mourns Passing of Senior Circuit Judge Arthur L. Alarcón (Jan. 29, 2015) (on 
file with author).  Governor Edmund “Pat” Brown, Sr. appointed Alarcón to the Los 
Angeles Superior Court in 1964, where he served until 1978 when Governor Edmund 
“Jerry” Brown, Jr. appointed him to the California Court of Appeal for the Second 
Appellate District.  Id. at 2.  He served therein until 1979, when President Carter 
appointed him to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where he 
served until taking senior status in 1992.  Id. 
265.  Attorney Search – Oscar Acosta, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.
calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/38731 (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).  Accord STAVANS, 
supra note 22, at 73 (noting that Acosta passed the California Bar exam on his second 
attempt in June 1966).  Although Acosta was declared legally dead in December 1986, 
Olivas, supra note 6, at 854 n.154, as of this writing no one has adequately notified the 
State Bar of California in order for Acosta’s California Bar webpage to reflect his 
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joined the California Bar in February 1953, was appointed by 
Governor Pat Brown to the Fair Employment Practices Commission, 
co-founded La Raza Lawyers (with Mario Obledo and Cruz Reynoso) 
in 1971, and later became presiding judge of the San Francisco 
Municipal Court.266  Leopoldo G. “Leo” Sanchez was admitted to the 
state bar in July 1954 and ran successfully against an incumbent judge 
to win a seat in the East Los Angeles Municipal Court in November 
1960.267  Robert T. Baca graduated from the Loyola Law School and 
was admitted to the state bar in January 1956.268  After running 
unsuccessfully for public office in the 1960s, he became a municipal 
court judge in 1976 until Governor Jerry Brown appointed him to the 
superior court in 1979.269  One could go on, and indeed for the most 
part, the histories of California’s Mexican American and Chicana/o 
lawyers have yet to be written.270 
 
death.  Instead, his record of administrative actions shows that he was suspended for 
failure to pay bar member fees on Dec. 12, 1974. 
266.  BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA, supra note 247, at 10, 12, 20; About Us, SAN 
FRANCISCO LA RAZA LAWYERS, http://larazalawyers.org/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 7, 
2015); Attorney Search – Louis Garcia, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca. 
gov/fal/Member/Detail/23987 (on file with author).  The organizers of La Raza 
Lawyers eventually launched state and national organizations, including California 
La Raza Lawyers Association and the Hispanic National Bar Association.  HISPANIC 
NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY 1986 vi-vii [hereinafter HNBA 
DIRECTORY]. 
267.  BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA, supra note 247, at 5; Attorney Search – Leo 
Sanchez, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/25510 
(on file with author).  Two years later he lost his election campaign for a seat on the 
Los Angeles Superior Court.  BURT, supra note 232, at 7. 
268.  BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA, supra note 247, at 7 (noting Baca’s unsuccessful 
election campaign for the California Assembly); Attorney Search – Robert Baca, STATE 
BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/26672 (on file with 
author); Ruth Brown, Longtime Kern County Judge Dies at 89, BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN 
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.bakersfield.com/news/2014/11/05/longtime-kern-county-
judge-dies-at-89.html. 
269.  Brown, supra note 268. 
270.  While many histories have been written about Mexican American and 
Chicana/o communities, community organizations, labor organizing, political 
advocacy, and social movements in California, other states, and historic territories of 
the United States, these works typically only mention that a particular person was an 
attorney and rarely highlight how lawyers as a class contributed distinctively to those 
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To reorient on one of my concluding points: in his 1991 essay, 
Professor Olivas’s case study on Oscar “Zeta” Acosta called the 
attention of legal scholars to this quixotic Chicano lawyer, who 
brazenly confronted the risks of representation faced by his Chicano 
Movement activist clients.  Although most legal scholars did not pay 
heed, a few, including Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, carefully 
considered Olivas’s treatment of Acosta, and apparently believed that 
Olivas’s essay, and Acosta’s example of “rebellious lawyering”271 
merited inclusion in several of their subsequent books.272  A question 
not completely addressed by Olivas in 1991, however, is why did 
Acosta believe that he could prevail in this claim?  Because of Ian F. 
Haney López’s meticulous research, we now know that the East L.A. 
Thirteen motion to quash the indictment cited to Hernandez v. Texas, 
the 1954 United States Supreme Court case that extended 
 
histories.  See, e.g., BURT, supra note 232 (discussing the twentieth century origins of 
California Latino politics in early-to-mid-century Mexican American community 
organizing); BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA, supra note 247 (discussing the founders and 
organizers of the Mexican American Political Organization from its postwar 
predecessor organizations like the Community Service Organization and California 
Democratic Council through 1982).  See also GARCÍA, supra note 220; GUTIÉRREZ, supra 
note 220; ROSALES, supra note 220; SÁNCHEZ, supra note 220.  One approach to this 
project of ethnic legal history would be to determine the earliest attorneys and judges 
of Mexican American heritage in the several states of the Southwest and to explore 
the lawyers’ organizations that they created.  Michael Olivas, among others, has 
conducted groundbreaking work in that respect regarding Mexican American 
attorneys in Texas.  See, e.g., sources cited, supra note 196; see also Michael A. Olivas, 
Reflections upon Old Books, Reading Rooms, and Making History, 76 UMKC L. REV. 811 
(2008).  Also, in addition to cross-referencing law school alumni directories with 
extant histories of Mexican Americans and Chicanas/os, one might review sources 
like national organizations’ directories, HNBA DIRECTORY, supra note 266 (the first 
membership directory of the Hispanic National Bar Association); LA RAZA LAWYERS 
OF CALIFORNIA 1983, at 1 (“This is the first statewide directory of Raza attorneys.”); 
National Roster of Spanish Surnamed Elected Officials (Frank C. Lemus ed., 1973), 
reprinted from 5 AZTLÁN-CHICANO J. OF THE SOC. SCIENCES AND THE ARTS 313, 322–23 
(1973) (listing thirteen judges of various California courts and one county clerk under 
the headings “California – State Officials – Judicial Department”). 
271.  On Gerald P. López’s theory of rebellious lawyering, see sources cited, supra 
note 151. 
272.  See sources cited, supra notes 156–57. 
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constitutional equal protection to Mexican Americans.273  But how did 
Acosta come to know of Hernandez? 
In studying Acosta’s lawyering under Haney López in 2003 and 
subsequently teaching undergraduate courses of Ethnic Studies that 
discussed his book, Racism on Trial, I came to believe that Acosta’s 
knowledge of Hernandez likely derived from his historical proximity 
to the case.  Born in El Paso, Texas on April 8, 1935,274 Acosta joined 
the California Bar in June 1966,275 so it seemed more likely than not 
that he knew about the triumph of Hernandez through the Zeitgeist in 
which he lived.276  Returning to the subject a dozen years later, 
however, I found myself unsatisfied with my prior notion of cultural 
diffusion and intrigued that Acosta’s public writings never refer 
expressly to Hernandez.277 
Consider that in Acosta’s 1971 autobiographical essay, he 
credited the idea of the grand jury challenge to “an acid 
experience.”278  Also, in the opening of his essay, “Challenging Racial 
 
273.  347 U.S. 475 (1954); HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 42, 174–78, 264 n.6. 
Although the motions cited to Hernandez, the appellate opinion in East L.A. Thirteen did 
not.  See Castro, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500.  (The appellate opinion in Biltmore Six, however, did 
cite to Hernandez.  Montez, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736).  Olivas later explored Hernandez in great 
detail. See e.g., “COLORED MEN” AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ”, supra note 2, at passim; Olivas, 
supra note 1, at 128. As Olivas explains, he did not know of Hernandez until a chance 
conversation alerted him to the importance of the case and the instrumental role that 
(by then Judge) James De Anda had played in it.  See “COLORED MEN” AND “HOMBRES 
AQUÍ”, supra note 2, at xvii; Olivas, Accidental Historian, supra note 2, at 19–22.  His first 
article citing to Hernandez was published in 1994.  Olivas, supra note 1, at 128. 
274.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 28; STAVANS, supra note 22, at 125; 
UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at xix. 
275.  See sources cited, supra note 264. 
276.  See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 275 n.13 (discussing California legislative 
proceedings questioning the grand jury selection process in 1963 and 1964). 
277.  See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 174–76 (discussing Acosta’s 
journalism on the grand jury challenge); STAVANS, supra note 22, at 79–82 (discussing 
Acosta’s 1969 essay, “Challenging Racial Exclusion on the Grand Jury”); 
UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at xiv, 13–14, 281–89 (commenting on Acosta’s 
views on grand jury discrimination and reproducing the essay that he wrote about 
racial exclusion from grand juries).  
278.  UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 14 (“Most of the big ideas I’ve gotten 
for my lawyer work have usually come when I am stoned.  Like the Grand Jury 
challenge was the result of an acid experience.  A lot of the tactics I employ I get the 
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Exclusion on the Grand Jury: The East L.A. 13 vs. the L.A. Superior 
Court,” which Ilan Stavans states was written in 1969 and published 
“in a small law school news service, Caveat,”279 Acosta began by 
asserting that no one in California had successfully quashed an 
indictment based on a challenge to the composition of the grand 
jury.280  He then claimed: 
The East L.A. 13 did what had not been done by any 
Mexican American: They challenged the jurisdictional 
power of the indicting body (the Grand Jury) on grounds of 
its discriminatory selection and resultant unrepresentative 
character by the very judicial officers, the Superior Court 
judges, who would not [sic] inquire into their allegedly 
criminal conduct.281 
Acosta continued: 
Laying the groundwork for appeals to the Supreme Court, 
they retained expert witnesses and used cardboard boxes 
full of documentary and statistical evidence to legally 
establish their identity as a people separate and distinct 
from the majority, thereby meeting the constitutional 
requirement of “classification” which is a pre-condition to 
a demand for consideration and representation from 
 
ideas for when I am stoned, which is not to say that I wouldn’t get them if I wasn’t 
stoned.  A lot of my creativity has sprung from my use of these psychedelic drugs.”).  
Ilan Stavans dates the autobiographical essay as “written circa 1971.”  Id. at xii. 
279.  See STAVANS, supra note 22, at 80; UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at xiv. 
Haney López provides another citation for Acosta’s essay on grand jury exclusion 
that Stavans reprinted: Oscar Acosta, The East L.A. 13 vs. The L.A. Superior Court, 3 EL 
GRITO 12 (1970).  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 288 n.1. 
280.  UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 281.  In making this claim, Acosta 
referenced several contemporaneous cases, which he asserted featured unsuccessful 
motions to quash, involving Black Panther Party leader Huey Newton and the 
assassin of Robert F. Kennedy, Sirhan Sirhan.  Id.  Haney López provides the case 
citations as People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1970), and People v. 
Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972).  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 274 n.8. 
281.  UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 283. 
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within their group upon the Grand Jury.282 
After eight paragraphs in which Acosta outlined his challenge to 
the Los Angeles County grand jury system,283 he then cited to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, an unnamed 1880 Supreme Court opinion, a 1966 
Fifth Circuit opinion, Brooks v. Beto, and a 1940 Supreme Court 
opinion, Smith v. Texas.284  Nowhere does he name Hernandez v. Texas. 
How should legal scholars interpret Acosta’s failure to publicly 
credit the Mexican American lawyers who litigated Hernandez?  
Initially, I felt tempted to conclude that Acosta had dissimulated out of 
seemingly characteristic flamboyance and hunger for the limelight.  I 
then considered if it was simply an error of omission, but quickly 
discarded this hypothesis.  Before identifying the correct citation for 
Smith v. State of Texas,285 I wondered if Acosta might have fabricated 
Smith in order to create a cipher for Hernandez.286  Ultimately, however, 
I found it more productive to worry less about whether Acosta 
developed the grand jury strategy himself, in order to consider how 
other members of the legal team contributed to the winning strategies. 
This hypothesis bears exploration because the legal team in East 
 
282.  UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 283. 
283.  Id. at 283–85. 
284.  See UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 286–88.  Either Acosta in his 
manuscript, the essay’s original publisher, or Stavans in his reprint mistook the Smith 
citation as “311 U.S. 218.”  UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 287.  The correct 
citation is Smith v. State of Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).  In contrast, Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 
1 (1966), from which Acosta quotes significantly in the essay, bears its correct citation. 
285.  Using Acosta’s citation, “311 U.S. 218” the author’s WestlawNext search 
conducted on July 14, 2015 brought up the case, Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust 
Co., 311 U.S. 211 (1940).  Searching for “Smith v. Texas” throughout the year 1940 in 
the WestlawNext database of U.S. Supreme Court opinions produced a single hit for 
a two-sentence long opinion.  Smith v. State of Texas, 309 U.S. 651 (1940) (“The motion 
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.  The petition for writ of certiorari 
to the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas is granted.”).  Broadening the 
search to “Smith v. State of Texas” finally identified the correct case, 311 U.S. 128 
(1940), and suggested that the error was simply a transposition. 
286.  The East L.A. Thirteen motion to quash cited to Hernandez.  HANEY LÓPEZ, 
supra note 23, at 264 n.6.  Acosta’s citation to Brooks v. Beto, in his racial exclusion essay 
was accurate, and the case cited multiple times to Hernandez.  See, e.g., Brooks, 366 F.2d 
at 4 n.4.  Brooks, however, never mentioned the word “Mexican.”  See id. 
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L.A. Thirteen was numerous and included attorneys substantially 
more experienced than Acosta, including individuals who were 
affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union, the National 
Lawyers Guild, and the nascent Chicano Legal Defense Committee.287  
In particular, future research into East L.A. Thirteen, Biltmore Six, and 
the other Chicano Movement cases should explore the dynamics of 
the legal teams, especially the influence of Hugh R. Manes,288 Fred 
 
287.  See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 30–31, 260 n.84 (“The National Lawyers 
Guild supplied Neil Herring and Samuel Rosenwein, and A.L. Wirin and Fred 
Okrand from the ACLU also greatly helped out . . . .  Other attorneys involved in the 
Chicano cases included Herman Sillas, Paul Posner, Hugh Manes, Al Michaelson, 
Ralph Segura, Joe Ortega, Elnora Livezey and Joan Anderson) (citations omitted).  See 
also GARCÍA & CASTRO, supra note 23, at 213, 354 n.30 (discussing the Chicano Legal 
Defense Committee and Chicano Legal Defense Fund) (citations omitted). 
288.  Hugh R. Manes earned his law degree from Northwestern University in 
1952 and joined the California Bar in July 1953.  Attorney Search—Hugh R. Manes, 
STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/24354 (on file 
with author). He began his law practice at Wirin, Rissman & Okrand and dedicated 
his career to litigating against police misconduct, trying over 400 cases in his career. 
Elaine Woo, Hugh R. Manes Dies at 84; Lawyer Fought for Victims of Police Misconduct, 
L.A. TIMES (June 18, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-hugh-
manes18-2009jun18-story.html.  See also Hugh R. Manes Papers (Collection 1854), 
UCLA LIBR. SPECIAL COLLECTIONS, CHARLES E. YOUNG RES. LIBR. (2010), available at http
://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt6199s3dp/entire_text/.  While he was not 
listed on the reported opinion for East L.A. Thirteen, he was listed as an attorney of 
record in the Biltmore Six, and Haney López identifies Manes as one of the attorneys 
with whom he spoke while researching for his book.  Montez, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736; HANEY 
LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 313.  
5 GONZALEZ MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  4:18 PM 
Winter 2016] LA GRAN LUCHA 139 
Okrand,289 Herman Sillas,290 and A.L. Wirin.291 
 
289.  Fred Okrand earned his law degree at USC in 1940 and joined the California 
Bar in December of that year.  The ACLU of Southern California Mourns the Loss of Fred 
Okrand, Legal Director Emeritus, ACLU OF S. CAL. (Mar. 19, 2002), https://www.aclusocal.
org/the-aclu-of-southern-california-mourns-the-loss-of-fred-okrand-legal-director-
emeritus/ [hereinafter ACLU Mourns]; Attorney Search – Fred Okrand, STATE BAR OF CAL., 
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/17351 (on file with author).  He began 
his legal career at Gallagher & Wirin but left with Al Wirin to affiliate with the ACLU of 
Southern California as a volunteer attorney after the United States entered World War II 
and began to intern Japanese Americans.  Elaine Woo, Fred Okrand, 84; Fought Key ACLU 
Battles, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/21/local/me-
okrand21.  In 1972, he became the ACLU of Southern California’s first legal director.  
ACLU Mourns, supra; Longtime Civil Liberties Lawyer Fred Okrand Dies at 84, METRO. NEWS-
ENTER. (Mar. 21, 2002), http://www.metnews.com/articles/okra032102.htm.  Thus, as 
Haney López notes, Okrand was affiliated with the ACLU during East L.A. Thirteen.  
HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 260 n.84.  In 1984, Okrand retired from his position and 
became Legal Director Emeritus of the ACLU Foundation of Southern California.  ACLU 
Mourns, supra.  According to the author’s July 23, 2015, search for “Fred Okrand,” 
WestlawNext lists him as an attorney of record in 528 reported judicial opinions.  
WESTLAW, https://lawschool.westlaw.com/ (follow “WestlawNext” hyperlink; then search 
“Fred Okrand” (with quotation marks) and select “Cases”; then narrow by “Reported”). 
290. Herman Sillas graduated from the UCLA School of Law and joined the 
California Bar in January 1960.  Herman Sillas, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.c
albar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/30281 (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); Herman’s Bio, 
http://www.hermansillas.com/finearts.home-bio.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); Law 
Office of Herman Sillas, http://www.hermansillas.com/firm.html (last visited Oct. 8, 
2015).  After the Watts Riots of 1965, Sillas joined the Los Angeles County Human 
Relations Commission, and the following year he helped organize the Association of 
Mexican American Educators.  Kenya Davis-Hayes, Herman Sillas’ Art and Activism, 
KCET L.A. (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.kcet.org/arts/artbound/counties/los-angeles/
herman-sillas-chicano-activist.html.  In 1968, Sal Castro hired Sillas to represent him 
in East L.A. Thirteen, and in the same period, Sillas helped to found MALDEF and 
served on its board of directors.  GARCÍA & CASTRO, supra note 23, at 213, 228-31, 248; 
Davis-Hayes, supra; Herman’s Bio, supra; Law Office of Herman Sillas, supra; Theresa 
Mesa, Research Guide to the Records of Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, 1968-1983, SPECIAL COLLECTIONS M0673, DEPT. OF SPECIAL COLLECTIONS, 
STANFORD UNIV. LIBRARIES, 229, 257, 1209-10 (1997, 2004), http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ 
ark:/13030/tf9f59p0b2; Reynaldo A. Valencia, What If You Were First and No One Cared: 
The Appointment of Alberto Gonzales and Coalition Building Between Latinos and 
Communities of Color, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 21, 30 (2005).  In 1975, 
Governor Jerry Brown appointed Sillas to serve as Director of California’s 
Department of Motor Vehicles, and in 1977, President Jimmy Carter appointed him 
to serve as United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California, where he 
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More experienced than Acosta, the court records leave traces of 
 
served until October 1980.  Herman’s Bio, supra; Law Office of Herman Sillas, supra.  
Today, he maintains a law practice in San Clemente, California, publishes a monthly 
column in the local newspaper, and maintains a career as a fine artist.  See generally 
View From the Pier, http://www.hermansillas.com/pier.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
291.  Born in Russia in 1901, A.L. Wirin immigrated to the United States as an 
infant.  11 REPORT OF THE SENATE FACT-FINDING SUBCOMMITTEEE ON UN-AMERICAN 
ACTIVITIES IN CALIFORNIA 169 (1961), http://content.cdlib.org/view?docId=kt39
6n99b3&query=&brand=calisphere [hereinafter UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN CALI
FORNIA]; A.L. Wirin, DENSHO ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://encyclopedia.densho.org/A.L.
%20Wirin/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); Paul Weeks, Lawyer Fought for All Rights, 
RECORDNET.COM (May 1, 2007), http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20070501/A_LIFE07/705010315/-1/A_LIFE07.  Wirin “attended primary schools 
in Massachusetts, majored in philosophy and economics at Harvard, [and] received 
his law degree from Boston College.  After graduating, he engaged for a short while 
in social work both in Boston and in Brooklyn, New York, then came to Los Angeles 
to practice his profession.”  UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN CALIFORNIA, supra, at 169.  
Wirin joined the California Bar in July 1930, the ACLU of Southern California hired 
him as its first civil rights lawyer in 1931, and he became active in the National 
Lawyers Guild. UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN CALIFORNIA, supra, at 169–73; Attorney 
Search – A. L. Wirin, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/
fal/Member/Detail/11892 (on file with author); From 1923 to 1940, ACLU OF S. CAL., 
https://www.aclusocal.org/our-history/from-1923-to-1940/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).  
Socially active over a legal career spanning more than four decades, he died in 1978.  
A.L. Wirin, ACLU Counsel, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Feb. 6, 1978), https://news.google
.com/newspapers?id=cgpZAAAAIBAJ&sjid=mlkDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6725%2C5048999.  
According to the author’s WestlawNext search of July 23, 2015, “A. L. Wirin” is listed 
in 558 reported judicial opinions, ranging from 1931 through 1977, including 176 cases 
with the U.S. Supreme Court.  WESTLAW, https://lawschool.westlaw.com/ (follow 
“WestlawNext” hyperlink; then search “A. L. Wirin” (with quotation marks) and 
select “Cases”; then narrow by “Reported”).  Supreme Court cases in which he was 
an attorney of record include, inter alia: Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1944) 
(representing Minoru Yasui); earlier and later phases of Korematsu v. United States, 319 
U.S. 432 (1943) (representing Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu), 324 U.S. 885 (1945) 
(petition for rehearing denied) (representing amicus curiae Japanese American 
Citizens League); Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 663 (1948) (representing Oyama 
petitioners).  Wirin also supported the plaintiffs in Mendez v. Westminster, 161 F.2d 
774 (1947) (representing Japanese-American Citizens League) and other Mexican 
American school desegregation cases.  See Michael A. Olivas, Review Essay—The Arc 
of Triumph and the Agony of Defeat: Mexican Americans and the Law, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
354, 361–62 (2010); Jeanne M. Powers & Lirio Patton, Between Mendez and Brown: 
Gonzales v. Sheely (1951) and the Legal Campaign Against Segregation, 33 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 127, passim (2008). 
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the senior lawyers’ influence,292 especially in East L.A. Thirteen, and 
one can imagine their spirited discussions regarding the feasibility of 
the grand jury challenge and how they ultimately determined that 
Acosta should implement it.  Acosta himself questioned thirty-three 
judges on the stand in East L.A. Thirteen before the First Amendment 
challenge ultimately prevailed on appeal.293  He continued the strategy 
in Biltmore Six with the support of the elder Manes, but apparently not 
with the support of Okrand and Wirin (the ACLU attorneys) or Sillas 
(Sal Castro’s attorney).294  Thankfully, Haney López has deposited the 
court transcripts, legal briefs, and police records that his research 
uncovered with the Oscar Zeta Acosta Papers at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara.295  Thus, it remains for an enterprising scholar 
to braid together the histories of the Chicano Movement legal teams 
into a multi-colored history of how lawyers of various racialized ethnic 
identities worked together across several generational cohorts to 
protect the freedom of the Chicano Movement activists whom Acosta 
is credited for representing.296 
For his part, contemporaneous with the proceedings, Acosta 
concluded his essay on grand jury racial exclusion by lamenting  
why lawyers had not previously raised the issue of racial exclusion 
from the grand jury as a defense to criminal indictment.  He asserted 
that this failure, “unfortunately reflects upon the legal profession.”297  
He went on: 
 
292.  See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 260 n.84; Compare Castro, 88 Cal. Rptr. 
500, with Montez, 88 Cal. Rptr. 736. 
293.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 313; Haney López, supra note 153, at 1722 
n.8; see also id. at 1845–83 (excerpting the transcript of Acosta’s examination of the 
judges in East L.A. Thirteen). 
294.  See Montez, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 737 (listing the petitioners’ attorneys as “Oscar 
Zeta Acosta, Neil M. Herring, Margolis, McTernan, Smith, Scope & Herring and 
Hugh R. Manes”). 
295.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 153, at 1845.  See also Güereña, supra note 169 
(Acosta Papers finding aid). 
296.  See, e.g., Genevieve Carpio, Unexpected Allies: David C. Marcus and his Impact 
on the Advancement of Civil Rights in the Mexican-American Legal Landscape of Southern 
California, in BEYOND ALLIANCES: THE JEWISH ROLE IN RESHAPING THE RACIAL 
LANDSCAPE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 1 (George J. Sanchez ed., 2012). 
297.  UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 288. 
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That it requires imagination and hard work is 
understandably a contributing factor; but perhaps the 
most compelling reason for their failure to raise the issue 
is that ultimately what the lawyer says in such a motion is 
an indictment of the profession which he professes and a 
castigation of the society to which he belongs.298 
In my view, Acosta’s elision of the source of the brilliant defense 
strategy that he personally implemented on an unprecedented scale 
is less important than the historical fact, recorded in the motion to 
quash, that he and his colleagues relied on the precedent established 
by an earlier team of Mexican American lawyers, who, after several 
attempts, persuaded the Supreme Court to extend equal protection to 
Mexican Americans in 1954.299  Because of the excellent scholarship of 
Professor Olivas and other socio-legal scholars, a recounting of 
Hernandez here is unnecessary.300  Rather, I conclude this Article by 
highlighting the historical context through which Acosta, and senior 
lawyers, knew of and relied upon Hernandez, and I argue for the 
importance of researching the oft-obscure, yet nonetheless concrete 
connections and personal relationships that constitute critical aspects 
of what I term la gran lucha. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While predictably subject to criticism as bombastic or otherwise 
pretentious, I mean for the concept of la gran lucha to contextualize 
and highlight the centurial, interracial, and transnational social 
struggles of myriad peoples.  In this interpretation of history, 
Chicana/o and other Mexican American attorneys, pre- and postwar, 
in California, Texas, and elsewhere, contributed their partial histories 
of socio-legal struggle, and they often collaborated with attorneys, 
 
298.  UNCOLLECTED WORKS, supra note 22, at 288. 
299.  Hernandez, 347 U.S. 475. 
300.  See, e.g., “COLORED MEN” AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ,” supra note 2 (publishing 
new research on Hernandez v. Texas following a symposium commemorating its 
fiftieth anniversary). 
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and others, of diverse racialized and ethnic identities.  These critical 
ethnic legal histories deserve to be carefully researched and accurately 
recounted. 
While many of these histories have yet to be told, in this, as in so 
many respects, Michael A. Olivas has charted paths for others to 
explore and planted seeds for others to cultivate.301  Thus, I 
understand Olivas to act within a fictive genealogy of Chicana/o, 
Mexican American and other Latina/o lawyers who seek to use the 
law to transform the socio-legal conditions that criminalize, 
impoverish, and otherwise marginalize our communities.  The 
Hernandez lawyers are in this lineage—Carlos Cadena, James De 
Anda, Gustavo “Gus” García, and Johnny Herrera—and beyond them 
stand the first three Mexican American lawyers of Texas: J.T. Canales, 
Manuel C. Gonzáles, and Alonso S. Perales.302  Before and after the 
first lawyers of Texas, perhaps waiting patiently in the shadows, there 
are many others whose histories have yet to be unearthed and 
remembered.303  In their own times, in myriad ways, these people and 
 
301.  See “COLORED MEN” AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ,” supra note 2; IN DEFENSE OF MY 
PEOPLE, supra note 196; Olivas, supra note 1; Olivas, Trial of the Century, supra note 2; 
Olivas, Accidental Historian, supra note 2; Olivas, supra note 6; Olivas, supra note 48; 
Olivas, supra note 196; Olivas, supra note 270; Olivas, supra note 291. 
302.  See “COLORED MEN” AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ”, supra note 2, at passim 
(discussing the rise of Mexican American lawyering through an examination of the 
four Hernandez lawyers); IN DEFENSE OF MY PEOPLE, supra note 196, at xi-xii (discussing 
the first three Mexican American lawyers of Texas—J.T. Canales, who graduated 
from the University of Michigan Law School in 1899, Manuel C. Gonzáles, who 
attended law school at St. Louis University and graduated from the University of 
Texas Law School in 1924, and Alonso S. Perales who completed law school in 1925 
at the school that later became George Washington University); Olivas, supra note 
291, at 364–65 (discussing the four Hernandez lawyers and the first three Mexican 
American lawyers of Texas); Lupe S. Salinas, Gus Garcia and Thurgood Marshall: Two 
Legal Giants Fighting for Justice, 28 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 145 (2003) (discussing the 
Hernandez lawyers). 
303.  See, e.g., Olivas, supra note 270, at 815–18 (discussing the Rev. Antonio José 
Martínez y Santístevan (1793 to 1867), who trained as a priest and lawyer in Durango 
(the then-provincial capital of Nueva Vizcaya, New Spain) before he founded a small 
seminary at Taos in 1833, where he printed books of formal logic as well as legal 
treatises, and which he converted into a law school when the United States occupied 
what became the territory of New Mexico in 1848). 
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countless others confronted the risks of representation.  Learning 
about their experiences, successes, and failures can provide new 
generational cohorts with valuable lessons in how to transform socio-
legal conditions so that more people may suffer less injustice under 
the color of law.304 
As I have written elsewhere, entire fields of critical ethnic legal 
histories lie fallow, awaiting scholars and students whose careful 
collaboration can make their memories green.305  Through such work 
we can help advance la gran lucha.  By educating ourselves, newer 
generations of lawyers, and other legal workers who care for our 
diverse communities’ intertwined destinies, we can contest today’s 
revanchism in the United States and beyond, so that all oppressive 
authority succumbs to the rule of law.306 
Con safos. 
 
304.  E.g., BURT, HISTORY OF MAPA, supra note 247, at 2 (“This history [of the 
Mexican American Political Association] serves as a guide for the leaders who are yet 
to surface.  It was written so that mistakes can be avoided, and the positive can be 
expanded upon with new ideas, creating the potential for betterment.”). 
305.  See González, supra note 7, at 1012, 1021–22 n.82, 1030, 1048, 1058–59, 1061–
62 (discussing various aspects of critical ethnic legal histories). 
306.  On revanchism in the United States, see SMITH, supra note 194, at 44–47; 
González, supra note 194, at 235–36, 257–59, 279–80.  See also Valdes, supra note 194, at 
passim (discussing the judicial backlash of kulturkampf politics).  On the notion of 
authority under the rule of law, see LINEBAUGH, supra note 109, at 17, 212–13. 
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Appendix 1.  Citing References to Michael A. Olivas, “Breaking 
the Law” on Principle.307 
 
 Author Title Citation Year 
1. 
Elizabeth 
Kay 
Harris 
Comment, Economic 
Refugees: Unprotected in the 
United States by Virtue of an 
Inaccurate Label 
9 AM. U.J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 269, 
301 n.188, 304 
n.203 1993 
2. Kevin R. 
Johnson 
Los Olvidados: Images of the 
Immigrant, Political Power 
of Noncitizens, and 
Immigration Law and 
Enforcement 
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The Obergefell Marriage Equality 
Decision, with Its Emphasis on  
Human Dignity, and a  
Fundamental Right to Food Security 
 
MAXINE D. GOODMAN* 
 
Introduction 
 
Many believe the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges1 reflects a new era of tolerance and decency in our 
country, with love winning out over politics and discrimination.2  Our 
nation has progressed beyond the close-mindedness of the past, when 
same-sex couples were treated as second class citizens in our society, 
not entitled to the basic rights which all of us should enjoy.  After the 
Court announced its decision, President Obama said from the Rose 
                                                          
 * Maxine D. Goodman is Professor of Professional Responsibility and Legal 
Research and Writing at South Texas College of Law.  She would like to thank her 
terrific colleagues at the law school, as well as the outstanding editorial staff of the 
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal for their support with this Article.  She dedicates 
the Article to her daughters, Rachel and Audrey, who inspire her to think about 
human dignity as something everyone deserves in equal measure.   
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Byron Tau, Obama Calls Supreme Court Decision a Victory for America, WALL. ST. 
J. (June 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-calls-supreme-court-ruling-on-
gay-marriage-a-victory-for-america-1435335722??mod=capitaljournalrelatedbox; 
Marianne Williamson, Marriage Equality: It’s a Beautiful Thing When Democracy 
Prevails, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
marianne-williamson/marriage-equality-when-de_b_7678490.html; Andrew 
O’Hehir, America is Changing and Marriage Equality is a Huge Victory – But We Need to 
Go So Much Further, SALON (June 26, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/06/27/
america_is_changing_and_marriage_equality_is_a_huge_victory_but_we_need_to_go 
_so_much_further/. 
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Garden, “Today we can say, in no uncertain terms, that we have made 
our union a little more perfect.”3  As Justice Kennedy wrote in affirming 
petitioners’ fundamental right to marry in Obergefell: “[t]hey ask for 
equal dignity in the eyes of the law.  The Constitution grants them this 
right.”4  Countless commentators applauded the Court’s opinion for its 
commitment to essential human rights, reliance on human dignity, and 
affirmation of society’s evolved sense of decency.5 
In Obergefell, the Court described petitioners’ constitutional 
argument as a “just claim to dignity.”6  The Supreme Court’s reliance 
on human dignity as the value underlying the due process and equal 
protection guarantees to which the petitioners were due in Obergefell, 
resembles the Court’s reliance on human dignity in other Supreme 
Court decisions.7  At other times, the Court has ruled to affirm the 
human dignity of the mistreated prison inmate, the defendant who 
wants to avoid giving self-incriminating testimony in court, the 
alleged criminal whose stomach the police forcibly pumped to obtain 
evidence, the defendant who wants to represent herself, and the 
government detractor who objected in obscene language to the draft.  
In each case, the Court relied on human dignity to remedy a 
constitutional infraction. 
Yet, with all the congratulations, pride, and gratefulness to the 
Supreme Court on the marriage equality decision,8 and the bountiful 
                                                          
 3. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same Sex Marriage a Right 
Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-marriage.html. 
 4. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 5. Sara El Yafi, Why the Supreme Court’s Decision to Legalize Gay Marriage Will 
Benefit You Wherever You Are on the Planet, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2015), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/sara-elyafi/why-the-supreme-courts-decision-to-legalize-
same-sex-marriage-will-benefit-you-wherever-you-are-on-the-planet_b_7749828.html 
(congratulating “all human beings” on the decision).  The “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” language comes from the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 8. This author wholeheartedly joins the “it’s about time” refrain and excitement 
over the Court’s decision. 
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commentary about the Court’s emphasis on human dignity,9 this 
author finds it difficult not to take stock of where we are in terms of 
advancing the most essential needs of Americans, as part of protecting 
their dignity.  The United States joined other developed nations in 
affirming marriage equality, recognizing, again, the fundamental 
right of all adults to marry.  Yet, in our prosperous nation, in 2014, the 
Children’s Defense Fund reported there are 14.7 million poor children 
and 6.5 million extremely poor children living in the United States.10  
Countless commentators have decried the state of the poor in this 
country, calling for renewed efforts to combat poverty.11  In a nation 
where the Court has acknowledged the right of all to marry, as a 
testament to their human dignity, the Court has never recognized the 
right of all to food security, and an end to poverty, as a testament to 
that same human dignity. 
Obviously, the two issues present a host of differences in terms of 
constitutional analysis.  The major difference is the positive versus 
negative rights distinction, which this Article addresses in Section III.A.  
Yet, the Court’s willingness to advance human dignity provides a 
meaningful common thread between the right to marry and the right to 
                                                          
 9. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dangers of a Constitutional ‘Right to Dignity’, ATLANTIC (Apr. 
29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-dangerous-doc
trine-of-dignity/391796/ (“Justice Kennedy invoked the word ‘dignity’ five times in 
the oral arguments; and other lawyers invoked it 16 times.  It was central to the 
opening statements of Solicitor General Don Verrilli.  ‘The opportunity to marry is 
integral to human dignity,’ he began.  ‘Excluding gay and lesbian couples from 
marriage demeans the dignity of these couples.’  It was also one of the first words 
uttered by the plaintiff’s lawyer, Mary L. Bonuato.”); Liz Halloran, Explaining Justice 
Kennedy: The Dignity Factor, NPR (June 28, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/the 
two-way/2013/06/27/196280855/explaining-justice-kennedy-the-dignity-factor (“The 
[human dignity] concept appears no less than nine times in the landmark 26-page 
decision overturning the 1996 law blocking federal recognition of gay marriage.”). 
 10.  Marian Wright Edelman, Foreword to Ending Child Poverty Now, CHILDREN’S 
DEFENSE FUND 4 (2015), http://www.childrensdefense.org/library/data/ending-child-
poverty-now-1.html.  
 11.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS (2004); Evgeny Krasnov, 
Note: Freedom from Food: on the Need to Restore FDR’s Vision of Economic Rights in 
America, and How It Can Be Done, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 735 (2013); Dennis D. Hirsch, The 
Right to Economic Opportunity: Making Sense of the Supreme Court’s Welfare Rights 
Decisions, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 109, 134 (1996). 
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food security.  This Article links the Supreme Court’s reliance on human 
dignity as a constitutional value most recently in Obergefell to the Court’s 
ability to recognize a fundamental right to food security12 under a 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection analysis.  
Ideally, at some point soon, commentators will proclaim, “It’s about time” 
when the Court acknowledges food security as a fundamental right. 
At one time, such a constitutional analysis and outcome seemed 
likely.  In 1970, the Court ruled in Goldberg v. Kelly,13 that only after a 
fair hearing could social services terminate benefits of welfare 
recipients.  Justice Brennan wrote with regard to the nation’s 
provision of assistance to the needy that “from its founding the 
Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-
being of all persons within its borders.”14  The Court noted the 
inextricable link between human dignity and food security, 
describing welfare as the means of bringing “within the reach of the 
poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate 
meaningfully in the life of the community.”15  Around the same time, 
in the mid-60s, with the “War on Poverty,” President Lyndon Johnson 
promised a right to food security, linking it to human dignity, when 
he said, “We have a right to expect a job to provide food for our 
families, a roof over their head, clothes for their body….”16  He 
described the impact of poverty: “Poverty not only strikes at the needs 
                                                          
 12.   For purposes of this article, food security means “access by people at all 
times to enough food for an active, healthy life.”  Food & Nutrition Assistance, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/.aspx (last 
updated June 8, 2015).  Food insecurity thus means “access to adequate food is limited 
by a lack of money and other resources.”  Alisha Coleman-Jensen, Christian Gregory 
& Anita Singh, Household Food Security in the United States in 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
ECON. RES. REPORT NO.  ERR-173, 1 (Sept. 2014). 
 13.   397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 14.   Id. at 264–65. 
 15.   Scholars have supported the notion of a fundamental right to food security 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of our 
Constitution: Rethinking our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987); Stephen 
Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277 (1993). 
 16.  President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at Cumberland, Maryland City Hall 
(May 7, 1964) in U.C. SANTA BARBARA AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26223. 
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of the body.  It attacks the spirit and it undermines human dignity.”17 
However, since the mid-1970s, most Supreme Court opinions 
regarding welfare rights have favored the government, and the Court 
has routinely reversed lower court decisions favoring the poor.18  The 
welfare rights movement, once compared to the Civil Rights 
Movement,19 has lost steam.  It is as though the legal community has, 
largely, left those in poverty behind.  Unfortunately, the notion that 
human dignity means a right to food security on the part of every 
American, a bedrock principle of other nations’ constitutions and of 
international law,20 and, arguably, necessary to liberty and general 
welfare, has lost traction.21  As Louis Henkin states, “[o]ur welfare 
state does not supply what human dignity requires today.  There is 
no respect for human dignity in tolerating poverty and homelessness, 
de facto segregation, and the growth of an ‘underclass.’”22  
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Section I provides a brief 
background of human dignity as a value in international law as well 
as the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States and other 
nations.  This section also provides the various definitions that courts, 
nations, and legal documents have ascribed to the term.  Then, Section 
II briefly discusses food insecurity in the United States and legislative 
efforts to provide for the needy.  This Article uses “food insecurity” 
to mean “the lack of access to enough affordable, nutritious food to 
fully meet basic needs at all times due to lack of financial resources.”23  
                                                          
 17.   Johnson, supra note 16.  
 18.   See infra Section I.C. 
 19.   See Hirsch, supra note 11. 
 20.   The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that “[e]veryone has 
the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care . . . .”  G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, Article 25(1), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).  See infra 
part III.E. 
 21.   See Hirsch, supra note 11 at 134. 
 22.   Louis Henkin, Dignity and Constitutional Rights, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS, HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 227 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. 
Parent eds., 1992). 
 23.   See Introduction: Hunger in the U.S., WHYHUNGER, http://www.why
hunger.org/frontend.php/overlay/simpleIndex?id=2056. See also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
supra note 12. 
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The section also summarizes the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
welfare cases24 from the 1960s until the present time. 
Section III provides five reasons the Supreme Court should 
acknowledge a fundamental right to food security for all American 
citizens.  Fundamental means, just as with other liberty rights under 
a Due Process Clause analysis, that unless it is necessary for the 
government to interfere with the right to achieve a compelling 
government objective, the government action is prohibited.  This 
Article does not describe the exact case that should be brought to get 
this question before the Supreme Court; rather, it encourages the legal 
community to reinvigorate the legal fight for this fundamental right, 
at a time when doing so just might succeed. 
The five reasons the Court should establish this fundamental 
right are grounded in existing constitutional jurisprudence involving 
human dignity, viewed largely through the lens of Obergefell.  Though 
many have written on human dignity in constitutional 
jurisprudence,25 scholars have written little on the necessary 
connection between human dignity and food security and why the 
Supreme Court should acknowledge this link.  As we applaud 
Obergefell as a reflection of the Court’s commitment to human dignity, 
commentators should pause to consider a jurisprudence which 
affirms the right of all citizens to marry on Fourteenth Amendment 
due process and equal protection grounds but which fails to recognize 
a right to food security for all citizens.  This Article strives to show 
why our evolved sense of decency and our existing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence support such a right. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 24   “Welfare cases” mean lawsuits involving federal and state welfare 
programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Food Stamps, and other 
safety net programs. 
 25.   See Jordan Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right:  Jurisprudentially 
Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J. 145 (1984); Leslie Meltzer Henry, 
The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011); Erin Daly, Human Dignity in 
the Roberts Court: a Story of Inchoate Institutions, Autonomous Individuals, and the 
Reluctant Recognition of a Right, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381 (2011). 
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I. Background of Human Dignity as a Value in  
 International and Constitutional Law 
 
This section briefly describes the philosophical and religious 
underpinnings of human dignity as a legal concept, as well as its 
meaning and use under international law, in United States Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, and as a value or right in other nations’ 
constitutions. 
 
A. Philosophical and Religious Underpinnings of Human 
Dignity 
 
The American concept of human dignity underlying human 
rights and constitutional guarantees is believed to have originated 
from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant,26 who posited, “to 
treat people with dignity is to treat them as autonomous individuals 
able to choose their destiny.”27  He defined dignity as “a quality of 
intrinsic, absolute value, above any price, and thus excluding any 
equivalence.”28  Kant’s “formula of ends” meant that people should 
behave in such a way “that you treat humanity, both in your person 
and in the person of each other individual, always at the same time as 
an end, never as a mere means.”29  Accordingly, human dignity, as 
opposed to something with a price, cannot be replaced by anything 
else, and it is not relative to anyone’s desires.30  As one scholar 
                                                          
 26.   “Thomas Paine eloquently invoked the natural dignity of man as the reason 
to protect individual rights that transcend authoritative rule. Paine’s conception of 
dignity marked a distinct break from the British rule where dignity had more of an 
ancient Roman connotation and was reserved for the nobility or aristocracy.  Thomas 
Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton shared Paine’s views.”  See Rex D. Glensy, The 
Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 77 (2011). 
 27.   See Izhak Englard, Uri and Caroline Bauer Memorial Lecture: Human Dignity: 
From Antiquity to Modern Israel’s Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1903, 
1918–20 (2000). 
 28.   Id. 
 29.   Id. 
 30.   Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death 
Penalty, Henkin, supra note 22, at 153–56. 
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describes Kant’s theory, “the humanity in each of us is of infinite 
value, and this explains why we must respect the humanity of others 
as we respect the humanity in ourselves.”31 
Commentators also ascribe a religious source to human dignity 
as relied on in Supreme Court jurisprudence, stemming from the 
Judeo-Christian notion that all people are created in the image of God.  
The Book of Genesis provides that God created man in God’s own 
image.32  As such, “‘there is a divine ‘spark,’ as it were, in human 
beings.  This element establishes man’s humanity and grants him 
unique status among the creatures in God’s creation, or in other 
words, his dignity.”33  Professor George Fletcher equates this Biblical 
source with Kant’s theory that each life has a dignity beyond price: 
“Kant’s idea of universal humanity functions as the secular analogue 
to creation in the image of God.”34 
Religions throughout the world are important sources for the 
conception of human dignity.  In Catholicism, for example, “human 
life is sacred and [Catholicism professes] that the dignity of the human 
person is the foundation of a moral vision for society”; Pope Benedict 
XVI stated that “the dignity of man is the locus of human rights”; the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that man was created in 
God’s image.35  Many scholars attribute the commitment to human 
dignity shown by Justices Kennedy and Brennan to their religious 
upbringings and beliefs.36  Some commentators contend the nation’s 
                                                          
 31.   George Fletcher, Essay, In God’s Image: the Religious Imperative of Equality 
under Law, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1608, 1619 (1999). 
 32.   Genesis 1:26.  See Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional 
Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 206 (2008) (“The notion of Imago Dei in Genesis was a 
universal attribute shared by all human beings.”). 
 33.   Rao, supra note 32, at 206. 
 34.   Fletcher, supra note 31, at 1619. 
 35.   Life and Dignity of The Human Person, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://
www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching/life-
and-dignity-of-the-human-person.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
 36.   See Deborah A. Roy, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., James Wilson, and the 
Pursuit of Equality and Liberty, 61 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 665, 678 (2013) (“Brennan 
believed Catholic social teaching had adopted the concept of human dignity, which 
derived from the belief that man was created in the image of God.  Justice Brennan 
echoed this thought in a speech to the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1964, stating 
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founding principles all originate in Judeo-Christian principles, which 
emphasize the man in God’s image to human dignity connection. 
Our nation’s history provides overwhelming evidence that 
America was birthed upon Judeo-Christian principles.  The first act of 
America’s first Congress in 1774 was to ask a minister to open with 
prayer and to lead Congress in the reading of four chapters of the 
Bible.  In 1776, in approving the Declaration of Independence, our 
founders acknowledged that all men “are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights …” and noted that they were relying 
“on the protection of Divine Providence” in the founding of this 
country.  John Quincy Adams said, “The Declaration of Independence 
laid the cornerstone of human government upon the first precepts of 
Christianity.”37  
Regardless of source, whether religious or philosophical, or the 
two combined, human dignity means every individual has intrinsic 
and equal worth.38  Human dignity is another manner of referring to 
a person’s worth, which differs from a person’s merit: “human beings 
do not vary in their dignity or worth.  Their dignity or worth is a kind 
of value that all human beings have equally and essentially.”39  Arthur 
Chaskalson, President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
from 1994 until his retirement as Chief Justice in 2005,40 said, “respect 
for dignity implies respect for the autonomy of each person, and the 
                                                          
‘the Old and New Testament teach that all men have rights – that every individual 
has Rights because as a child of God he is endowed with human dignity.’”). 
 37.   J. Randy Forbes, Obama Is Wrong When He Says We're Not a Judeo-Christian 
Nation, U.S. NEWS (May 7, 2009, 3:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/
2009/05/07/obama-is-wrong-when-he-says-were-not-a-judeo-christian-nation. 
 38.   Bedau, supra note 30, at 153–56. 
 39.   Id. at 153. 
 40.   Mandela made him the first president of the new Constitutional Court in 
1994; Chaskalson had served on Mandela’s defense team for treason in 1963 and was 
an ardent opponent of Apartheid.  He wrote the opinion abolishing the death penalty.  
See Rebecca Davis, Death of a Lion of the Law, DAILEY MAVERICK, (Dec. 12, 2012, 2:44 
AM), http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-12-03-death-of-a-lion-of-the-law-
arthur-chaskalson/#.VaA_KVzBwXA (“The day after the Constitutional Court was 
formally opened on 14 February 1995, the 11 green-robed judges heard their first case.  
Their first ruling was on the unconstitutionality of the death penalty, and they would 
go on to rule on a host of other vital issues, including the recognition of same-sex 
marriages and the right of all South Africans to a roof over their head.”). 
6 GOODMAN MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2015  8:53 AM 
158 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIII 
right of everyone not to be devalued as a human being or treated in a 
degrading or humiliating manner.”41  Commentators posit an 
emphasis on human dignity in international law arose from rejecting 
totalitarianism’s lack of respect and dehumanizing treatment of 
citizens.42 
 
B. Human Dignity in International Law 
 
Human dignity became connected to human rights as the 
premier value of the New World Order in response to the atrocities of 
fascism and Nazism of World War II.43  Governments and human 
rights groups sought to protect human dignity against the abuses of 
totalitarian regimes.44  As such, international legal texts, such as the 
United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
affirm the dignity of all men and women, with the Declaration’s 
Preamble recognizing the “inherent dignity and . . . the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”45  Article One 
of the Declaration states: “All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”46  The 
United Nations Charter affirmed faith in human rights and dignity 
and thus required a pledge to promote respect for, and observance of, 
                                                          
 41.   Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, in THE CONCEPT 
OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 135 (David Kretzmer and Eckart 
Klein eds., 2002). 
 42.   See Maxine D. Goodman, In the Holocaust's Shadow: Can German and American 
Constitutional Jurisprudence Provide a “New Guarantee” of Human Dignity?, 4 BRIT. J. AM. 
LEGAL STUD. 303 (2015). 
 43.   Id. at 133. 
 44.   Julie Resnick & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role 
of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1939 (2003) (“Our review 
of the deployment of the term dignity of persons . . . documents.”). 
 45.   G.A. Res. 217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf; MARY 
ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, appendix 7 (2001). 
 46.   Id. 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms.47 
Other international legal instruments and treaties treat human 
dignity as a preeminent value underlying human rights, with 
commentators frequently describing the connection between human 
dignity and human rights.48  Human dignity “furnishes each one of 
us, whether strong or weak, politically powerful or disenfranchised, 
competent or inept, and whatever our race, religion, sex, or sexual 
orientation, with an indefeasible moral standing to protest (or to have 
protested on our behalf) all insidious attempts to degrade our 
persons.”49 
In addition to the international community rallying around 
human dignity as protecting against the abuses of a totalitarian 
regime, individual nations included the value in their constitutions.  
Article I of Germany’s Basic Law, adopted by the West German states 
in 1949, proclaims “the dignity of man is inviolable.  To respect and 
protect it is the duty of all state authority.”50  Under German 
constitutional law, human dignity is not subject to balancing against 
other rights, such as freedom of expression.51  Rather, human dignity 
prevails as the value underlying fundamental rights and supporting 
the individual’s “free unfolding of personality.”52  After World War 
II, Japan, West Germany, and Italy were among the first to include 
human dignity in their constitutional documents.53 
Nations including France, Canada, Israel, and South Africa now 
rely heavily on human dignity as a lodestar constitutional value.54  
                                                          
 47.   Glendon, supra note 45, at 78. 
 48.   See id. 
 49.   Henkin, supra note 22, at 48.  
 50.   Ernest Benda, Fifty Years of German Basic Law, The New Departure for Germany: 
the Protection of Human Dignity (Article I of the Basic Law), 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 443, 443 
(2000) (citing Article 1, 1 of the German Constitution). 
 51.   Id. 
 52.   James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004). 
 53.   Doron Shulztiner & Guy E. Carmi, Human Dignity in National Constitutions: 
Functions, Promises, and Dangers, 62 AM.  J. COMP. L. 461, 465 (2014). 
 54.   See Luis Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in 
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331 
(2012) (describing how other nations’ included human dignity as a constitutional 
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Guy E. Carmi and Doron Shulztiner describe nations’ use of the term 
in their constitutions, including a comprehensive description of what 
the term is meant to protect.55  In South Africa, the right to human 
dignity is embedded as a discrete right in the Bill of Rights, with the 
Constitutional Court affording the right special weight.56  As these 
commentators describe, nations differ both in terms of their reliance 
on human dignity as a fundamental value in constitutional 
jurisprudence, as well as on the value’s meaning.57  As shown below, 
the United States has developed its own constitutional jurisprudence 
of human dignity, despite the absence of an explicit guarantee in the 
United States Constitution. 
 
C. Human Dignity as a Value in United States Constitutional 
Jurisprudence 
 
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly use 
the term human dignity,58 the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on 
the value, most often linked to the Bill of Rights.  In Miranda v. Arizona, 
the Court held that “the constitutional foundation underlying the 
privilege [Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination] is the 
respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its 
citizens.”59  And, when describing the role of human dignity in death 
                                                          
value following the international human rights instruments and German 
constitution). 
 55.   See Shulztiner & Carmi, supra note 53. 
 56.   Arthur Chaskalson, Dignity as a Constitutional Value: A South African 
Perspective, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2011).  According to Chaskalson, the 
Constitutional Court stresses human dignity because of South Africa’s history of 
Apartheid.  He quotes this language from a court decision: “Respect for the dignity 
of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa.  For apartheid was a 
denial of a common humanity.  Black people were refused respect and dignity and 
thereby the dignity of all South Africans was diminished.  The new Constitution 
rejects this past and affirms the equal worth of all South Africans.”  
 57.   Shulztiner & Carmi, supra note 53. 
 58.   Some state constitutions, including Illinois, Louisiana, and Montana, 
actually enumerate dignity as protected under their constitutions.  MONT.  CONST. art 
II, § 4; LA.  CONST. art.  I § 3; ILL.  CONST. art 1, § 20; see Burt Neuborne, Forward: State 
Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893–95 (1989). 
 59.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1996).   
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penalty jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment, the Court has 
said that “even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed 
of common human dignity”60  The Court has repeatedly proclaimed, 
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less 
than the dignity of man.”61 
After World War II and the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, “the Court embraced dignity as something 
possessed by individuals,” rather than just states and other entities, 
relying on the concept in its constitutional interpretation.62  
Commentators opine it was in response to the war and adoption of 
international legal norms in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights that the Court “changed the content of U.S. constitutional law 
to name dignity as a distinct and core value.”63 
In 1944, Justice Frank Murphy64 used the term “dignity” in his 
                                                          
 60.   Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (per curiam). 
 61.   Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2001) 
(quoting Trop v. Dulles). 
 62.   Resnick & Suk, supra note 45, at 1926, 1939 (“As a result of WWII when legal 
and political commentary around the world turned to the term dignity to identify 
rights of personhood . . .  Dignity talk in the law of the United States is an example of 
how U.S. law is influenced by the norms of other nations, by transnational 
experiences, and by international legal documents.”  “Our review of the deployment 
of the term dignity of persons in the constitutional law of the United States 
demonstrates that use of the word began during World War II and expanded as the 
term was embraced in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other 
nations’ constitutive legal documents.”). 
 63.   Id. at 1941. 
 64.   Justice Murphy was vehemently opposed to discrimination of any type, and 
his opinions while on the Court were certainly informed by the events in Europe 
during his tenure on the bench.  Commentators link Justice Murphy’s Catholic faith 
and concerns for labor to his strong interest in and reliance on human dignity.  See 
Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 
19 EUR. J. INT’L.  L. 655 (2008); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Essay: Justice Frank Murphy and 
American Labor Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1900, 1924 (June 2002) (“He brought to the law 
and the art of judging some eminently worthy values.  Among them was an unceasing 
determination to see realized in the daily lives of ordinary people such basic human 
rights as freedom of expression, fair and equal treatment, personal dignity, and the 
capacity to form organizations to promote their political, economic, and social well-
being.”).  Yet, arguably, the horrors ofWorld War II, in response to which he formed 
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dissent in Korematsu v. United States.65  Fred Korematsu was convicted 
of remaining in a designated military area in violation of the military 
requirement that persons of Japanese ancestry be excluded from that 
area.66  The Court upheld the exclusion program based on military 
necessity.  Justice Black, writing for the majority, said the Court 
“could not reject the finding of the military authorities” that the 
exclusion was necessary.67 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy opposed the race-based 
classification based on human dignity concerns: 
To give constitutional sanction to that inference in this 
case, however well-intentioned may have been the 
military command on the Pacific Coast, is to adopt one of 
the cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to 
destroy the dignity of the individual and to encourage 
and open the door to discriminatory actions against other 
minority groups in the passions of tomorrow.68 
Justice Murphy described the military orders as falling “into the 
ugly abyss of racism” and as going beyond the brink of constitutional 
power.69  Justice Murphy again called forth the notion of dignity, this 
time “human dignity,” in his dissent in Yamashita v. Styer.70  Tomoyuki 
                                                          
the group described herein, also contributed to his inclusion of this value in his 
jurisprudential decision-making. 
 65.   323 U.S. 214, 240 (1944).  Justice Murphy also dissented in Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91, 135 (1945) (considering the constitutionality of police officers’ 
convictions under Section 20 of the Federal Criminal Code) (Justice Murphy stated 
that by beating an African-American man to death, police had deprived him of the 
“respect and fair treatment that befits the dignity of man, a dignity recognized and 
guaranteed by the Constitution.”). 
 66.   Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.  Korematsu's residence was in San Leandro, 
California, one of the areas from where all persons of Japanese ancestry were 
excluded. 
 67.   Id. at 219. 
 68.   Id. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 69.   Justice Murphy was the first to use the term “racism” in a Supreme Court 
opinion.  Frank Murphy Hall of Justice, DETROIT: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE 
MOTOR CITY (Dec. 2012), http://detroit1701.org/Frank%20Murphy%20Hall%20of%
20Justice.html. 
 70.  327 U.S. 1, 28 (1946). 
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Yamashita, a general of the Japanese army who was convicted by a 
military commission of violating laws of war, sought a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging the jurisdiction and legal authority of the military 
commission that convicted him.  The Court denied the petition for 
certiorari. 
In his dissent, Justice Murphy wrote: 
[I]f we are ever to develop an orderly international 
community based upon a recognition of human dignity, it 
is of the utmost importance that the necessary punishment 
of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the 
ugly stigma of revenge and vindictiveness.”71 
Justice Murphy ended his lengthy dissent with another reference to 
dignity: “While peoples in other lands may not share our beliefs as to 
due process and the dignity of the individual, we are not free to give 
effect to our emotions in reckless disregard of the rights of others.”72 
After this, human dignity continued to play a role in American 
constitutional jurisprudence.  Several Supreme Court justices have 
referred to the concept at one time or another, while Justices Murphy, 
                                                          
 71.   Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 29 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 72.   Id. at 41. 
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Frankfurter,73 Brennan,74 and Kennedy75 have given the value the most 
“air time,”76 relying on it to underlie protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment, privacy rights, and other explicit constitutional 
guarantees.  The more conservative justices have also discussed the 
value and its role in the nation’s constitutional jurisprudence.77 
Commentators contend that, generally speaking, in American 
constitutional jurisprudence, human dignity is most closely tied to 
liberty; human dignity and liberty allow for individuals to live 
autonomously, without state interference.78  As this Article will 
address later, many argue that the notion of human dignity as 
liberty is inconsistent with the Court acknowledging a 
fundamental right to food security, as this necessitates government 
interference.  Others proclaim the opposite—that liberty cannot 
                                                          
 73.   In McNabb v. United States, Justice Felix Frankfurter used the term dignity in 
1943 as part of the rationale for requiring that those who are arrested are taken before 
the committing authority without delay.  318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943) (“The purpose of 
this impressively pervasive requirement of criminal procedure is plain.  A democratic 
society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against 
the misuse of the law enforcement process.”).  He also used the term in his concurring 
opinion in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 89 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
involving a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights: “Whether their [the Bill of Rights] 
safeguards of liberty and dignity have been infringed in a particular case depends 
upon the particular circumstances.”). 
 74.   Justice Brennan, after serving in World War II as an Army JAG, served as a 
judge in New Jersey courts before joining the Supreme Court in 1956.  He was 
Catholic, as was Justice Frank Murphy, who relied heavily on human dignity in his 
decision-making.  See Deborah A. Roy, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., James Wilson, and 
the Pursuit of Equality and Liberty, 61 CLEV.  ST. L. REV. 665 (2013).  According to Leslie 
Melzer Henry, Brennan “invoked ‘dignity’ in an astounding thirty-nine opinions 
during his tenure on the Court.”  Henry supra note 25, at 171.  See RAOUL BERGER, 
Justice Brennan, ‘Human Dignity,’ and Constitutional Interpretation; Henkin, supra note 
22 at 10.; Stephen J. Wermiel, Essay: Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice 
Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.  J. 223 (1998). 
 75.   One commentator referred to Justice Kennedy as “the dignity whisperer.”  
Dahlia Lithwick, An Argument for Dignity, SLATE (Apr. 28, 2015, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2015/0
4/gay_marriage_arguments_at_supreme_court_anthony_kennedy_on_dignity.html. 
 76.   See Henry, supra note 25 (comparing frequency of use of the concept). 
 77.   See infra Part III.D. 
 78.   Whitman, supra note 52, at 1161. 
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exist for those who lack food security.79 
 
II. Food Insecurity in America, Government Assistance, 
 and the Court’s Decisions Regarding Welfare 
 
According to the United States Department of Agriculture, in 
2013, 14.3 percent of American households (17.5 million households) 
were food insecure.80  These households “had difficulty at some time 
during the year providing enough food for all their members due to a 
lack of resources.”81  Fourteen percent of households in the United 
States were food insecure despite welfare and food stamp programs, 
meant to provide assistance to Americans in need.82  Approximately 
nine percent of these households had children.83  In 2013, “49.1 million 
Americans lived in food insecure households, including 33.3 million 
adults and 15.8 million children.”84  Present rates of poverty in the 
United States are higher than in several other industrialized nations.85 
In terms of reasons for food insecurity, according to the 
organization, WhyHunger, federal food programs face increasing 
resource cuts.  The organization notes that some who are eligible for 
food assistance do not receive it, and, at times, the assistance provided 
is not sufficient to remedy food insecurity.86  The organization also 
notes that circumstances like immigration status and income level can 
                                                          
 79.   For instance, Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “We have come to a clearer 
realization of the fact . . . that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic 
security and independence.”  President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union 
Message to Congress (January 11, 1944) in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http:/
/www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16518. 
 80.   Hunger and Poverty Fact Sheet, FEEDING AMERICA, http://www
.feedingamerica.org/hunger-in-america/impact-of-hunger/hunger-and-poverty/
hunger-and-poverty-fact-sheet.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
 81.   Food & Nutrition Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/
topics/food-nutrition-assistance/.aspx  (last updated June 8, 2015). 
 82.   Id. 
 83.   Hunger and Poverty Fact Sheet, supra note 80. 
 84.   Id. 
 85.   See Helen Hershkoff, Forward: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State 
Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 801 (2002). 
 86.   WHYHUNGER, supra note 23. 
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affect an individual’s right to assistance.87 
In 2013, food insecurity varied dramatically from state to state, 
with the percentage of food insecurity ranging from 8.7 percent in 
North Dakota to 21.2 percent in Arkansas.88  Cities also see a great 
disparity in food insecurity, with Memphis, San Antonio, 
Washington, D.C., and San Francisco currently among the poorest 
American cities; in Memphis, twenty-six percent of its residents had 
been food insecure sometime during 2014.89  Regardless of location, 
across the board, the nation’s children suffer the most from food 
insecurity.  During the 2012 to 2013 school year, fifty-one percent of 
pre-Kindergarten through twelfth grade students were eligible to 
receive free and reduced-price lunches, illustrating the striking level 
of poverty among this population.90 
The history of welfare in the United States reflects, at best, the 
lack of a national commitment to the plight of the poor and, at worst, 
a steady decline during the past fifty years in our commitment to 
caring for the needy.  Welfare programs to provide cash assistance to 
the poor in the United States came about after the Great Depression, 
when the government undertook to better assist families with the 
necessities of food and shelter.  In advancing his New Deal agenda, 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”) said, “If, as our 
Constitution tells us, our Federal Government was established among 
other things, to ‘promote general welfare,’ it is our plain duty to 
provide for that security upon which welfare depends.”91  Congress 
enacted the Social Security Act in 1935 to provide unemployment and 
                                                          
 87.   WHYHUNGER, supra note 23. 
 88.   Alex Henderson, 10 Cities Where an Appalling number of Americans are 
Starving, SALON (Jan. 10, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/01/10/10_cities_
where_an_appalling_number_of_americans. 
 89.   Id. 
 90.   Lyndsey Layton, Majority of U.S. Public School Students are in Poverty, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 16, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/majority-of-
us-public-school-students-are-in-poverty/2015/01/15/df7171d0-9ce9-11e4-a7ee-
526210d665b4_story.html. 
 91.   President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the Objectives 
and Accomplishments of the Administration, (June 8, 1934) in U.C. SANTA BARBARA 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=
14690. 
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old-age insurance, maternal and general health programs, and 
general economic assistance for the needy.92  The main purpose of 
these categorical assistance programs was to encourage state 
governments to provide “new and greatly enhanced welfare 
programs.”93  Title IV-A of the Social Security Act established Aid for 
Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”), a joint federal-state 
program.  It was created to provide economic support for needy, 
dependent children and those who care for them.94 
During the period from adoption of AFDC through the 1960s, the 
number of families receiving support increased dramatically, from 
162,000 to 1,875,000.95  Critics challenged existing programs for not 
providing job training and opportunities.  Accordingly, in May 1964, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson declared a “War on Poverty,” with the 
Economic Opportunity Act to provide job training and education.  
Johnson said, “We have a right to expect a job to provide food for our 
families, a roof over their head, clothes for their body and with your 
help and with God’s help, we will have it in America!”96 
 Around the same time, Congress passed the first law creating a 
permanent food stamp program,97 which allows eligible low-income 
                                                          
 92.   SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 51. 
 93.   Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 644 (1969) (Warren, J., dissenting).   
 94.   AFDC reimburses each participating state with a percentage of the funds it 
expends. 
 95.   Eugene M. Lewit, Donna L. Terman & Richard E. Behrman, Children and 
Poverty: Analysis & Recommendations, 7 J. CHILD. & POVERTY (1997), http://www.
princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/journals/article/index.xml?journalid=53
&articleid=284&sectionid=1869. 
 96.   President Lyndon Baines Johnson, Remarks at Cumberland, Maryland City 
Hall (May 7, 1964), in U.C. SANTA BARBARA AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26223; see also WAR ON POVERTY (PBS 1998), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/bonus-video/presidents-
economy-lbj/. 
 97.   A Short History of SNAP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“On Jan. 
31, 1964, President Johnson requested Congress to pass legislation making the FSP 
permanent.  Secretary Orville Freeman submitted proposed legislation to establish a 
permanent FSP on April 17, 1964.”). 
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individuals to purchase food.98  The food stamp program, despite 
sustaining significant funding cuts and then rebounding from those 
cuts with changing political climates, serves as one of the most 
enduring and effective parts of the “social safety net.”99  It has at times 
served as the “gap filler” where other programs have failed; of those 
who receive food stamps, eighty percent receive other types of 
benefits as well.100  Today, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (“SNAP”) continues to provide monthly benefits for eligible 
families. 
Yet, during the 1970s, with growing inflation, the rate of benefits 
decreased significantly and, according to Cass Sunstein, “Nixon’s 
appointees stopped an unmistakable trend in the direction of 
recognizing social and economic rights.”101  In the 1980s the welfare 
program came under increased, bipartisan criticism for its inability to 
properly and effectively assist those in need.102  The Reagan 
Administration expressed disdain for welfare programs not linked to 
jobs.  In describing his desired welfare reforms, which would 
emphasize work and jobs, Reagan quoted President Roosevelt from 
his State of the Union address on January 4, 1935, warning that 
welfare was “a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit” and 
                                                          
 98.   A Short History of SNAP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“On Jan. 
31, 1964, President Johnson requested Congress to pass legislation making the FSP 
permanent.  Secretary Orville Freeman submitted proposed legislation to establish a 
permanent FSP on April 17, 1964.”).  The program’s mission is “providing relevant, 
vital help to boost nutrition, economic security and health among seniors, children, 
people with disabilities, and unemployed or low-income working families.” 
 99.   R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES, INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 183 
(1994). 
 100.  Id. at 185. 
 101.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 169 (describing Nixon as “the anti-Roosevelt” in 
terms of social and economic rights).  Sunstein also describes how Nixon’s Supreme 
Court appointee, Warren Burger, and Burger’s Court, “nipped these developments 
[social and economic rights] in the bud, and by 1975 the whole idea of minimum 
welfare guarantees had become implausible.” 
 102. Id. 
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that “we must now escape the spider’s web of dependency.”103   
In the first two years of Reagan’s presidency, the food stamp 
program sustained $6 billion in budget cuts.104  Reagan believed in a 
welfare system that imposed norms of work and certain family 
values, whereby a man living in a household should provide for the 
family as husband and father, rather than allowing government 
support for those in other types of family and household 
relationships.105 
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(“PRWORA”), abolishing the AFDC and presumably “reforming” the 
welfare state.106  Clinton stated he wanted to “end welfare as we know 
it.”107  At the time, most of those relying on the welfare cash benefits 
were women with children, and the idea was that because of the 
healthy economy, those women could find jobs.108  The statute 
replaced existing programs with a cash welfare block grant called the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) program.109  
Some of the goals were to end welfare as an entitlement program,110 
require recipients to work, place a lifetime limit of five years on cash 
benefits, discourage out-of-wedlock births, and enhance enforcement 
of child support.111 
The program gave states fixed amounts (limited to five years) in 
                                                          
 103.  Robert Pear, Reagan Seeks Welfare Plan to Free Poor From Government 
Dependency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1986, http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/05/us/reagan-
seeks-welfare-plan-to-free-poor-from-government-dependency.html. 
 104.  Melnick, supra note 99, at 230. 
 105.  Id. at 129. 
 106.  Cf. Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1997, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/0sunst3/the-worst-thing-bill-
clinton-has-done/376797/. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Ed Koch, It’s Time to Reexamine The Welfare Reform Law of 1996, HUFFINGTON 
POST, (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ed-koch/Welfare-reform_b_
1428284.html.  
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See Jennifer E.K. Kendrex, Punishing the Poor Through Welfare Reform: Cruel 
and Unusual? 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 121 (2015). 
 111.  Id. 
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the form of block grants designed to establish programs of temporary 
assistance.112  The act does not require states to provide any specific 
assistance to the poor.113  Instead, it added time limits and work rules 
and capped federal spending.  Critics claimed that the reforms 
allowed states to stop providing cash assistance to the poor, most of 
whom could not find jobs because they were competing with skilled 
and semi-skilled middle-class workers, thus exacerbating the nation’s 
poverty challenges.114  Those who supported the new program 
praised the decreased dependency by the needy.115 
Many contend that the end of AFDC, along with the 2007 to 2009 
Great Recession, worsened the plight of America’s poor.116  Present 
rates of poverty in the United States are higher than in several other 
industrialized nations.117  Several recent studies find that as many as 
one in every four low-income single mothers is unemployed and 
lacking cash aid—approximately four million women and children.118 
The Supreme Court’s role with regard to Congress and these 
programs in terms of advancing human dignity concerns related to 
food security, though inconsistent, has generally favored the 
government, against the interests of the poor and food insecure.  
Initially, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court 
appeared willing to acknowledge a fundamental right to food 
security.  In Goldberg v. Kelly,119 King v. Smith,120 and Shapiro v. 
                                                          
 112.  Edelman, supra note 106. 
 113.  Again, as described above, the poor can still turn to food stamps and 
Medicaid for some relief. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Jason DeParle, Welfare Limits Left Poor Adrift as Recession Hit, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/us/welfare-limits-left-poor-adrift
-as-recession-hit.html?_r=1. 
 116.  See Hershkoff, supra note 87, at 801 (“Since 1996, . . . about two and a half 
million former welfare recipients have entered the labor market, earning, on average, 
only seven dollars an hour for a thirty hour work week—yielding an income below 
that of the poverty level for a household of two or more individuals.”). 
 117.  Id.  
 118.  DeParle, supra note 115. 
 119.  397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 120.  392 U.S. 309 (1968) (deciding Alabama's “substitute father” regulation, 
which denied AFDC benefits to the children of a mother who "cohabits" in or outside 
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Thompson,121 the Court ruled in favor of welfare recipients in cases 
challenging provisions that would lessen or stop their benefits.  For 
instance, in Goldberg, petitioners challenged the procedures New York 
used to terminate mothers’ welfare benefits.122  Under that state’s law, 
welfare benefits could be denied based on a caseworker’s mere doubts 
as to a recipient’s eligibility.123  A recipient could seek review of the 
caseworker’s justifications by way of a hearing, but only after the state 
had terminated the benefits.124  The Court held that because welfare 
benefits were like property, the government had to provide due 
process before taking them away.125 
Despite these early cases, the early 1970s showed a weakening of 
Supreme Court support for rights of welfare recipients, a change 
scholars attribute to “the rising hegemony of the ‘moral majority,’ 
which argued that entitlement to basic rights should be predicated on 
behavioral prescriptions unrelated to actual need.”126  In Dandridge v. 
Williams, the Court rejected the notion that the “maximum grant” 
provision of Maryland’s AFDC, by which families, no matter the 
number of children, could receive only a certain amount of benefits, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.127  The Court applied a rational 
basis test to the constitutional analysis rather than treating the 
classification (families with greater numbers of children) as a 
                                                          
her home with any single or married able-bodied man, was inconsistent with the 
Social Security Act; the Court did not decide the constitutionality of the regulation.). 
 121.  394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down durational residency requirements as 
part of welfare benefits.  Specifically, the Court addressed the 1992 part of the 
California statute regarding Aide to Families with Dependent Children limiting 
maximum welfare benefits during a resident’s first year of residency in California to 
the amount the resident was receiving in his prior residence.  For the California 
residents who sued, the statute resulted in substantially lower welfare benefits than 
they would have received, absent the statutory provision.  The Court held the statute 
unconstitutional because it infringed on the resident’s “right to travel,” a right “firmly 
embedded in our jurisprudence.”). 
 122.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 257. 
 123.  Id. at 258. 
 124.  Id. at 256. 
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Bridgette Baldwin, In Supreme Judgment of the Poor: The Role of the United 
States Supreme Court in Welfare Law and Policy, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 13 (2008). 
 127.  397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970). 
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protected or suspect class requiring strict scrutiny standard of review 
and a compelling state interest; thus, the Court rejected the argument 
that the cap violated a fundamental right to welfare.128  In their 
dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall chided the majority for using 
the same constitutional test used for business regulations for “the 
literally vital interests of a powerless minority—poor families without 
breadwinners . . . .”129 
A decade later, the Court again failed to affirm the poor’s human 
dignity in Harris v. McRae.130  In Harris, a class of pregnant women 
sued, claiming the Hyde Amendment of the Medicaid program 
violated the equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause by 
denying them funding for medically necessary abortions.131  At issue 
was whether the Medicaid program, which subsidizes a woman’s 
medically necessary services, could fail to subsidize a medically 
necessary abortion.132  The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
claim, holding that due process does not confer entitlement to federal 
funds for the protected right to have an abortion.133  The Court held as 
follows: 
[R]egardless of whether the freedom of a woman to 
choose to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies 
at the core or the periphery of the due process liberty 
recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a 
woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional 
entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the 
full range of protected choices.134 
While human dignity prevailed in allowing women the freedom to 
                                                          
 128.  Williams, 397 U.S. at 487 (“By the early 1970s, however, the Court had 
rejected the view that the federal Constitution guarantees any right to minimal 
subsistence, declaring instead that ‘the intractable economic, social, and even 
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the 
business of this Court.”). 
 129.  Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 130.  448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 131.  Id. at 332. 
 132.  Id. at 301. 
 133.  Id. at 318. 
 134.  Id. at 316. 
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choose whether to terminate a pregnancy, human dignity was 
outweighed when the government had to get involved by paying for 
that freedom. 
Justice Marshall, dissenting in McRae, referred to the Hyde 
Amendment as “the product of an effort to deny to the poor the 
constitutional right recognized in Roe v. Wade.”135  Justice Marshall 
linked the outcome to the Court’s “unwillingness to apply the 
constraints of the Constitution to decisions involving the expenditure 
of governmental funds.”136  While not using the term human dignity, 
Justice Marshall reflected on a welfare recipient’s dilemma to either 
have the child or obtain a “back-alley” abortion.137  Justice Blackmun, 
in his dissent, described as “condescension” the Court’s statement 
that a Medicare recipient needing a medically necessary abortion 
“may go elsewhere for her abortion.”138 
In the late 1980s, the Court continued to rule in favor of the 
government in a series of cases in which petitioners challenged the 
constitutionality of certain eligibility requirements in welfare 
statutes.139  In Luckhard v. Reed, the Court ruled that personal injury 
awards should be counted as income for purposes of determining 
welfare eligibility.140  In that case, the petitioner received a lump sum 
                                                          
 135.  McRae, 448 U.S. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 136.  Id. at 347. 
 137.  Id. at 346. 
 138.  Id. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 139.  See Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 
U.S. 587 (1987) (The Court used a rational basis analysis to affirm constitutionality of 
the provision at issue, which authorized AFDC to require that a family's eligibility for 
benefits take into account, with certain exceptions, the income of all parents, brothers, 
and sisters living in the same home, which would include child support payments for 
one of the children from a non-custodial parent.).  In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Brennan discusses the government’s infringement of a fundamental right: “the 
Government “‘directly and substantially’ interfere[s] with family living 
arrangements, and thereby burden[s] a fundamental right.  The infringement is 
direct, because a child whose mother needs AFDC cannot escape being required to 
choose between living with the mother and being supported by the father.  It is 
substantial because the consequence of that choice is damage to a relationship 
between parent and child.”  Id. at 624. 
 140.  Luckhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 381 (1987).  
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personal injury payment, which disqualified her from AFDC funds.141  
If the government had treated the payment as an asset, the petitioner 
would have lost benefits for only the month in which she received the 
award.142  The Court affirmed the state’s treatment of the award as 
income, thus disqualifying the permanently disabled mother from 
AFDC benefits.143  The Court also ruled against welfare benefits in 
Lyng v. UAW, upholding the state’s denial of food stamps to a striking 
employee who was losing income because of the strike.144  The Court 
agreed with the state that participation in the strike made petitioner 
ineligible for food stamps.145 
In 1995, the Court in Anderson v. Edwards, upheld a California 
provision of the AFDC that groups into a single “assistance unit” all 
needy children living in the same household, including non-siblings, 
if one adult cares for them.146  Petitioner, who was caring for her minor 
granddaughter and two grandnieces in the same household, sued 
because the California rule resulted in a $200.00 decrease in her AFDC 
benefit (she had a higher amount of benefits when caring for only her 
granddaughter).147  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the 
California provision violated federal law, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed.148 
As shown, human dignity has proven frail as a constitutional 
value in cases involving the government’s provision of economic 
assistance.  This is so despite the strong ties between liberty, which 
the Court has routinely ruled to protect, and food security.  Cass 
Sunstein highlights FDR’s vision of a second Bill of Rights, premised 
on the notion that “necessitous men are not free men,” saying: 
“[u]nlike the Constitution’s framers, ‘we have come to a clear 
realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist 
                                                          
 141.  Reed, 481 U.S. at 373. 
 142.  Id. at 371. 
 143.  Id. at 383. 
 144.  485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143, 145 (1995). 
 147.  Id. at 148. 
 148.  Id. at 149. 
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without economic security and independence.’”149  In light of the 
Court’s advancement of human dignity in Obergefell, reasons for the 
Court’s failure to acknowledge a right to food security have become 
increasingly fragile. 
 
III.   Five Reasons the United States Supreme Court  
  Should Establish a Fundamental Right to Food  
  Security 
 
The Court should affirm human dignity in welfare rights cases 
by acknowledging a fundamental right to food security under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.  
The Court’s existing jurisprudence regarding liberty and human 
dignity, and international and foreign legal standards relating to food 
security evidences this conclusion.  This section provides five 
arguments as to why the Court should acknowledge this right; each 
argument also provides a response to the counterargument as to why 
the Court has not and should not recognize such a right. 
 
A. The Positive/Negative Rights Distinction Lacks Merit in 
View of Supreme Court Human Dignity Jurisprudence. 
 
In his dissenting opinion in Obergefell, Justice Thomas 
emphasizes his position that human dignity serves as a constitutional 
value with regard to only negative rights: “Our Constitution—like the 
Declaration of Independence before it—was predicated on a simple 
truth: One’s liberty, not to mention one’s dignity, was something to 
be shielded from—not provided by—the State.”150 
Justice Thomas linked the foundational principles of this country, 
as reflected in the Declaration of Independence’s “all men are created 
equal” proclamation, to its religious underpinnings that all men are 
created in the divine image “and therefore [are] of inherent worth.”151  
                                                          
 149.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 11.  
 150.  Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 151.  Id. 
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Justice Thomas then concluded that because of all citizens’ innate 
human dignity, the government cannot advance nor impede the 
value.152 
Commentators posit the Court relies on human dignity only to 
affirm negative rights, not positive ones that create obligations on the 
part of the State.153  One commentator describes this distinction as 
follows: “[n]egative rights comprise defensive claims against invasion 
by the state; the citizen can assert a negative right against the 
government, … positive rights extend a sword, entailing affirmative 
claims that can be used to compel the state to afford substantive goods 
or services” based on the Constitution.154 
Despite the distinction, which many commentators reject as 
groundless with regard to a fundamental right to food security,155 this 
argument lacks merit for several reasons.  First, the government’s 
commitment already exists.  Our nation has already obligated itself to 
provide assistance to families in need, through programs such as 
TANF, WIC,156 and food stamps.  Arguably, the Court’s present role 
is to ensure the government does not unfairly and without due 
process deprive citizens of access to these resources.157  Yet, for the 
                                                          
 152.  Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 153.  See Whitman, supra note 52, at 1161. 
 154.  See Hershkoff, supra note 85.  
 155.  Id. at 810 (questioning the validity of this distinction in view of 
constitutional challenges involving, for instance, denial of a parade permit; the 
commentator asks whether this challenge involves interference with a right or right 
to provision of police and other governmental services); Krasnov, supra note 11, at 
737. 
 156.  The United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service 
describes WIC as a nutrition program for women, infants, and children (“WIC”) that 
“provides Federal grants to States for supplemental foods, health care referrals, and 
nutrition education for low-income pregnant, breastfeeding, and non-breastfeeding 
postpartum women, and to infants and children up to age five who are found to be 
at nutritional risk.”  Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://
www.fns.usda.gov/wic/women-infants-and-children-wic (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
 157.  See Kendrex, supra note 110, at 138 (“Neither Congress nor the states can 
deny welfare benefits in a way that violates an individual’s freedom of association or 
freedom to travel, and welfare cannot be denied without a full and fair hearing.  
Likewise, welfare cannot be instituted or revoked in a way that violates the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
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past forty-five years, the Court has routinely ruled in favor of the 
government and against the poor. 
With regard to obligations toward the poor, the Court has, in the 
past, relied on human dignity to rule in favor of a fundamental right 
to assistance under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses.  In Goldberg v. Kelly, Justice Brennan linked 
the petitioner’s constitutional claim to living with human dignity,158 
stating, “From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has been 
to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its 
borders.”159  Justice Brennan went on to describe the impact of the 
state’s failure to provide public assistance. 
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can 
help bring within the reach of the poor the same 
opportunities that are available to others to participate 
meaningfully in the life of the community.  At the same 
time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may 
flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration 
and insecurity.  Public assistance, then, is not mere 
charity, but a means to “promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity.”160 
Goldberg,161 Shapiro,162 United States Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno,163 and Boddie v. Connecticut164 reflect the Court embracing 
                                                          
 158.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 162.  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 163.  413 U.S. 528, 543 (1973) (holding an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that 
excluded from eligibility any household containing someone unrelated to the others 
in the household, and thus discriminated against “hippies,” violated the Fifth 
Amendment).   
 164.  401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (holding that due process prohibits the State from 
denying opportunity to dissolve a marriage because of inability to pay courts costs 
from indigence). 
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economic rights regarding the poor.165  In Goldberg, Justice Brennan 
commenced a path in which the Court, looking through the due 
process lens, relied on a national “commitment” to assure the human 
dignity of all citizens by providing a minimum standard of life.166 
Additionally, in other circumstances, the Supreme Court has 
relied on human dignity to satisfy constitutional guarantees, even 
when doing so requires an affirmative obligation on the government’s 
part.  For instance, in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with regard 
to prison conditions, the Court has ruled that the government must 
take steps to ensure the fair treatment of incarcerated individuals.167  
As Justice Kennedy said in Brown v. Plata, a prison overcrowding case 
involving inmates’ claims of inadequate health care: “A prison that 
deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical 
care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no 
place in civilized society.”168  Accordingly, once the government takes 
on the obligation to incarcerate, it must do so fairly based largely on 
human dignity concerns. 
Public schooling provides another example.  In Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Court sought to advance the human dignity of African-
American children by striking down the “separate but equal” 
doctrine.169  The Court never used the term human dignity; yet, the 
Court emphasized the demeaning impact on African-American 
children of having to attend a separate school from their white 
counterparts: “To separate them from others of a similar age and 
qualification solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
insecurity as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”170  This ruling 
                                                          
 165.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 159–62 (“By the late 1960s, the Court seemed to 
be moving toward recognition of a robust set of social and economic rights.”). 
 166.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265 (“From its founding, the Nation's basic 
commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its 
borders.”). 
 167.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1929 (2011). 
 168.  Id. at 1928. 
 169.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896).  
 170.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
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created an affirmative obligation on the government’s part to ensure 
the children’s access to equal schools:  “Today, education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments … such 
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms.”171  As Cass 
Sunstein notes, many of our “negative rights” cost the government 
money and require the government’s affirmative steps.172 
In the 1960s, under President Johnson, the Government 
commenced an “unconditional” War on Poverty, with state and the 
federal government undertaking programs to provide resources for 
the needy.173  Arguably, as with public education, Social Security, 
Medicare, and conditions on incarceration, the Court’s current role is 
to strike down government attempts to unfairly interfere with 
individuals’ access to the assistance (like denying benefits without a 
hearing).  However, the welfare cases of the past fifty years reflect the 
Court doing just the opposite: affirming the government’s attempts to 
lessen and chip away at access to government resources.174 
 
B. The Court’s Conception of Human Dignity, with its Strong 
Ties to Liberty is Consistent with a Right to Food Security. 
 
Liberty enjoys a paramount role in our constitutional 
jurisprudence based on the Founding Fathers’ distrust of government 
and need to ensure against tyranny and government intrusion.175  
Many argue that since liberty serves as this nation’s lodestar value, as 
                                                          
 171.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 172.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 200. 
 173.  The War on Poverty was part of President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great 
Society.”  President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to Congress on the State of 
the Union (Jan. 8, 1964), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787.   
 174.  See infra Part III.  
 175.  Edward Eberle, in one of his many comprehensive articles comparing Germany 
and the U.S., summarizes the key difference between the two nations’ constitutional 
jurisprudence as “the vision of the Constitution they are pursuing, an American 
constitution of liberty as compared to a German constitution of dignity.”  Edward J. 
Eberle, Equality in Germany and the United States, 10 S.D. INT’L L.J. 63, 120 (2008). 
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opposed to human dignity, the preeminent value in other nations,176 
the Court’s reliance on human dignity is limited to those instances 
that involve freedom from government interference and affirm privacy 
and autonomy.  As Neomi Rao, who has written extensively on the 
contours and various meanings of human dignity, explains, “The 
positive, communitarian dignity at the heart of the welfare state is not 
the prevailing one in the United States.  In American political and legal 
discourse, dignity is primarily associated with individual rights, a 
classical liberal understanding of freedom from interference.”177 
Some argue that economic rights are inconsistent with civil rights 
and liberty.178  For instance, the Reagan administration179 sought to 
“recast the vocabulary of the human rights debate” to eliminate 
economic rights.180  The administration posited that human rights 
include “only ‘political rights and civil liberties.’”181  According to 
those who hold this view, “by recognizing economic rights, the 
government ‘waters down’ civil and political rights and undermines 
individual liberty.”182 
However, as with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act,183 Social Security, Medicare, and public schooling, human dignity 
                                                          
 176.  See Goodman, supra note 42 (comparing German and American notions of 
human dignity in constitutional jurisprudence); see Marc Chase McAllister, Human 
Dignity and Individual Liberty in Germany and the United States as Examined Through Each 
Country’s Leading Abortion Case, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.J. 491, 491 (2004) (positing 
that securing civil liberties, not protecting human dignity, is the lodestar value of the 
American Constitution). 
 177.  Neomi Rao, American Dignity and Healthcare Reform, 35 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 
171, 174 (2013), http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/35_1_
171_Rao.pdf. 
 178.  Krasnov, supra note 11, at 756 (citing Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: the Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 
84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 385 (1990)). 
 179.  Ronald Reagan was President from January 1981 to January 1989. 
 180.  WILLIAM F. FELICE, THE GLOBAL NEW DEAL: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN WORLD POLITICS 238 (2010). 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Krasnov, supra note 11, at 745. 
 183.  Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, which President Obama then 
signed into law on March 23, 2010.  On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld key 
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as liberty can certainly coexist with (and be enhanced by) the 
government’s provision of resources.  Many argue the government’s 
provision of health care/insurance enhances liberty, just as public 
education provides freedom and opportunity to those who partake of 
it.184  As FDR said, with regard to his “Second Bill of Rights,”185 and 
the inadequacy of the first Bill of Rights, “We have come to a clearer 
realization of the fact … that true individual freedom cannot exist 
without economic security and independence.”186  Arguably, the 14.7 
million children living in poverty in the United States lack the same 
freedom and opportunities to participate in democracy as their 
counterparts who are food secure or enjoy “freedom from want.”187 
Regarding the differences between European and American 
notions of human dignity, commentators describe European nations’ 
conception of human dignity as advancing the free unfolding of 
personality—the individual’s right to develop and flourish.188  In 
Germany and other nations, this right to flourish necessitates the 
government providing the basics of education, work, and food.189  In 
Germany, the Sozialstaat, or social state principle, along with the 
promise of human dignity obligate the state to act on behalf of its 
citizens to secure their welfare and freedom.190 
                                                          
provisions of the health care law.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg–11 (2010), http://housedocs.
house.gov/energycommerce/ppacacon.pdf. 
 184.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 217–18. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  FDR’s third freedom, from his famous “Four Freedoms” speech, was 
freedom from want: “economic understandings which will secure to every nation a 
healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world.”  President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 6, 
1941), http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/pdfs/fftext.pdf. 
 187.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265 (1970) (Justice Brennan expressly tied welfare and 
providing for those in need to “securing the Blessings of Liberty.”). 
 188.  Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and 
American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 966 (1997). 
 189.  See id. 
 190.  Human dignity arises from Article 1 of the Basic Law and the social state 
principle arises out of Article 20, which provides at section (1): “The Federal Republic 
of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.”  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, BASIC 
LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 27 (2012), https://www.bundestag.de/
blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dcd/basic_law-data.pdf. 
6 GOODMAN MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/2015  8:53 AM 
182 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIII 
The German Constitutional Court (“GCC”) has held that human 
dignity, with other constitutional guarantees, “imposes an obligation 
on the state to provide at least minimal subsistence to every 
individual.”191  The GCC has used the promise of human dignity “to 
give meaning to the ‘existential minimum’ of social welfare in the 
German Basic Law, by which society is obliged to provide everyone 
with the socioeconomic conditions adequate for a dignified 
existence.”192 
 Fundamentally, the Sozialstaat obligates the state to act on behalf 
of its citizens to secure their dignity, welfare, and freedom.  Certainly 
the obligation to enact social welfare measures is part of this.  But so 
is the idea that the state has a moral duty to act on behalf of its citizens 
over a wide range of measures such as education, protection of human 
life, human security, and achievement of social justice.  Further, the 
state is to respect and guarantee individual freedom and protect 
against violations of personal rights.  The proactive duties associated 
with the state reflect a vision of man as not just an isolated, sovereign 
individual, but a person bound to, and defined within, a community.  
The idea of Sozialstaat obligates the state to create and maintain 
necessary social conditions so that man can thrive.193 
Thus, the German idea of freedom suggests freedom with help 
from the government, rather than freedom from the government.194  As 
Erin Daly explains the GCC’s interpretation of human dignity and the 
social state principle: “dignity means that people must have some 
control over their lives, must not be forced by circumstance to devote 
their lives to finding food or protection from the elements.”195 
The GCC’s Hartz IV judgment illustrates the Sozialstaat principle.  
In Hartz IV, the GCC ruled the federal legislature had failed to 
properly determine social welfare benefits based on the legislature’s 
                                                          
 191.  McCrudden, supra note 64. 
 192.  Katherine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights, 33 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 113, 134 (2008). 
 193.  Edward J. Eberle, The German Idea of Freedom, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 1, 52–53 
(2008). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS 155 (2013). 
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lack of underlying statistical investigation.196  In reaching its decision, 
the GCC relied on the guarantee of human dignity, which provides 
an enforceable right to a subsistence level of benefits.  This right 
“guarantees the whole subsistence minimum by a uniform rights 
guarantee[,] which encompasses both the physical existence of the 
individual that is food, clothing, household goods . . . and a minimum 
of participation in social, cultural and political life.”197  Again, the state 
is not giving people dignity, but “merely enables every individual to 
lead a life that is consistent with human dignity, and uphold[s] the 
possibility of self-determination and autonomy.”198 
American constitutional jurisprudence reflects a strong liberty 
component tied to human dignity, where state interference is a 
catalyst for dignity concerns, as in cases involving the right to choose 
(autonomy), and right to privacy (right to be left alone).199  In Roe v. 
Wade200 and the other cases involving abortion, the Court emphasized 
the right to choose.  In 1992, in revisiting its abortion jurisprudence 
from Roe v. Wade, the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,201 described 
a woman’s right to choose: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, its meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.202 
                                                          
 196.  See Stefanie Egidy, Casenote, The Fundamental Right to the Guarantee of a 
Subsistence Minimum in the Hartz IV Decision of the German Constitutional Court, VOL 12, 
NO. 11 GERMAN L.J. 1961 (2011). 
 197.  Hartz IV 125 BVerfGE 175 (2010); DONALD P. KOMMERS AND RUSSELL A. 
MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 50 
(3d ed. 2012). 
 198.  Id. at 1970. 
 199.  KOMMERS AND MILLER, supra note 197, at 1970. 
 200.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 201.  505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming Roe’s basic holding, yet 
holding the legislature could constitutionally limit the right to abortion). 
 202.  Id. at 851 (plurality opinion). 
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In Casey, Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part in 
the opinion, described a woman’s “authority” to choose whether to 
have an abortion as “an element of basic human dignity.”203  
Commentators note the “intertwining nature of dignity, liberty, and 
privacy”204 in these cases. 
 Our existing constitutional jurisprudence in criminal law,205 racial 
and gender discrimination,206 free speech,207 and right to marriage 
equality208 all reflect a conception of human dignity aligned with 
liberty as allowing the individual to flourish within society, not 
despite society.  For instance, in Cohen v. California, the Court 
overturned Paul Cohen’s arrest for wearing a jacket that said “f**k the 
draft.”209  Justice Harlan noted the purpose of preserving human 
dignity in striking down the government’s case.210  Citing the 
concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California,211 
Justice Harlan noted that freedom of expression “will ultimately 
produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and . . . no 
other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity 
                                                          
 203. Casey, 505 U.S. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 204.  Daly, supra note 179; see Rao, supra note 32, at 204 (“Individual liberty and 
freedom from interference emphasize the primacy of the individual, a being who 
chooses his own life.  When courts invoke dignity in the context of holding off the 
government, they are invoking the idea that dignity rests in individual agency, the 
ability to choose without state interference.”). 
 205.  See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984) (“The right to appear 
pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the 
presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible 
defense.”). 
 206.  See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (noting the 
“deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies equal access to public 
establishments” (quoting Heart of Atlanta Hotel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)). 
 207.  Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984) (“The First 
Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect 
of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common 
quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”). 
 208.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
 209.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
 210.  Id. at 24. 
 211.  74 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927). 
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and choice upon which our political system rests.”212 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, a gender discrimination case, 
Justice Brennan described the effect of discrimination on the 
individual’s ability to thrive in society: “It thereby both deprives 
persons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of 
wide participation in political, economic, and cultural life.”213  In these 
cases, the Court protected an interest much like the European free 
unfolding of personality, an interest that involves an individual’s 
identity and ability to flourish in society.  Without food security and 
the accompanying dignity, an individual lacks the ability to 
participate in political, economic, and cultural life.  As one 
commentator notes: “Rhetorically speaking, how can people exercise 
their free choice if they have no food on the table, or if they are unable 
to treat their sicknesses?  Thus, positive dignity mandates state action 
to alleviate these conditions.”214 
And, in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy described what liberty 
provides:  
The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a 
liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow 
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their 
identity.  The petitioners in these cases seek to find that 
liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and having 
their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and 
conditions as marriages between persons of the opposite 
sex.215  In addition[,] these liberties extend to certain 
“personal choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy, including intimate choices that define 
personal identity and beliefs.216 
 
 
                                                          
 212.  Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. 
 213.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625. 
 214.  Glensy, supra note 26, at 66. 
 215.  Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2593. 
 216.  Id. at 2597. 
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C.   The Supreme Court Has Ruled to Affirm Fundamental 
  Rights Not Expressly Provided in the Constitution. 
 
The Supreme Court has often relied on values and rights not 
expressly found in the Constitution.  Human dignity itself is a value 
not mentioned in the Constitution; yet the Court has routinely relied 
upon it, though, as commentators often note, without providing its 
contours or definition.217  Accordingly, while the Justices quibble over 
its meaning,218 with some leaning on it much more heavily, and 
commentators continue to debate its relevance and definition, most 
agree the value plays a role in our constitutional jurisprudence.219 
Some argue human dignity is among the nation’s founding 
principles.  In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton mentions 
human dignity as a lodestar value, arguing for adoption of the 
Constitution as “the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and 
your happiness.”220  FDR called the Bill of Rights, “the great American 
charter of personal liberty and dignity.”221  As Judge Walter Mansfield 
wrote, in a case involving welfare benefits, the General Welfare 
                                                          
 217.  See Maxine Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006); Rao, supra note 32, at 206 (2008); Henry, supra 
note 25, at 171; Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 183 (2011).  
 218.  See infra Part III.D. 
 219.  See Paust, supra note 25; Henkin, supra note 22.  In terms of the nation’s 
Founders, the Declaration of Independence of 1776 states as a “self-evident truth” 
that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
inalienable Rights, that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”  
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  The Declaration goes on to 
state that government’s purpose is “to secure these rights.”  Accordingly, the Court 
has repeatedly tied human dignity to Liberty. 
 220.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton); Glensy, supra note 26, at 77; 
Parent, supra note 50, at 69 (noting that Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, 
stated: “Yes, my countrymen, I own to you, that, that after having given in my 
attentive consideration, I am clearly of the opinion, it is your interest to adopt it.  I am 
convinced, that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your 
happiness.”). 
 221.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 131 Proclamation 2524, Bill of Rights Day 
(November 27, 1941), in U.C. SANTA BARBARA AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16046. 
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Clause of the Constitution’s Preamble requires economic security: 
Receipt of welfare benefits may not at the present time 
constitute the exercise of a constitutional right.  But 
among our Constitution’s expressed purposes was the 
desire to “insure domestic tranquility” and “promote 
general Welfare.”  Implicit in these phrases are certain 
basic concepts of humanity and decency.  One of these, 
voiced as a goal in recent years by most responsible 
governmental leaders, both state and federal, is the desire 
to insure that indigent, unemployable citizens will at least 
have the bare minimums required for existence without 
which our expressed constitutional rights and liberties 
frequently cannot be exercised and therefore become 
meaningless.222 
At the same time, the Court has acknowledged fundamental 
rights not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, the most famous 
among them being privacy.  Although the Constitution does not 
mention privacy, the Supreme Court has acknowledged a right to 
privacy, based on human dignity, beginning in the 1960s with 
Griswold v. Connecticut, which involved the dispensing or use of birth 
control devices.223  In Griswold, the Court first recognized the right to 
personal privacy under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court 
ruled unconstitutional a Connecticut statute prohibiting the 
dispensing or use of birth control devices to or by married couples.224  
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court relied on penumbras 
emanating from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.225   
The opinion emphasized the sanctity of marriage, stating: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
                                                          
 222.  Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339, 346–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 223.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965). 
 224.  Id. at 485.  
 225.  Id. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill 
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance.”). 
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Rights—older than political parties, older than our school 
system.  Marriage is a coming together for better or for 
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred.226 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird in the 1970s, and coming to the forefront more 
recently in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
the right to privacy “emanating” from the express guarantees, 
grounded in human dignity; it protects individuals against 
unwarranted government intrusion in their homes, bedrooms, and 
private affairs.227 
The Court affirmed the “right to marry” in Zablocki v. Redhail, 
striking down as an equal protection violation, a law that prevented 
fathers who were behind on their child support payments from 
marrying.228  The Court noted in Loving v. Virginia, primarily an equal 
protection decision, that “the freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.”229  And recently in Ogerbefell, the 
Court applied, as its second principle, that “the right to marry is 
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other 
in its importance to the committed individuals.”230 
Not only has the Court ruled in favor of rights to privacy and to 
marriage but the Court has also struck down the constitutionality of 
statutes based on the “right to travel,” a right certainly not mentioned 
                                                          
 226.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
(establishing the right of unmarried people to possess contraceptives); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 US 558, 575–78 (2003) (Justice Kennedy discusses the stigma “all that 
imports for the dignity of the persons charged.  The State cannot demean their 
existence or control their destiny by making their private conduct a crime”).  Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 227.  Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Lawrence, 539 U.S.at 578. 
 228.  434 U.S. 374 (1978) (“Since our past decisions make clear that the right to 
marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here 
significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that ‘critical 
examination’ of the state interests advanced in support of the classification is 
required.”). 
 229.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 230.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
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in the Constitution.  In both Shapiro v. Thompson231 and Saenz v. Roe,232 
the Court struck down durational residency requirements as part of 
welfare benefits.  Specifically, the Court addressed the 1992 part of the 
California statute regarding AFDC that limited maximum welfare 
benefits during a resident’s first year of residency in California to the 
amount the resident was receiving in his prior residence.233  For the 
California residents who sued, the statute resulted in substantially 
lower welfare benefits than they would have received, absent the 
statutory provision.234  The Court held the statute unconstitutional 
because it infringed on the resident’s “right to travel,” a right “firmly 
embedded in our jurisprudence.”235 
Similarly, in Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court advanced “a right to 
be heard” by striking down Connecticut’s procedures for 
commencing a divorce action; the procedures required welfare 
recipients to pay court fees and costs for service of process, which 
restricted their access to the courts when suing for divorce.236  Justice 
Harlan, writing for the Court, acknowledged “the right to be heard:”  
“No less than these rights, the right to a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard within the limits of practicality, must be protected against 
denial by particular laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular 
individuals.”237  
Each of these rights, none of which is expressly guaranteed in the 
Constitution and some of them fundamental based on the Court’s 
analysis, arise out of the Court’s role in preserving individuals’ 
human dignity.  Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses or a “penumbra” arising from a specific 
                                                          
 231.  394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (concurrence) (citing United States v. Guest for the 
notion that ‘‘the constitutional right to travel from one State to another … has been 
firmly established and repeatedly recognized.”). 
 232.  526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 233.  At the time of the decision, California, according to Justice Stevens, was one 
of the most generous states in terms of welfare benefits under the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children programs.  It had the sixth highest benefit levels.  Saenz, 
526 U.S. at 492. 
 234.  Id. at 506–07. 
 235.  Id. at 498. 
 236.  401 U.S. 371, 377–78 (1971). 
 237.  Id. at 379. 
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guarantee, when aligned with human dignity concerns, should 
provide for a constitutional right to food security in the United States. 
 
D.  The Supreme Court Should Rule in Favor of a Fundamental 
Right to Food Security Because Poverty Shames, Demeans, 
and Humiliates, and the Court Has, in the Past, Ruled to 
Remedy Shame and Humiliation. 
 
As Tevya, the milkman from Anatevka says to God at the 
beginning of “If I Were a Rich Man,”238 in Fiddler on the Roof: “Dear 
God, you made many, many poor people.  I realize, of course, that it’s 
no shame to be poor.  But it’s no great honor either!”239  Commentators 
routinely link poverty to shame, in addition to poverty’s link to poor 
health and lack of education.240  Regarding the humiliating impact of 
being poor, one commentator discussing poverty in England writes, 
“poverty is inextricably linked to shame across societies; it suggests 
that to ignore stigma is potentially to miss out on some of the most 
corrosive effects of poverty.”241 
In discussing the earned income tax credit, a commentator 
recently praised it for providing a benefit to the poor without stigma: 
“While decades of research has shown that other anti-poverty 
programs tend to confer stigma, isolating the poor from mainstream 
society, this tax credit generates strong feelings of inclusion and hope 
for upward mobility.”242 
The Court has routinely ruled in favor of petitioners seeking 
redress for constitutional infractions stemming from government 
                                                          
 238.  From Fiddler on the Roof, a musical by Jerry Bock and Sheldon Harnick. 
 239.  If I Were a Rich Man lyrics, LYRICSMANIA.COM, http://www.lyricsmania.com/
if_i_were_a_rich_man_lyrics_fiddler_on_the_roof.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
 240.  Caroline Gregorie, Study Reveals Sad Link Between Poverty and Children’s 
Brain Development, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2015/03/30/brain-development-poverty_n_6968758.html. 
 241.  Declan Gaffney, The Missing Dimension of Poverty: Stigma, New Statesman, 
(Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.newstatesman.com/economics/2013/02/missing-dimen
sion-poverty-stigma. 
 242.  Laura Tach & Kathryn Edin, When Taxes Aren’t a Drag, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 
2105), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/opinion/when-taxes-arent-a-drag.html?_r=0. 
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treatment that demeans or humiliates.  Search and seizure and 
prisoner treatment cases illustrate when the Court finds it necessary 
to step in to strike down whatever government action results in 
humiliation.243  For instance, in Hope v. Pelzer, the Court struck down 
as unconstitutional an Alabama prison’s practice of handcuffing 
misbehaving prisoners to a hitching post.244  In describing the 
humiliating nature of the hitching post punishment (in the sun, 
without adequate water or bathroom breaks), the Court emphasized 
that what underlies the Eighth Amendment “is nothing less than the 
dignity of man.”245 
Regarding Fourth Amendment due process protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court’s language suggests an 
unwavering commitment to human dignity, in terms of avoiding 
shame and humiliation (however, the results at times belie this 
unwavering commitment).246  In Rochin v. California,247 after his arrest 
for allegedly possessing morphine in violation of California law, Mr. 
Rochin was forcibly taken to a hospital.  Once there, under a police 
officer’s direction, “a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube 
                                                          
 243.  See Goodman, supra note 217, at 767–76. 
 244.  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 730 (2002). 
 245.  Id. at 738. 
 246.  See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 482 U.S. 602 (1989) in which 
the Court affirmed the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of mandatory 
blood and urine tests for railroad employees under regulations promulgated by the 
Federal Railroad Administration.  The Court held no warrants or reasonable 
suspicion were required before the testing because, in the balance, the government 
had a strong interest in obtaining the test results to ensure public safety.  The 
employees had a diminished expectation to privacy because the test’s intrusiveness 
was minimal.  Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, emphasizing the indignity and humiliation suffered by employees 
at having the sample taken.  Urination is “among the most private of activities,” 
according to the dissenting Justices, especially with a monitor listening at the door.  
Id. at 645.  Justice Marshall likened the assault on personal dignity in Skinner to the 
World War II relocation-camp and McCarthy-era cases in terms of the denials of 
liberty in times of perceived necessity.  Id. at 635.  He wrote of the danger of sacrificing 
fundamental freedoms in the name of exigency: “History teaches that grave threats 
to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too 
extravagant to endure.”  Id. 
 247.  342 U.S. 165 (1952) (the “shocks the conscience” decision). 
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into Rochin’s stomach against his will.  This ‘stomach pumping’ 
produced vomiting.  In the vomited matter were found two capsules 
which proved to contain morphine.”248 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, held that police 
violated Mr. Rochin’s due process rights, describing the force used 
against him as brutal and “offensive to human dignity.”249  In 1984, 
the Court again struck down as unconstitutional a bodily intrusion 
where police sought to compel a criminally accused individual to 
undergo surgery to remove a bullet that might implicate the accused 
in criminal proceedings.250  In applying the Fourth Amendment 
protection, the Court described the “extent of intrusion upon the 
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily 
integrity.”251 
In Lawrence v. Texas,252 the Supreme Court relied on human 
dignity when describing how the Texas anti-sodomy law at issue 
demeaned those subject to its prohibition.253  The Court overturned 
Bowers v. Hardwick,254 holding that a Texas law prohibiting 
homosexual sodomy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in part because it was demeaning.255  The 
Court further explained, “The State cannot demean their existence or 
control their destiny by making their private conduct a crime.”256  
Justice Kennedy described the privacy interest at stake as follows: “It 
                                                          
 248.  Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166. 
 249.  Id. at 174.  But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which the 
Court reached the opposite result, holding the intrusion constitutional, for mandatory 
testing of a criminally accused’s blood for alcohol content.  The Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Brennan, described the Fourth Amendment as protecting “personal privacy 
and dignity against unwanted intrusion by the State.”  Id. at 767.  The blood tested 
passed constitutional muster only because the test chosen to measure blood-alcohol 
was reasonable under the circumstances and was performed in a reasonable manner. 
 250.  Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1984). 
 251.  Id. at 761. 
 252.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 253.  Id. at 575–78 (Justice Kennedy discusses the stigma “all that imports for the 
dignity of the persons charged.  The State cannot demean their existence or control 
their destiny by making their private conduct a crime.”). 
 254.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 255.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 256.  Id. at 578. 
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suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon 
this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private 
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”257  Accordingly, the 
Court has repeatedly treated human dignity as the antidote to laws 
and government acts that demean and humiliate.   
The Windsor Court noted that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments “withdraw . . . from Government the power to degrade 
or demean . . . .”258  In Obergefell, the Court discussed the “stigma” 
ascribed to the children of same sex couples who are unable to marry. 
Without the recognition, stability, and predictability 
marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of 
knowing their families are somehow lesser.  They also 
suffer the significant material costs of being raised by 
unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their 
own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.  The 
marriage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the 
children of same-sex couples.259 
This language resembles the language found in Brown v. Board of 
Education,260 written sixty years ago, in which the Court described the 
impact of separate but equal on children as follows: “To separate them 
from others of a similar age and qualification solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of insecurity as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone.”261  In both cases, the Court leans heavily on human 
dignity as the value underlying the constitutional guarantees at stake 
and the need to redress “institutionalized humiliation.”262 
Likewise, the Court should acknowledge a fundamental right to 
                                                          
 257.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 258.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.  
 259.  Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2593 (Much of the opinion is written in terms of 
protecting children). 
 260.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 261.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 262.  See Bruce Ackerman, Dignity is a Constitutional Principle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar., 
29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/dignity-is-a-constitu
tional-principle.html?_r=0. 
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food security because, among other ills involving health and 
education, poverty shames.  Dissenting in Wyman v. James,263 Justice 
Marshall noted the “severe intrusion upon privacy and family 
dignity” arising from welfare visits to a family’s home.264  This anti-
shame conception of human dignity is certainly controversial.  Justice 
Scalia challenges this “anti-shame” conception of human dignity in 
Indiana v. Edwards,265 a case involving whether a state that insists a 
defendant, whom the court deems competent to stand trial, not 
represent himself (for competency concerns) violates that defendant’s 
right to self-representation.266  The Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Breyer, explained that the right of self-representation will not 
preserve a defendant’s human dignity (as it is meant to do) if the 
defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without 
the assistance of counsel.267 
The dissenting justices questioned the Court’s conception of 
human dignity as remedying conduct that demeans and shames.268  
Rather, according to Justice Scalia, human dignity means “being 
master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the State—the dignity of 
individual choice.”269  He goes on to say “if the Court is to honor the 
particular conception of ‘dignity’ that underlies the self-
representation right, it should respect the autonomy of the individual 
by honoring his choices knowingly and voluntarily made.”270  Thus, 
the State should never step in to interfere with individual choice even 
if that choice leads to humiliation on the part of the petitioner.271  
Scalia suggested the government actually impedes an individual’s 
                                                          
 263.  400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
 264.  Id. at 340 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 265.  554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 266.  In McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), the Court affirmed the 
constitutional right of self-representation with Justice O’Connor saying, “The right to 
appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow 
the presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible 
defense.”  Id. at 176-177. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  James, 400 U.S. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 269.  Edwards, 554 U.S. at 187. 
 270.  Id.  
 271.  Id. 
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dignity by insisting on the use of counsel.272 
In Obergefell, Justice Thomas provided a different definition of 
human dignity.  Justice Thomas wrote that because dignity is innate, 
the government can never advance it or deprive an individual of it.273  
In his dissenting opinion, which many commentators criticize for its 
reference to the dignity of slaves,274 Justice Thomas described the 
“corollary” of human dignity as follows: 
Human dignity cannot be taken away by the government.  
Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost 
their humanity) because the government allowed them to 
be enslaved.  Those held in internment camps did not lose 
their dignity because the government confined them.  
And those denied governmental benefits certainly do not 
lose their dignity because the government denies them 
those benefits.  The government cannot bestow dignity, 
and it cannot take it away.275 
Thus, unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas defined the notion as 
something immutable, inherent in each person regardless of state 
action or inaction.  Justices Scalia and Thomas have conceded that 
human dignity serves as a value; the differences come in what the 
value means and requires.  According to Justices Thomas and Scalia, 
human dignity will never serve as a reason for the Court to rule on a 
constitutional issue because it is immutable—everyone has it, all the 
time, so the State cannot infringe on it or fail to afford it.  Yet, as shown 
here, the Court, international and foreign law, the federal 
government, and state governments have all (at times) taken the 
                                                          
 272.  Edwards, 554 U.S. at 187. 
 273.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 274.  Scott Eric Kaufman, Thomas’ Offensive Comparison: Same-Sex Marriage 
Opponents are Like Slaves—Defeated but Still Possessing Dignity, SALON.COM (Mar. 26, 
2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/06/26/thomas_offensive_comparison_same_sex_
marriage_opponents_are_like_slaves_defeated_but_still_possessing_dignity/.  See 
Jamil Smith, Clarence Thomas’s Disgraceful Definition of Human Dignity, NEW REPUBLIC 
(June 26, 2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122178/clarence-thomas-
marriage-equality-dissent-all-about-him. 
 275.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2639. 
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opposite approach, applying the need to protect, preserve, restore, 
and at times advance human dignity to remedy individualized, 
institutional humiliation and shame. 
 
E. The Court has Often Relied on International Legal 
Standards and Foreign Law,276 Both of Which Require Food 
Security. 
 
With regard to food security in the international arena, the 
United States “increasingly finds itself an outlier to an emerging 
global consensus.”277  It has “ratified fewer major human rights 
treaties than any other economically developed democracy….”278 
Under international law, all citizens have a right to food security 
based largely on the promise of human dignity.  Article 25 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides as follows: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care[,] and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control.279 
And, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) provides at Article 11: 
                                                          
 276.  See Rex.  D. Glensy, The Use of International Law in U.S. Constitutional 
Adjudication, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 197 (2011) (identifying the differences between 
international legal standards and foreign law). 
 277.  See Bruce Porter, Judging Poverty: Using International Human Rights Law to 
Refine the Scope of Charter Rights, 15 J. LAW & SOCIAL POL’Y 117, 122 (2000) (“On the 
other hand, our [Canada’s] approach to human rights protections has not 
incorporated this fundamental difference and has tended to conform more to a U.S. 
style rights regime in which social and economic rights have been accorded little 
recognition.”). 
 278.  Aaron X. Fellmeth, Leading from (a Bit) Behind: the United States and 
International, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 977, 988 (2014). 
 279.  UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf; Glendon, supra note 47, at xv-xvi.  
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1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.  The States Parties will take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to 
this effect the essential importance of international co-
operation based on free consent. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing 
the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, 
shall take, individually and through international co-
operation, the measures, including specific programmes, 
which are needed….”280 
The United States has signed but not ratified the Covenant, thus it 
is not bound to adhere to it.281  There are 164 parties to the ICESCR, but 
only 6 signatories.282  One commentator notes the United States’ refusal 
to ratify the Convention, and its refusal, along with only one other 
country, to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child.283  The 
United States has maintained this position of failing to affirm these 
covenants despite these treaties being based on the fundamental notion 
that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”284 
Other nations’ constitutions provide for a fundamental right of 
food security, tied to human dignity.  The South African Bill of 
Rights285 provides that everyone has a right to sufficient food and water, 
                                                          
 280.  United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status 
of Ratification, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
 281.  Id. at 754 (“The President’s signature indicates at least a political willingness 
to be bound by the Covenant . . . thus, should the U.S. government decide to start 
systematically depriving its citizens of basic economic rights, it would be in breach of 
the ICESCR.”). 
 282.  United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status 
of Ratification, http://indicators.ohchr.org/; Krasnov, supra note 11, at n. 6. 
 283.  Porter, supra note 277, at 123. 
 284.  UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 279. 
 285.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 217 (describing the South African 
Constitution as “the world’s leading example of a transformative constitution” 
because so much of it was aimed at eliminating the system and effects of apartheid).  
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and the State must take “reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of 
that right.”286  The Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution 
“enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”287 
The landmark case involving socioeconomic rights, particularly 
the right to housing, Government of the Republic of South Africa v. 
Grootboom288 acknowledged the interrelatedness of the socioeconomic 
rights with the civil and political rights in its reading of the 
Constitution.  The Constitutional Court proclimed, “[T]here can be no 
doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational 
values of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or 
shelter.289  Affording socioeconomic rights to all people therefore 
enables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in Chapter 2.”290  
Grootboom focused on the right to adequate housing; however, the 
Constitutional Court acknowledged that the socioeconomic rights 
included in the Constitution cannot only exist on paper but must 
actually be implemented.291  The Court held the basic necessities of life 
are provided to all to affirm the promise of a society based on human 
dignity.292  According to the Court, the state must take affirmative 
steps to remedy the plight of those living in poverty, the homeless, or 
those residing in inhabitable dwellings.293 
Similarly, the German Basic Law contains both objective and 
subjective rights; the objective rights obligate the government to fulfill 
the objective values outlined in the Basic Law.294  Objective rights are 
described as forming “part of the legal order, the order public, [and] 
                                                          
 286.  Bill of Rights, S. AFRICAN CONST., Ch. 2, Section 27(1)(b), (2), http://www
.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/chp02.html. 
 287.  Id. at Section 7(1). 
 288.  Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2000 1 (CC), http://www.
saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.html.  
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Grootboom, supra note 288, at para. 23.  
 291.  Id. at para. 20. 
 292.  Id. at 34. 
 293.  Id. at 20 (para. 24). 
 294.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, supra note 190. 
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thereby taking their place among the governing principles of German 
society.”295  Accordingly, the state has affirmative obligations to 
secure certain rights, including the rights to basic necessities to live, 
as described in the Hartz IV decision.296 
The Supreme Court has certainly relied on both international law 
standards as well as the standards of individual nations as persuasive 
authority for its decisions.  The Miranda decision relies on English and 
Scottish law for the warnings police must provide those whom they 
plan to interrogate and the results of those procedures.297  In Miranda, 
Justice Warren explained: 
The experience in some other countries also suggests that 
the danger to law enforcement in curbs on interrogation 
is overplayed.  The English procedure, since 1912 under 
the Judges’ Rules, is significant.  As recently strengthened, 
the Rules require that a cautionary warning be given an 
accused by a police officer as soon as he has evidence that 
affords reasonable grounds for suspicion….298 
 In Roper v. Simmons,299 a 2005 decision striking down capital 
punishment for juvenile offenders, Justice Kennedy wrote: “The 
opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, 
does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.”300  Justice Kennedy cited the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.301  Likewise, in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas,302 he cited three decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, noting that homosexual conduct was accepted as “an 
integral part of human freedom.”303 
                                                          
 295.  DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, supra note 190, at 969. 
 296.  See supra Part III.B. 
 297.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468–88 (1966). 
 298.  Id. at 486. 
 299.  125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 300.  Id. at 578. 
 301.  Id. at 576. 
 302.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 303.  Id. at 577. 
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The Court’s practice of relying on this persuasive authority to 
bolster its analysis is certainly controversial, with certain justices 
showing more of a willingness to do so.304  Justice O’Connor 
encouraged courts’ continued reliance on foreign and international 
law as a way “to innovate, to experiment, and to find new solutions 
to the new legal problems that arise each day; they offer much from 
which we can learn and benefit.”305  The Court has certainly shown its 
willingness to benefit from these authorities in its prior constitutional 
analysis, and therefore, it should once again look to other nations and 
international law standards to acknowledge food security as a 
fundamental right in this country. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Lawyers and academics should restore efforts to persuade the 
Court that just as the Constitution protects human dignity by allowing 
Americans to marry, to travel, to make private decisions about 
personal issues like contraception, and, if incarcerated, to receive 
adequate health care, so too should all Americans enjoy a right to food 
security.  Today, approximately 17.5 million households in the United 
States live without this very basic necessity, and many of those living 
without food are children.  Certainly, the promises of general welfare, 
ordered liberty, and living with dignity, all of which the Court has 
relied on, are diminished for those who lack sufficient food and 
nutrition.  This Article seeks to reignite the necessary discussion about 
the challenges of a Supreme Court jurisprudence in which human 
dignity requires a right of all to marry but, up until this point, does 
not acknowledge a fundamental right to food security for all. 
                                                          
 304.  See Diane Marie Amann, Cynthia R.L. Fairweather & Vivian Rhoe, Using 
International Law to Defend the Accused, 1 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2000).  See David T. 
Hutt & Lisa K. Parshall, Divergent Views on the Use of International and Foreign Law: 
Congress and the Executive Versus the Court, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 113 (2007). 
 305.  SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW, REFLECTIONS OF A 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (2003) 234–35 (discussing reasons American judges should 
increase their reliance on foreign and international law). 
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[201] 
Police Terror and Officer Indemnification 
ALLYSSA VILLANUEVA* 
Introduction 
On May 6, 2012, Oakland Police Officers Miguel Masso and 
Joseph Fesmire initiated a stop of Alan Bluford and two friends in 
Oakland, CA.1  The facts are disputed but the altercation escalated 
resulting in Bluford sustaining three fatal gunshot wounds from 
Officer Masso.2  Bluford was an 18-year-old high school senior.3  No 
weapons were found on Bluford and witnesses stated he was not a 
threat to anyone around.4  In July of 2012, Bluford’s mother filed suit 
in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her 
son’s civil rights against the Oakland Police Department and the 
individual officers involved.5  In June of 2014, the case settled with an 
award agreement in the amount of $110,000 to Bluford’s family and 
was approved by the Oakland City Council.6 
These homicides are portrayed as aberrations from routine 
 
 * J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 
2016.  Thank you to U.C. Hastings Professor Osagie Obasogie and to the Hastings Race 
and Poverty Law Journal.  
1.  Bluford v. City of Oakland, No. 12-CV-0379-WHO, 2014 WL939939, at *1 
 *N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Alan Bluford FAQ, JUSTICE4ALANBLUEFORD.ORG (Nov. 12, 2012), http://justice4
alanblueford.org/2012/11/12/alan-blueford-faq/. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Complaint for Damages for Violations of Civil Rights and Wrongful Death, 
Bluford v. City of Oakland, No. C12-03791 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2012). 
6.  Family of Teen Killed by Oakland Police Receives $110k Settlement, ABC 7 NEWS 
(June 4, 2014), http://abc7news.com/news/family-of-teen-killed-by-oakland-police-
receives-$110k-settlement/94178/. 
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policing and as rare “accidents.”7  However, this atomized focus 
on each single event transforms them into a spectacle and it is the 
job of the spectacular to draw attention away from the banality of 
police murder as standard operating procedure.8  The 
spectacularized event of murder by police is actually routine.9  Police 
power is unique because it is the government’s central grant of 
authority to use physical repression and violence against citizens.10  
This includes implied power over life and death.11  Police actions must 
be reviewed because a unique aspect of their power is the ability to 
use lethal force against unarmed citizens.12  Even if there were no 
demonstrable pattern of police malpractice, the experience of 
American history suggests that safeguards must be constructed 
against any grant of state power as large as that given to the police.13 
Critical Race Theory (“CRT”) was founded as a critique of the 
law as an institution complicit in the creation and sustenance of 
racism, discrimination, and other forms of societal inequality.14  
This Note offers a critique of indemnification law specifically, and 
§ 1983 generally, as the main civil cause of action for homicides 
committed by police in the line of duty.  Furthermore, CRT 
provides an analytical framework to assess the current economy of 
 
7.  Steve Martinot & Jared Sexton, The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy, 9 SOCIAL 
IDENTITIES: J. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE, NATION, & CULTURE 2, 6 (2003). 
8.  Id. 
9.  Reported data shows that officers have killed 600-800 people every year in the 
past decade, which suggests a routine, if not daily, occurrence.  ANDREA M. BURCH, 
2003-2009 Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ARREST-RELATED DEATHS 4 at 
T1 (2011). 
10.  Government police power is the general power to infringe on individual 
liberty to serve the public welfare.  See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 
(1962).  
11.  ZENITH GROSS, POLICE POWER AND CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR AN 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD 4 (ACLU ed., 1966); Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 
PUBLIC CULTURE 11, 11 (Translated by Libby Mientjes, 2003). 
12.  Id. at 4. 
13.  Id. at 14. 
14. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii-
xiv (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995). 
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police violence, its historical trajectory, and legal structuring 
through a racial lens. 
Before attending law school, I completed an undergraduate 
honors thesis entitled “Police Terror and Anti-Black Genocide in the 
United States.”15  That thesis examined the issue of officer-involved 
homicides through a Black Studies and Ethnic Studies framework.  
The scope of this Note is limited to lethal police violence as it becomes 
subject to § 1983 litigation through a Critical Race Theory lens.  The 
Note focuses specifically on § 1983 civil suits and the doctrine of 
indemnification; it will not include any discussion of potential 
criminal liability or nonlethal forms of police use of force. 
Often, the only direct consequences for officers comes internally 
from their department or the locality they serve.16  These commonly 
include: paid administrative leave, work suspension, negative reports 
in their file, job transfer, and other disciplinary measures.  Many civil 
rights laws rely heavily on the assumption that police officers pay 
judgments and settlements out of their own pockets.17  However, most 
officers do not.18  The court’s jurisprudence prohibiting municipal 
liability for punitive damages was designed to protect taxpayers from 
bearing the costs of officer misconduct.19  However, recent studies 
reveal that taxpayers almost always satisfy both compensatory and 
punitive damage awards assessed against their sworn servants.20  This 
cost shifting effectively undercuts any liability potentially imposed on 
 
15.  Allyssa Villanueva, Police Terror and Anti-Black Genocide in the United 
States (June 13, 2012) (unpublished B.A. honors thesis, U.C. San Diego) (on file with 
the Ethnic Studies Department, U.C. San Diego). 
16.  There is no comprehensive tracking of discipline and punishment rates of 
officers who use excessive force.  This is due in part to the lack of mandated reporting 
and to the fact that many aspects of personnel decisions are not available for public 
disclosure.  For officers’ thoughts and experiences with discipline, see DAVID 
WEISBURD ET AL., THE POLICE FOUNDATION, “THE ABUSE OF POLICE AUTHORITY: 
NATIONAL STUDY OF POLICE OFFICERS’ ATTITUDES” loc. 31 (2001) (online report) http://
www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Weisburd-et-al.-2001-The-
Abuse-of-Police-Authority.pdf. 
17.  Joanna Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 887 (2014). 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. at 888. 
20.  Id. at 890. 
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an individual officer through court judgment. 
To address this practice, which fails to serve the goal of 
deterrence of lethal police misconduct, I propose excluding public 
monetary awards resulting from officer-involved homicides from 
indemnification coverage so that officers will bear sole responsibility.  
Individual liability is a necessary component in the regime of police 
reform to increase officer accountability and to decrease the number 
of officer-involved homicides of unarmed civilians each year. 
I will first discuss the current problems of lethal police violence.  
I then discuss the doctrine of indemnification.  I will then center my 
discussion on civil suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and how the 
doctrine of indemnification, as applied, undermines the goals of the 
statute as well as the goal of deterring lethal police violence, which is 
my primary concern.  I conclude by proposing my own solutions 
directed at local governments. 
 
I. Overview of the Problem of Officer-Involved 
 Homicides in the United States 
 
A central hurdle to defining the problem of officer-involved 
homicides is the lack of national and uniform reporting requirements.  
Departments currently participate in federal reporting programs on a 
voluntary basis.21  Therefore, no one knows exactly how many people 
die each year at the hands of law enforcement.  Reporting mandates 
are a key component to federal police reform.22 
The United States (U.S.) Department of Justice publishes reports 
on arrest-related deaths nation-wide.23  In the Department’s most 
recent report of data from 2003 to 2009, homicide by law enforcement 
was the leading cause of arrest-related death and increased by eight 
 
21.  Reporting mandates may accompany consent decrees resulting from 
Department of Justice investigations of unconstitutional “pattern and practices.”  42 
U.S.C. § 14141 (1994). 
22.  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, INTERIM REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 8 (2015). 
23.  BURCH, supra note 9, at Fig. 1. 
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percent over the course of the reporting period.24  Regardless of the 
manner of death, 4,813 people died in the course of arrest during this 
period.25  Local governments are uniquely positioned to address this 
problem as 73.3 percent of arrest-related deaths reported to the federal 
government from 2003-2009 involved local police departments.26 
 
 A.  Officer-Involved Homicides Are a Manifestation of  
       Racism. 
 
Nationally, communities have organized protests, educational 
events, media blackouts, and occupations to demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction with officer-involved homicides and the lack of 
remedies, consequences, or meaningful reform.27  The existing data 
also support the public’s charges of racial inequality in arrest and 
arrest-related deaths.28  The existence of racial category in the federal 
government’s reports presupposes a racial dynamic in the tactic of 
police lethal violence.29  Racism is the ordinary means through which 
dehumanization achieves ideological normality and it is through the 
practice of dehumanizing people that produces a racial category.30  
Regardless of intent, our national policing structure results in the 
disproportionate victimization and risk of death to civilians based 
on race. 
 
24.  Id. 
25.  BURCH, supra note 9, at T1. 
26.  Id. at T17. 
27. See, e.g., Kenrya Rankin Naasel, RECAP: From #BlackLivesMatter to 
#RiseUpOctober, a Day of Protest, COLORLINES (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:51 PM) http://
www.colorlines.com/articles/recap-blacklivesmatter-riseupoctober-day-protest; 
David Nakamura & Hamil Harris, 20 Years After the Million Man March, a Fresh Call 
for Justice on the Mall, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/20-years-after-the-million-man-march-a-fresh-call-for-justice-on-the-mall/ 
2015/10/10/b3d8ffca-6f66-11e5-b31c-d80d62b53e28_story.html. 
28.  BURCH, supra note 9, at T3 (disaggregating statistics by racial categories, 
including “White, non-Hispanic;” “Black non-Hispanic,” “Hispanic,” “Other,” 
“Unknown”). 
29.  Id.  
30.  RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, AND OPPOSITION IN 
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 243 (2007). 
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Overall, 27.8 percent of all arrests were Black people yet thirty-
one percent of the reported deaths related to arrest were Black 
victims.31  Between 2003 and 2009, 1,529 Black victims were killed during 
arrests, which amounts to about one Black person per day, giving rise to 
the popularized slogan that a Black person is killed every twenty-eight 
hours by state or local law enforcement personnel in the U.S.32  During 
the time period of this study, the national Black population was 
reportedly under thirteen percent.33  Every historical study of police use 
of fatal force has found that persons of color (principally Black males) are 
a disproportionately high percentage of the persons shot by police 
compared to their representation in the general population.34  If the 
number of Black people killed annually by law enforcement personnel is 
not alarming enough, consider the total number of victims, irrespective 
of race and/or gender.35  Black people are more likely to be killed by 
police now than they were fifty years ago.36 
 
 
31.  BURCH, supra note 9, at T3. 
32.  BURCH, supra note 9.  
33.  JESSE MCKINNON, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000, 1 (2001).  It is also important 
to note that California is the leading state in arrest-related deaths, with 775 total 
reported deaths over the six-year period.  See BURCH, supra note 9. 
34.  Hubert G. Locke, The Color of Law and the Issue of Color: Race and the Abuse of 
Police Power, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF 
FORCE 129, 135 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996). 
35.  Citizen-generated databases estimated that 1,029 people were killed by law 
enforcement in 2014.  See Jay Syrmopoulus, Citizen Run Database Show over 1,000 People 
Killed by Cops in 2014, FREE THOUGHT PROJECT (Dec. 10, 2014), http://thefreethought
project.com/data-shows-1000-people-killed-cops-2014/.  The last report released by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics totaled 4,813 deaths in custody or during attempted 
arrests from 2003-2009.  See More than 4,800 Arrest-Related Deaths Reported from 2003 to 
2009, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Nov. 17, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/press/ard0309stpr.cfm. 
36.  Recent data estimates that police killed 238 Black people in 2014.  See Tony 
Ortega, Black Americans Killed by Police in 2014 Outnumbered Those Who Died on 9/11, 
RAW STORY (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/2015/04/black-
americans-killed-by-police-in-2014-outnumbered-those-who-died-on-911/. 
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 B.  Racism Manifested in Officer-Involved Homicides is 
       Historical. 
 
Although heightened attention to systemic police violence is 
recent, the practice is historical.  Gerald Robin’s study remarked that 
throughout several past sociological studies, “Regardless of the index 
used, then, the Negro’s tendency to be a subject of police slayings is 
excessive [noting that] for a nation as a whole the ratio of Negro to 
white rates of the victim-offender was 7 to 1, respectively.”37  A study 
conducted in Philadelphia from 1950 to 1960 found that 87.5 percent 
of the victims of homicides by police were Black while the current 
population of the city was only twenty-two percent Black.38 
In a subsequent study produced in 1974, research determined that 
the death rate for Blacks was found to be consistently nine times higher 
than for whites for the entire period of 1950-1968 in his study of police 
killings of “unarmed” civilians.39  This study suggested that the rise in 
Black victims of homicide by police is attributable to the rise in Black 
militancy and political struggle during the time period.40  One year 
later, an article on police killings in the U.S. from 1965 to 1969 based 
on the National Vital Statistics systems report combined this previous 
data and determined that Black people were killed by the police at a 
rate thirteen times higher than for whites and not the nine to ten times 
previously reported.41  The report also offered details that thirty 
percent of the civilians killed from 1965 to 1969 were not involved in 
criminal activity.  This is confirmed by a report released by the Police 
Foundation, which reveals that as many as forty percent of civilians 
killed by the police were not involved in serious criminal conduct.42  
These studies provide evidence of a history of racist and anti-Black 
 
37.  Gerald Robin, Justifiable Homicide by Police Officers, 54 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 223, 226 (Summer 1963). 
38.  Id. at 2. 
39.  Sid Harring, Tony Platt, Richard Speiglman & Paul Takagi, The Management 
of Police Killings, 8 CRIME & SOC. JUSTICE 34, 34 (1977). 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. at 36. 
42.  Id. at 39.  The Police Foundation’s mission is to advance policing through 
innovation and science.  Id.  
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policing practices in the U.S.  The ratio has increased between Black 
and white victims even while the Black American population has 
declined.43 
 C.  Officers Enjoy a Unique Level of Impunity. 
 
The police continue to kill civilians.  Officer impunity adds insult 
to injury.  Though officer-involved homicides are a daily occurrence, 
criminal prosecutions of police officers for misconduct in the line of 
duty are exceedingly rare.44  Police officers have been indicted in every 
region of the U.S. for acting under the color of law, unlawfully 
shooting the victim, and taking away his or her constitutional right 
not to be deprived of life and liberty without due process of law.  
However, federal indictments do not mean that justice has been 
obtained because all too often the police officers involved are found 
not guilty.  From 2009 to 2011, 2,716 officers throughout the U.S. faced 
allegations of excessive force.45  Of those 2,716 officers, only twenty-
eight were charged with a crime and fourteen were convicted which 
is only a 0.5 percent conviction rate.46  As evidence of historical trend, 
180 out of 228 officers indicted by the federal government between 
1971 and 1975 were acquitted.47 
These data reveal a continued pattern of protection and 
justification for officers who kill.  Impunity itself is troubling but 
becomes intolerable when data and other evidence indicate that 
 
43.  The Black U.S. population was 13.2 percent in 2012.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
THE BLACK ALONE POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012 (May 2, 2015), 
http://www.census.gov/population/race/data/ppl-ba12.html.  The same year, there 
were 313 reported extrajudicial killings of Black people, amounting to one Black 
person killed every twenty-eight hours.  ARLENE EISEN, OPERATION GHETTO STORM: 
2012 ANNUAL REPORT ON EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OF 313 BLACK PEOPLE BY POLICE, 
SECURITY GUARDS AND VIGILANTES 12 (2014), http://www.operationghettostorm.org/
uploads/1/9/1/1/19110795/new_all_14_11_04.pdf. 
44.  Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 152 (1998). 
45.  David Packman, The Problem with Prosecuting Police in Washington State, 
NAT’L POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT (Feb. 21, 2011, 12:55 AM), http://www.
policemisconduct.net/the-problem-with-prosecuting-police-in-washington-state/. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Harring et al., supra note 39, at 40. 
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officer-involved homicides are also informed by systemic racism.48  
Though they occur at different times and places, these homicides are 
similar to the extent that they are premised on the logic of anti-Black 
racism.49 
Furthermore, victims cannot defer to the existing structure of 
criminal justice when the alleged perpetrator of illegal behavior is an 
officer of the law.  Even though police officers are employees of the 
local or state government, victims’ families must turn to these same 
structures to seek justice.  This triggers distrust in the legal system, 
which is exacerbated when there are seemingly no consequences for 
officers who are responsible for the death of an unarmed civilian.  
These notions of the state as the arbiter of justice and the police as the 
unaccountable arbiters of lethal violence are two sides of the same 
coin.50 
 
II.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its Application to Local and 
  State Governments and Individual Police Officers 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the most commonly used civil cause of action 
to remedy homicides caused by police officers, therefore, it follows 
that indemnification also occurs in cases alleging unconstitutional 
conduct under § 1983 against law enforcement personnel.51  
Indemnification protects police officers from individual liability for 
monetary judgments entered against them and ensures that a 
prevailing plaintiff can collect their court-ordered judgment.52 
 
48.  Locke, supra note 34, at 137.  Hubert Locke’s research on race and police 
violence concludes that officers are more likely to use reasonable force against Blacks 
which increases the likelihood that such officers will adopt an aggressive or hostile 
approach to Black suspects but not white suspects. 
49.  Villanueva, supra note 15, at 40.  
50.  Martinot & Sexton, supra note 7, at 2. 
51.  Martin Schwartz, Should Juries be Informed that Municipality Will Indemnify 
Officer’s § 1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1211 
(2001). 
52.  Id. 
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The Court’s jurisprudence of § 1983 has developed as tort law.53  
Therefore, tort principles determine available remedies, which 
include compensatory, punitive, and exemplary damages.  
Compensatory damages are strictly provided to compensate the 
prevailing party for the injury suffered, thus these awards must 
correlate with the actual harm to the aggrieved party.54  On the 
contrary, punitive damages are awarded as retribution and 
deterrence of the offending party’s unlawful actions.55  Smith v. Wade 
held that the threshold showing for awarding punitive damages in § 
1983 cases requires that defendants be motivated by “evil motive or 
intent” or show “reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others.”56  The amounts awarded for punitive 
damages are left to the discretion of the jury or fact finder.57  
Exemplary damages are awarded when a defendant’s behavior 
results from an “evil state of mind” including recklessness or spite.58  
Exemplary damages differ from punitive awards in that they may also 
serve compensatory functions.59 
States and municipalities throughout the country frequently 
indemnify police officers to protect them from personal liability for 
monetary awards.  States such as California mandate that public 
entities defend their employees in suit and pay any “judgments, 
compromises, or settlements agreed to in the process.”60  A 2014 study 
found that approximately 9,225 civil rights cases were resolved with 
payments to plaintiffs between 2006 and 2011 in the forty-four largest 
police jurisdictions in the country.61  Of those cases, officers financially 
contributed to settlements or judgments in approximately 0.41 
 
53.  Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983). 
54.  James R. Mckown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and Developments, 14 REV. 
LITIG. 419, 422–23 (1995). 
55.  Id. 
56.  Smith, 461 U.S. at 56. 
57.  Id. at 54. 
58.  Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 517 (1957). 
59.  Id. at 520–21. 
60.  See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a) (1995). 
61.  Schwartz, supra note 17, at 912–13. 
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percent of the cases and only 0.02 percent of the total dollars paid.62  
Furthermore, no officer paid any portion of a punitive damage award 
assessed against him or her.63  A subsequent study of police 
misconduct suits confirmed that no City of Oakland police officer has 
paid settlement costs in civil rights-related cases since 1990.64  The 
information collected further evinces that the largest police 
departments in the country each paid, on average, upwards of $20 
million in settlements from 2006 to 2010.65  Indemnification shifts 
these costs from the individual officers and their respective police 
departments to cities and their resident taxpayers.  Indemnification 
thus operates to make citizens, including the victims, pay the costs of 
lethal police misconduct. 
Municipalities are specifically subject to § 1983 suits whereas the 
Eleventh Amendment gives states immunity against such suits and 
any resulting damages.66  Municipalities often indemnify officers for 
compensatory damages under § 1983.  State indemnification statutes 
regarding punitive and exemplary damages commonly require that 
the employee must (1) have acted within the scope of employment, (2) 
not have engaged in intentional, reckless, or malicious wrongdoing, 
and (3) be in the best interest of the public entity.67  All three factors 
are weighed under the “sole discretion” of the government or public 
entity.68 
Municipalities, specifically, are immune from being assessed 
punitive damages in § 1983 suits.69  However, Smith held that officers 
may be sued in their individual capacity and assessed punitive 
 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 916. 
64.  Abraham Hyatt, Oakland Spent $74 Million Settling 417 Police Brutality 
Lawsuits, OAKLAND POLICE BEAT (Apr. 9, 2014), http://oaklandpolicebeat.com/2014/04/
oakland-spent-74-million-settling-417-police-brutality-lawsuits/; JOHN L. BURRIS, 
BLUE VS. BLACK: LET’S END THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COPS AND MINORITIES 22–23 (1999). 
65.  Schwartz, supra note 17, at 912–13.  
66.  Id. at 1214; U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
67.  Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1217; see, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b). 
68.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b). 
69.  Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). 
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damages.70  In practice, municipalities pay the cost of punitive 
damages.  However, the threshold findings required to award 
punitive damages should make an officer ineligible for 
indemnification.  A municipality’s obligation to indemnify an officer 
for punitive damages does not make the municipality the real party 
in interest, and thus does not violate the holding in Newport71 that 
municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983.72  
This precedent leaves municipalities responsible for damage awards 
that may rest primarily on punishment of the officer and not on 
compensation for the plaintiff.  Furthermore, evidence that the 
municipality may indemnify the defendant is not admissible at trial.73  
In general, federal courts exclude this information from the jury just 
as liability insurance is excluded in tort cases.74  State courts have not 
resolved whether a jury should be informed of this fact.75 
The two prominent justifications in favor of officer 
indemnification are (1) that officers will be deterred from performing 
their jobs and (2) indemnification ensures that the plaintiff will be 
made whole.  To the first claim, there is no factual basis to assert that 
law enforcement will be chilled if officers are not indemnified since 
no municipality has implemented a reform to deny indemnification 
of their officers in lawsuits for lethal use of force against unarmed 
civilians.  Though this may be a legitimate concern, studies show that 
officers rarely pay any out-of-pocket costs for their defense or to 
satisfy awards assessed against them.76  Many states require 
governments to provide officers with legal representation to defend 
claims arising from conduct or omission within the scope of officers’ 
employment, regardless of whether the department ultimately 
 
70.  Smith, 461 U.S. at 35. 
71.  Newport, 453 U.S. at 271. 
72.  Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1220; see also Cornwell v. Riverside, 896 F.2d 398 
(1990); Bell v. Milwaukee, 536 F. Supp. 462 (1982). 
73.  Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1220. 
74.  Id. at 1229–30. 
75.  Id. at 1212. 
76.  Schwartz, supra note 17, at 890. 
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indemnifies the officer.77  Available evidence indicates that law 
enforcement officers are almost always provided with defense 
counsel paid by municipalities when they are sued.78  Finally, 
refusing to perform one’s job without indemnification presupposes 
conduct that warrants litigation.  This is a reasonable expectation for 
law enforcement occupations.  However, it becomes unreasonable to 
expect indemnification in the context of litigation regarding conduct 
that rises to the level of evil that warrants punitive damages. 
The second justification that plaintiffs will not be made whole is 
the most compelling.  Yet even this justification is not wholly merited, 
for at least two reasons.  First, a plaintiff who has lost a relative due to 
an officer-involved homicide can never be made truly “whole” in the 
tortious sense, or be put back into the same position they were in 
before the incident, because the victim is deceased.  On this ground, 
the tort of wrongful death is more egregious than lesser degrees of 
injury cognizable under tort law yet offers the same remedies.  
Second, police are government agents, funded through public dollars, 
and controlled by local and state governments.  The public should all 
be uncomfortable allowing state agents whose primary mission is to 
“protect and serve” and enforce the law to commit arguably the most 
heinous crime—homicide—with no direct personal or financial 
liability. 
The California Supreme Court addressed both arguments in its 1976 
holding, in Williams v. Horvath, that state indemnification applies to 
officer defendants in § 1983 federal suits.79  The court expressly rejected 
the argument that indemnification deprives plaintiffs of their rights to 
full relief, because this would mean that governments are never liable for 
their employees’ conduct, and would actually limit plaintiffs’ recovery.80  
The Court comments, “[I]t may be argued that to permit indemnification 
would remove an effective deterrent to illegal police conduct—the 
potential of personal liability.  But in truly egregious cases the 
 
77.  Id; see, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 825(a) (1995). 
78.  Id. at 915.  Officer defendants are usually represented by a city attorney or 
county counsel. 
79.  16 Cal.3d. 834, 836 (1976). 
80.  Id. at 845. 
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indemnification statutes expressly forbid reimbursement by the 
entity.”81  Government indemnification or constructive indemnification 
by police unions and foundations show the opposite of this theory: near 
complete indemnification no matter the alleged conduct or judgment.  
Local governments assume entire liability for defense and fulfillment of 
awards with no responsibility resting on the individual officer whose 
conduct is the impetus of the suit. 
III.  The Legislative and Judicial History of 42 U.S.C. § 
  1983 and its Application 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 makes it unlawful for any person, under color of 
law, to deprive any citizen of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the U.S. Constitution and federal and state law.82  Section 
1983 does not confer substantive rights to potential plaintiffs, but 
creates a cause of action to vindicate rights found either in the U.S. 
Constitution or federal statute.83  Section 1983 was originally enacted 
as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” to provide a remedy for civil rights 
violations inflicted by anyone acting “under the color of law.”84  
Section 1983 was passed in response to voluminous reports of Ku 
Klux Klan (“KKK”) violence and the inability of local governments to 
address it.85  Nonenforcement of the law on the state and local level 
was the main problem identified by Congress at the time of the Act’s 
passage.86  The Act was passed with the larger purpose of ensuring 
that lower governments would enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Congressman Lowe of Kansas 
expressed at the time that: 
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while 
 
81.  Id. at 848.  
82.  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Act Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13) (also referred 
to as “Enforcement Act of 1871,” “Third enforcement Act,” or “Third Klu Klux Klan 
Act”). 
85.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).  
86.  Id.  
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whippings, lynching and banishing have been visited 
upon unoffending American citizens, the local 
administrators have been found inadequate or unwilling 
to apply the proper corrective measures.  Combinations, 
darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, 
wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone 
unwhipped of justice.  Immunity is given to crime and the 
records of public tribunals are searched in vain for any 
evidence of effective redress.87 
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the specific 
question of whether police officers are equally subject to § 1983 suits 
in Monroe v. Pape.88  In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that thirteen 
Chicago police officers broke into their home without a search or 
arrest warrant, made all the residents stand naked in their living 
room, ransacked their belongings, detained Plaintiff Monroe for 
questioning for ten hours without access to an attorney, then released 
Monroe with no charges.89  The Court held that acting “under color 
of” the law is interpreted as a misuse of power, possessed by virtue of 
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed 
with the authority of state law.90  Since the Monroe decision held that 
police are certainly subject to suits under this provision, § 1983 suits 
have increased.91 
Subsequently, Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of 
New York, addressed whether a municipality can be the subject of suit 
under § 1983.92  The Monell Court overruled the portion of Monroe that 
held that local governments are completely immune from suit under 
§ 1983.93  The Court held that local governments and officials can be 
 
87.  Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., 374 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe) (quoted 
in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985)). 
88.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174. 
89.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169. 
90.  Id. at 184.  
91.  Sheldon H. Nahmad, Personal Viewpoint: The Mounting Attack on Section 1983 
and the 14th Amendment, 67 A.B.A. J. 1575, 1586 (1981). 
92.  436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978). 
93.  Id. at 658. 
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sued directly under § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations as a 
result of an official policy or custom which results in a “pattern or 
practice” of misconduct.94  Indemnification creates a liability 
relationship that mirrors the tort concept of respondeat superior 
between municipalities and its officers.95  Respondeat superior imposes 
vicarious liability on an employer because of the conduct or omission 
of its employee.96  However, the Supreme Court held in Monell that 
vicarious liability through respondeat superior is inapplicable to § 1983 
suits.97 
The original 1871 Act also included provisions for harsher 
punishment when the underlying charge is a criminal offense 
including larger fines and extended prison sentences.98  In United 
States v. Harris, the Court interpreted these provisions when the State 
brought criminal conspiracy charges against Tennessee Sherriff, R. G. 
Harris, and nineteen others who removed four men from a county jail 
and subsequently beat one man to death.99  The Court held that the 
criminal provisions were unconstitutional because Congress did not 
have constitutional authority to regulate private individuals.100  Harris 
was only recently overturned in United States v. Beebe.101  In Beebe, the 
defendants were indicted under the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 
2009 for conspiracy to commit a federal hate crime and the racially 
motivated harassment and assault of a developmentally disabled 
Navajo minor.102  The Court held that Congress did have authority to 
enact the criminal provisions under the power granted by the 
Thirteenth Amendment and that racially motivated violence is a 
badge and incident of slavery.103  Section 1983 was enacted to 
 
94.  Id. at 659. 
95.  Schwartz, supra note 17, at 889. 
96.  51 A.L.R. Fed. 285 § 2(a) (1981). 
97.  Monell, 436 U.S. at 707. 
98.  Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Act Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). 
99.  U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 629–31 (1883). 
100.  Id. at 640–42. 
101.  807 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (2011). 
102.  Id. at 1047; see also 18 U.S.C. § 249 (Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009). 
103.  Beebe, 807 F. Supp 2d at 1051 & 1056. 
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counteract domestic terrorism and nonenforcement of the law, often 
perpetrated by the same person: law enforcement officers.  
Indemnification, especially in the blanket application we see today, 
undercuts the purpose of § 1983 by circumventing direct liability and 
denying citizens full protection from violence by those “acting under 
color of law.”104 
IV.   Circumvention of the Original Purpose of § 1983 
  Through Officer Indemnification 
 
Our nation has declared racism a problem of the police force 
itself, embedded in police policies and in individual officer 
discretion.105  If police are racist, and racism manifests itself in lethal 
police misconduct, officer indemnification is, in effect, the symbolic 
sanctioning of these attitudes and practices.  Officer-involved 
homicides are an auxiliary constituent of the carceral state, a revised 
practice of lynching with many of the same tenets linking racism, 
criminalization, and domestic terrorism.106 
 
 A.   Officers Involved in Lethal Misconduct Do Not Face 
    Legal Consequences. 
 
As this Note has described, officer-involved homicides 
contribute to our society’s long legacy of state terror and oppression.  
Furthermore, the legal recourse for this violence is inadequate.  
Criminal prosecution of officers is exceedingly rare, and the few that 
are charged rarely result in conviction.107  Civil suits are often the only 
way to impose legal liability on officers following a homicide.  The 
 
104.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174 (discussing the purpose and history of Section 1983 
to redress civil rights violations by law enforcement or failure to enforce the law by 
local law enforcement). 
105.  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 22. 
106.  Terrorism defined as the use of violence and intimidation in pursuit of 
political aims. 
107.  Allyssa Villanueva, Police Terror and Prosecutorial Discretion, (UC 
Hastings College of the Law, working paper, 2015) (on file with author) (providing 
an overview of problems in criminal prosecution of officers and suggested solutions 
for local governments). 
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main justification for indemnification is its supposed benefit to 
plaintiffs by ensuring that the liability of insolvent officers will shift 
to municipalities whom are able to pay monetary awards.108  
However, this reduces the legitimate substantive claims of 
constitutional violations resulting in death to a mere discussion of 
money.  Indemnification contributes to the banality of police terror 
when it has the power to curtail this practice.  Indemnification, as 
applied, shields officer defendants and does nothing to shield citizens 
from the violence that gives rise to § 1983 suits.  This injustice is 
exacerbated by the low rates of criminal prosecution of officers who 
are found to have unlawfully used lethal or excessive force against 
unarmed civilians who posed no threat to them while in the line of 
duty.  Local government involvement to assist with monetary 
remedies diminishes the significance of the violation and the injury to 
the plaintiffs that often includes racism and unjust lethal violence by 
government agents. 
 
B.  The Current Application of Indemnification to § 1983 Suits  
    Does Not Serve the Goal of Deterrence. 
 
The prospect and accumulation of civil suits, unfortunately, may 
not be enough to actually deter officers or encourage governments to 
implement policies that will have such a deterrent effect.  A recent 
study found that the six police departments, constituting thirty-two 
percent of officers in the largest police departments across the 
country, do not gather or analyze information from lawsuits against 
them or their officers in any comprehensive or systematic way.109  This 
information could be used for preventative and remedial measures 
including: early identification of problematic officers with a history of 
 
108.  See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 847 (1976) (holding that 
indemnification does not frustrate purpose of § 1983 but rather furthers the purpose 
by ensuring that Plaintiffs can recover from Defendants and that municipalities can 
be liable). 
109.  Joanna Schwartz, Myth & Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law 
Enforcement Decision-making, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1045 (2010). 
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misconduct or complaints, identification of patterns & trends, and 
investigation of claims made in lawsuits. 
Furthermore, individuals charged under § 1983, who are not 
officers of the law, do not have the benefit of an agency to indemnify 
their awards.  Such defendants must bear the total brunt of the 
liability.  Indemnification creates a more favorable outcome for officer 
defendants compared to civilian defendants for the same violation.  
This “privilege” available to officer defendants is unsettling because 
officers are currently subject to § 1983 more frequently than 
civilians.110  Blanket indemnification results in no legal accountability, 
criminal or civil, to individual officers engaged in misconduct.  There 
are countless examples of officers, chiefs, and other officials who have 
revealed deep-seated racist beliefs and attitudes.111 
 
C.  The Current Law Enforcement Regime is Directly  
    Connected to a Legacy of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. 
 
The KKK is arguably the most well-known domestic terrorist 
organization in the U.S.112  The KKK was directly responsible for the 
systematic perpetration of centuries of racialized domestic terror, 
inflicted upon African Americans, in particular.113  Reports estimate 
that countless police departments across the country actively 
participated in at least fifty percent of documented lynchings in the 
U.S. between 1880 and 1950, and passively condoned a majority of the 
rest.114  An important and ironic dynamic of this history of state-
sponsored violence is the commonly known fact that many KKK 
 
110.  Nahmad, supra note 91. 
111.  See, e.g., Associated Press, 7 San Francisco Officers Suspended over Racist Texts, 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/03/cops-racist-text-sus
pend_n_7001580.html (Apr. 4, 2015, 8:59 AM). 
112.  Extremist Files: Ku Klux Klan, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.
splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan (last visited Oct. 17, 
2015). 
113.  Id. 
114.  Robert A. Gibson, The Negro Holocaust: Lynching and Race Riots in the United 
States, 1800-1950, YALE NEW HAVEN TEACHERS INST. (2015), http://www.yale. 
edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1979/2/79.02.04.x.html.  
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members and participants in these high-profile, coordinated, and 
widely celebrated acts of terrorism were in fact, distinguished 
members of the law enforcement community.  Officers were routinely 
complicit in refusing to charge known KKK terrorists, to vindicate its 
victims, and allowing mobs and terror groups to forcefully take 
victims from police custody.  Concerned citizens and hate-tracking 
organizations, like the Southern Poverty Law Center, have discovered 
officers belonging to the KKK or other hate groups that conflict with 
the mission of police departments.115  Most police departments do not 
currently screen officers for hate group affiliation.116  These facts 
intensify the demand for equal policing that is free of racism and 
discrimination. 
For a nation-state like the U.S., sovereignty means the capacity to 
define who matters and who dies.117  In a local context, police are 
given that power of discretion.  Licensed by law, the mere capacity of 
the police for vicious and “irrational” violence is an important part of 
the state’s repressive apparatus, regardless of statistical frequency.118  
The willingness of the police to kill people exerts a control power far 
beyond any statistical measure of the actual incidence of police 
killings.119  Even with statistical measure, victims are unequal along 
racial lines. 
 
V.   Proposed Reform at the Local Government Level to  
 Deter Lethal Use of Force 
 
The objectives of this proposed reform are deterrence and 
 
115.  Allie Jones, This Florida Police Department Can’t Stop Hiring KKK Members, 
GAWKER (July 14, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://gawker.com/two-alleged-kkk-members-fired-
from-florida-police-depar-1604795204.  
116.  Renee Lewis, No Police Screening for KKK, Hate Group Membership, Florida 
Case Shows, AL JAZEERA (July 15, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://america.aljazeera.
com/articles/2014/7/14/kkk-florida-police.html. 
117.  Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUB. CULTURE 11, 11 (Translated by Libby 
Mientjes, 2003). 
118.  Harring, et al., supra note 39, at 42. 
119.  Id.  
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punishment.  At the least, municipal governments should not 
indemnify punitive awards based on officer misconduct, because the 
awards are based solely on findings of egregious misconduct and 
imposed for the purpose of punishment, not compensation.  Complete 
non-indemnification of officers in any suit resulting from lethal 
misconduct (as opposed to nonlethal) is needed from employing 
agencies to deter lethal use of force policies and practice.  A strict policy 
will force officers to not just think about the potential of civil suit but 
also the possibility of personal liability for monetary awards. 
Prosecutorial discretion and internal investigations following 
officer-involved homicides demonstrate an unwillingness to 
criminally charge officers causing current national controversy.  As 
discussed in Part IV, arguments that without indemnification people 
will not become officers or that officers cannot perform their jobs are 
unpersuasive.  Furthermore, direct personal liability for civil awards 
puts an extreme financial burden on the officer(s) based on the fact 
that awards can reach millions of dollars.  It is unlikely that officers 
will bear the burden alone.  Police culture has created an ironclad 
system of moral, political, and financial support from police unions, 
foundations, and the larger American public.120  Many of these 
organizations use their power to fund attorneys and support 
campaigns for officers.  The National Police Misconduct Statistics and 
Reporting Project estimates that civil litigation related to police 
misconduct cost $72 billion in 2009 alone.121  Simple exposure to civil 
liability requires minimal reform effort with a potential for high 
societal impact.  Local governments should not be in the business of 
indemnifying punitive awards by definition of the degree of conduct 
required to warrant punitive damages.  Furthermore, local 
governments can use their statutory discretion to refuse to indemnify 
 
120.  See, e.g., online fundraising campaigns for Officer Darren Wilson who was 
acquitted by a jury at trial for death of 18-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri; Carolyn M. Brown, Over $500,000 in Crowd Funding Raised for Ferguson Officer 
Darren Wilson, BLACK ENTER. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.blackenterprise.com/news/
over-500000-raised-for-ferguson-officer-darren-wilson-before-sites-shut-down/. 
121.  National Police Misconduct Statistics and Reporting Project, 2009 Quarterly Q2 
Report, CATO INST., http://www.policemisconduct.net/statistics/quarterly-q2-2009/ 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
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officers in the specific class of cases involving the use of lethal force. 
In the narrow case of officer-involved homicides, civil law 
reduces the violation to a mere tort that seeks to compensate victims 
and their families, rather than punish or deter the defendant.  This 
effectively devalues citizens’ lives; a value that is not even paid by the 
officer(s) responsible.  Personal liability will strengthen deterrence.  
Deterrence is furthered by the threat of contempt of court proceedings 
if an officer refuses to pay a civil award.  While state laws differ, 
contempt of court generally refers to the disobedience of any lawful 
judgment or order of the court.122  The penalties for contempt of court 
vary and may include: jail time, community service, fines, and 
attorney fees.123  Direct liability for civil damages may lead to other 
punitive measures if officers fail to take responsibility under court 
order. 
When police and their supporters feel the true weight of the 
millions of dollars that are assessed in damages and settlements each 
year against municipalities for lethal officer misconduct, they might 
re-consider their position on the issue.  Officers will certainly 
consider whether their discretion to use lethal force in the field is 
worth the risk to their personal finances with knowledge that their 
City will not indemnify them in suit.  This shift of thinking from “Can 
I use lethal force?” to “Should I use lethal force?” will save countless 
lives.  Cities will also have more money available to fund any number 
of other critical expenditures.  It is true that non-indemnification will 
leave some successful plaintiffs without payment or delayed 
payment.  Arguments for liability that turn on compensation shift the 
focus away from the structural issue of officer-involved homicides to 
monetary awards and a party’s ability to pay.  Individual victim 
compensation does not address the structural problems of policing 
that this Note intends to address. 
Indemnification effectively circumvents individual liability that 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to impose.  Victims are left without the 
 
122.  See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1209(a); La. Code of Civ. Proc. § 221 et seq.; 
N.Y. Code § 2308; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571–81. 
123.  17 C.J.S. Contempt § 5 (2015).  
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legal right to life and liberty, and their families are left without an 
institution to provide them with justice.  The law, clothed in the ethic 
of impunity, is simply contingent on the repetition of its own 
violence.124  The least that local governments can do to remedy the 
historical trajectory of racist and anti-Black state violence is not 
indemnify its officers in cases involving homicide, especially when a 
court finds the officer’s misconduct is as egregious or evil as to meet 
the higher standard required for punitive damages. 
Each officer should be held individually liable for such civil 
awards.  States such as California grant sole discretion to the public 
agency of whether to fulfill punitive or exemplary damages.125  
Furthermore, all states have an exemption for memorandum of 
understandings (“MOUs”).126  The terms of an MOU are bargained 
for between the police union and the municipality.  These are a few 
of the opportunities for municipalities to limit their liability to satisfy 
awards based on officer misconduct. 
Conclusion 
American society does not yet function as an idyllic state in 
which all vestiges of racism, oppression, and malicious deprivation 
of constitutional rights have been eliminated.127  When police kill, the 
shock of the violence and the weight of the resulting awards are 
absorbed by local governments and their taxpayers.  However, it is 
the local governments who are generally empowered to impose 
direct consequences on their officers and best situated to address the 
problems raised in this Note. 
The individual officers who are the perpetrators of lethal 
violence and defendants in subsequent suits face no personal stake in 
the current regime of civil legal remedies.  Criminal liability is even 
more of a rarity imposed on individual officers.  Racism exists at the 
individual, interpersonal, and structural levels of society.  No form 
 
124.  Martinot & Sexton, supra note 7, at 8. 
125.  See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 825(b) (1995). 
126.  See supra Part I.C. for an in-depth discussion of officer impunity.  
127.  Williams, 16 Cal. 3d at 841. 
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of jurisprudence, civil or criminal, has been successful in imposing 
individual accountability for the citizen’s life prematurely ended by 
police violence.  Current remedies and suggested policy reforms are 
consistently structural.  Reform must be instated at every level and 
indemnification limitations must be aimed at the individual and 
interpersonal level of this systemic violence. 
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